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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-024

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NATO: Solana Interviewed on Central Europe Expansion

AU0202144996 Prague PRAVO in Czech 31 Jan 96 p 6

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Helena Landovska in Brussels; date not given: "Solana: At the End of the Year, We Will Assess Talks With NATO-Membership Hopefuls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new secretary general of the North Atlantic Alliance, only six weeks in office, wants, according to his own words, to complete the work of his predecessors.

On the basis of the December decision of the NATO Council, this year is to be a period of intensive dialogue with the countries wishing to join the alliance. The visit of Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec to Brussels and his meeting with Solana are considered at NATO headquarters to be a part of this dialogue. On this occasion, the NATO secretary general granted an interview for PRAVO, Czech Television, and CTK.

[Landovska] In your opinion, how realistic is the expectation of the Central European countries that the starting date of the talks on expansion will be set by the end of 1996?

[Solana] We have reached the second stage of the process, in which we want to intensify the dialogue with partner countries. It will last throughout 1996. As the Council decided, we will evaluate the situation with each country separately at the end of the year.

[Landovska] Will the participation of the Czech Republic in joint operations of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia in some way affect the process of expansion?

[Solana] Very favorably so. It is the most important operation we have been executing jointly. The operation brings peace to Bosnia, but I believe it has a more profound meaning. It is led by NATO, but even NATO nonmembers, be they membership candidates or not, are taking part. They all are in the field together, and that is an important stage for mutual understanding and the formation of the European security structure. We ascribe great significance, pivotal for future stability in Europe, to the success of the international forces in the attempt to save Bosnia.

[Landovska] Can the joint operation accelerate the expansion process?

[Solana] I would not link the two issues. One must think conceptually. If the operation succeeds, however, its implementation will have to be analyzed and conclusions drawn and applied in future cooperation.

[Landovska] How does NATO imagine financing of the planned joint operations with partner countries, including join exercises?

[Solana] It is a matter of agreement between NATO and the individual countries.

[Landovska] What specific steps do you expect from the Czech Republic?

[Solana] We expect, above all, that we get to know each other better in all aspects in the intensive dialogue this year so we can assess everything in December and decide which countries can be considered for NATO expansion.

[Landovska] Will the relatively advanced countries like the Czech Republic benefit from the intensive dialogue?

[Solana] I believe so. It is a country that wants to join NATO. Therefore, it must pass through certain stages. It is a two-way process. First, the country must conform its structure to that of the alliance, and NATO, on the other side, must prepare to admit new members, and that is precisely what is being clarified in the dialogue. After all, it is analogous to the process of EU expansion.

[Landovska] What other shortcomings do the membership hopefuls have?

[Solana] Their weakness is in the ability to consistently conform themselves in both organization and equipment. I am emphasizing here that it is a matter of integration into a military alliance and not admission to some club.

[Landovska] Are the Czech military officials aware of this opinion?

[Solana] We have discussed it many times. Moreover, the Czech Republic already has close relations with NATO, it signed the Partnership for Peace, and we cooperate in peacekeeping forces. There are numerous opportunities for an exchange of opinion.

Albania: Serreqi: EU Orientation 'Absolute Priority'

AU0402172196 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Feb 96

[Interview with Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi by Bujar Muharremi in Tirana; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Muharremi] Mr. Minister, you have just returned from a visit you recently paid to Brussels. You held meetings with Mrs. Agnelli and European Union [EU] Foreign Commissioner Mr. Han van der Broek. Please, what was the topic of these meetings?

[Serreqi] First, I would like to stress that this visit to Brussels was made within the framework of regular political dialogue. A country that has signed an agreement with the EU, such as the one that the Albanian Government signed in 1992 on trade and cooperation—accompanied with a protocol on political dialogue—conducts political dialogue in a regular way, from time to time, within this framework at a political directors level up to a ministerial one. This visit was prepared and proceeded by a meeting in Rome in the middle of this month and aimed at examining Albania's level of relations with the EU, while Italy is running the presidency, as well as at the Council of Ministers and simultaneously at commissions.

We intended the visit precisely to examine not only the level of these relations but also the near and far perspective of Albania's relations with the EU.

[Muharremi] Can you please tell us what was Mrs. Agnelli's and Mr. Van der Broek's stance regarding Albania's fulfillment of the political criteria in this direction?

[Serreqi] I would say that some useful and evident conclusions were drawn from the discussions and the examination of the level of these relations. First, it should be understood that the EU is Albania's main partner, and not only on the economic level. Second, it should be understood that the EU Commission and Presidency have assessed the results of reform in Albania in a superlative way. They have clearly evidenced from what point the Albanian transition started and with what burdens the first democratic government after 50 years of dictatorship undertook the task of transforming Albania, not only on a political and institutional level but also on an economic one.

I would stress here that, regarding this, Mr. Van der Broek, on behalf of the commission, and Minister Agnelli, on behalf of the EU Presidency and the Council of Ministers, stated that our results in all fields are really astonishing. No time should be lost. We should undoubtedly raise the level of Albania's relations with the EU to an agreement that will be extremely profound and broader than the trade and cooperation agreement that has been implemented so far.

On behalf of the Presidency, Minister Agnelli, as well as Mr. Van der Broek, clearly pointed out that Albania fulfills all the political criteria and there is no obstacle to prevent it from strengthening cooperation with the EU and starting negotiations for an agreement that will, of course, respect the specifics of Albania. This agreement will also respect precisely what I stressed before, that Albania carried on its back the most difficult inheritance of all other Eastern countries. At the same time, stress was also put on the extremely positive influence of Albania's foreign policy in the region, which means that the geopolitical aspect, Albania's integration, and the strengthening of the agreements and Albania's relations with the EU is not something that has only one-sided interest, but it is of a mutual interest.

In this direction, I think that, as we agreed there, all the procedures will be met until March, so as to initiate negotiations that will undoubtedly lead to an agreement that will be extremely broader and more profound and favorable for Albania, and it will further move Albania toward integration in the European structures. Cooperation with the EU will start and this will prepare the way for this first transitional phase of association to end with the European agreement.

[Muharremi] Mr. Minister, what facilities will the agreement you just spoke about create for Albania at an economic level, in cooperation with the EU?

[Serreqi] Of course, considering that Albania's European orientation is an absolute priority, I would like to stress that this agreement has not only an economic aspect, it has its political and all-round aspect. At the same time, this agreement approaches Albania in all its own standards toward the European one.

[Muharremi] Mr. Minister, thank you, all the best.

[Serreqi] Thank you.

Albania: Former Communist Leader Arrested for 'Genocide'

AU0202213096 Paris AFP in English 2056 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Feb 2 (AFP)—Former Albanian communist president Ramiz Alia was arrested here Friday on several charges, including genocide, murder and massive deportation, judicial officials said.

The arrest was made under a law on "genocide and communist crimes" that was adopted in September by parliament.

Alia, 70, is to be tried for "crimes committed by the communist regime" between 1986 and 1990, the officials said.

They notably include the shooting deaths of Albanians who tried to cross the border illegally between 1990 and 1992.

He is also accused of being responsible for the massive deportation of citizens for political reasons in 1982 to 1986, when he was head of the People's Assembly.

News of his arrest came in a statement from the prosecutors' office in Tirana, relayed on national television.

Under a new penal code, those convicted of genocide and communist crimes face at least 15 years in prison or the death sentence.

Alia had been arrested in 1992 after the opposition won Albania's first free elections, and was sentenced in July 1994 to nine years in prison for abuse of power and violating human rights.

The sentence was later shortened, and he was freed in July.

Alia had succeeded communist dictator Enver Hoxha in 1985.

More than 30 former senior members of the communist regime have been arrested since December under the genocide and communist-crime law.

Albania: Ramiz Alia Rearrested Under Genocide Law

AU0302210096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 3 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by Mentor Kikia: "Alia Back in Prison Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Ramiz Alia is back in prison for the second time. The former president was put in handcuffs at about 1800 [1600 GMT] yesterday evening. Internments and acts of banishment, the case of 2 April in Shkoder [deaths of demonstrators in Shkoder on 2 April 1991] and murders on the border in the eighties make up the list of accusations on the basis of which the Tirana procurator has issued the order for Alia's removal to prison again. The procurator's rapid investigations into the genocide carried out during the years of communist rule had led to Alia being "invited" twice to the Procurator's Office as a witness, to be asked about events that occurred during the time when he was the Albanian head of state. Meanwhile, dozens of denunciations from families throughout the country had arrived at the office of the Tirana procurator. The charges were that Alia was responsible for the murder of their sons on the border at the end of the eighties."

Alia's arrest brings the number of those detained under the Genocide Law to 32. A few days ago, all Alia's former Politburo colleagues were returned to prison for the same reason. However, whereas the other communist leaders were arrested only as "responsible for the internment and banishment for political reasons of hundreds of innocent families," the cold handcuffs have been placed around Alia's wrists for other reasons, including the still mysterious 2 April events in Shkoder, over which investigations were resumed some months ago following the denunciation made by Azem Hajdari, chairman of the Commission for Public Order and the National Intelligence Service. Hajdari did a great deal to bring Alia to the prison gates.

Hajdari even declared to GAZETA SHQIPTARE one month ago that Alia's arrest was a matter of days. According to evidence gathered by the investigator, Alia is suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for the massacre in Shkoder. Alia was questioned twice a few days ago about this case and other incidents at that time. Sources in the Tirana Procurator's Office meanwhile report that dozens of charges have been laid against Alia by families from all districts of the country. They relate to the tense years of 1990-91 when escape from Albania was no longer considered treason. Dozens of young people tried to cross the border illegally, but fell victim to soldiers' bullets on the border. This is one of the charges that led the former number one of Albanian politics to prison yesterday evening. Alia first went to prison in the summer of 1992. Convicted of misappropriating state property and creating privileges, he was released last July. However, he has now been obliged to return to prison over much more serious charges.

Albania: People's Assembly Approves Electoral Law

AU0202163296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 2 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Ilir Alia: "Battle in Parliament: Electoral Law Approved"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Microphones pulled out, crowds of angry deputies surging toward Arbnori, demonstrative banging of chairs and fists on desks, noise, and insults of all kinds made up the atmosphere of yesterday's parliamentary session before the approval of the important but highly controversial new Electoral Law. The embittered atmosphere also spread outside the parliament. For the first time, no press representatives were allowed to follow the session for more than one hour. The session was also interrupted twice by the Socialists' protests. Democratic Party [PD] Deputy Halit Shamata's speech was interrupted twice. The most "fortunate" were the journalists, for whom the furious politicians improvised a spontaneous news conference on the parliament steps. After the session started about 30 minutes late, the first incident involved insults traded between Socialist Deputy Musa Ulqini and Parliamentary Chairman Pjeter Arbnori regarding their honesty and their youth, which were followed by a wave of hysteria sweeping over the hall. Immediately after this, a "battle" between Dokle and Arbnori began over the right to the floor, while Halit Shamata of the Legal Commission was preparing to speak before his colleagues. The debate culminated in the entire group of Socialist deputies rising to their feet in protest, while Namik Dokle even went up to Arbnori's chair to vent his rage. This led to the adjournment of the first session. The first pause did not last more than 30 minutes. Almost the same scenes were repeated after this enforced interruption and lasted longer. Dokle was again one of the protagonists. After speaking for some minutes, he asked to take the floor again, although Shamata had in the meantime begun to express the view of the Legal Commission. Shamata was not able to continue for long. A group of opposition deputies did not allow him to announce what the commission under his leadership had decided the previous day. Some resorted to other methods: An enraged Imami preferred to seize his microphone in order not to allow him to speak. The argument did not rest at that. This time, Socialist Deputy Chairman Pellumbi advanced in the direction of Arbnori, not stopping even after appeals from the speaker, who said, "Don't come any closer." The session was adjourned once again, and journalists were thereafter not allowed to remain inside. The heavy parliament doors opened only 90 minutes later, when the deputies of all parties emerged, the opposition members furious at what had happened in the hall. They uttered words such as "fascism," "constitutional coup," but, in another improvised news conference, spoke about "the opposition remaining in the parliamentary chamber until morning" in protest against what had happened inside and outside parliament yesterday. Now a response from the opposition parties is expected, because they have all warned that they will take steps against this law. Instructions were issued to the Socialist deputies who were preparing to stay till morning in the parliamentary chamber, but these have still not been made known to the public.

Albania: Party Deputies Comment on New Electoral Law

AU0502121996

[FBIS Report] Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 2 February carries on page 5 a 1,800-word report by Arben Vata on a news conference given by deputies of the People's Assembly outside the parliament building in Tirana on 1 February following the approval of the new Electoral Law, under the headline, "Constitutional and Judicial Putsch." Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian on 2 February carries on page 1 an 800-word unattributed interview with Democratic Party [PD] General Secretary Tritan Shehu, made in Tirana on 1 February, entitled, "All Points in the Statement by the Roundtable of Parties Were Considered."

Asked by KOHA JONE's Vata about the People's Assembly session, Socialist Party [PS] Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi reportedly says: "You saw yourself when they ejected you from the chamber. We underwent one of the most outrageous sessions today that a parliament could devise. A law that should have been passed by consensus was voted through in the most high-handed fashion. Our parliamentary group and the other opposition groups were determined in our opposition to a session of this kind, and were compelled even to advance to the speaker's chair to stop this charade, but, as usual, Pjeter [Arbnori] and the PD group voted to order in the most scandalous fashion, raising their hands article by article without understanding what they themselves were doing. This behavior marks the establishment of a dictatorship in Albania, unless it is stopped. But we think that the people will say 'no' to such neodictatorial and neototalitarian behavior; no label you may use can fully describe what happened in today's session." Asked how many deputies voted for the bill, Pellumbi is reported as saying, "Nobody can ever know how many voted. Not even the secretary counted the votes.... There was no debate on the individual articles or on the bill as a whole. This made the session even more high-handed."

Democratic Alliance deputy Perikli Teta is reported as saying, "Today's act showed me that the PD is not prepared to surrender power in a democratic manner."

Social Democratic Party Chairman Skender Gjinushi is reported as saying, "I think that we are on the threshold of the restoration of a neodictatorship that only the people's votes can bring down. We are not advocating an armed front, because there is no such thing in a democracy, but we think that all the parties should group together to take a common stand on democracy, which is sacred."

Socialist Party deputy Dritero Agolli is reported as saying, "This is not a confused situation, but is perfectly clear and unambiguous. Dictatorships are clear and unambiguous. They do not involve contradictions."

Petrit Kalakulla, chairman of the Democratic Party of the Right, is reported as saying, "I do not favor fronts, but the roundtable of 12 parties should continue its activities and assume institutional form to sensitize the Albanian public to the danger that threatens democracy in Albania. The law as approved is an intentional blow primarily against the political forces of the right, with the purpose of excluding the Right from active political life. This is doubtless harmful to democracy. The law was approved in an undemocratic manner, and we will wage our struggle, because we have faith in the people."

PS Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle is reported as saying, "This is a judicial and constitutional putsch." Asked about the opposition's plans for further action, Dokle reportedly says, "We will demand Skenderbeg Square for a demonstration against this violation of the constitution. We will make our application tomorrow, and will ask Berisha personally to give us Skenderbeg Square. We will make him talk to us.... If he does not give us permission, we will take the square without permission."

RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE asks PD General Secretary Tritan Shehu about the procedure followed to approve the Electoral Law. Shehu reportedly replies, "The procedure to approve this law seemed quite normal to me, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Albanian parliament." Shehu continues, "I think it is a good law, which will exert a positive influence on the development of Albanian democracy. It will create a more stable form of government, not only for the next four years. It is a law that corresponds to the aspirations of Albanian political forces, and I can say for sure that the proposals made by the different parties have been taken into consideration. For instance, the law enshrines the 4-percent threshold that was agreed by consensus with the president, too. The law has a stronger majoritary element than the last law, but still retains the balance between majority and proportional representation. The law as it was approved today was also corrected in certain aspects following the proposals of the roundtable of the 14 parties, i.e., the points on the declaration signed at this roundtable were taken into consideration.

"First, it was decided that constituency commissions will have representatives from every organization nominating a candidate in the relevant constituency.

"Second, the proportion of permitted television broadcasting time allowed was raised in favor of the small parties, at the expense of our own time.

"Third, the proposal that deputies' mandates should last until the first day of the opening of the new parliament was accepted.

"Fourth, the minimum necessary period during which candidates must be resident in Albania before the elections was reduced from one year to six months.

"Fifth, all representatives on a commission have the right to a signature, and the commission's documents are considered valid only when they are signed by more than 50 percent of the representatives."

Asked to comment on the response of the opposition, Shehu reportedly says, "For me this was not a new attitude, but the same as they have always maintained. They voted against the Law on Human Rights. They voted against other important laws in the parliament. They have never been anything but destructive, obstructing the normal conduct of the parliament's work."

Albania: Opposition Vows To Oppose Electoral Law

AU0302171396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Four opposition parties, the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Human Rights Union, and the Democratic Alliance, held a news conference at the Social Democratic Party headquarters today.

At the conference, a statement was read out on behalf of these four parties to say that they opposed the Election Law that had been approved by parliament last night and that had been supported by the majority of deputies and independent deputies. They considered that this law aimed at preserving the current power. This law meets with our open objection, they said. We will use all democratic methods to oppose it.

The correspondents present then asked questions, which were answered by representatives of the four opposition parties.

Albania: Parties Hold 2d Meeting on Electoral Law

AU0402141796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of 14 political parties met again this morning. However, this time, according to Mr. Sabri Codo, chairman of the Republican Party and the initiator of the negotiating roundtable of the 14 parties, the aim of the meeting was to make a balance of the meetings held on the Electoral Law, which was approved by the People's Assembly on 1 February. Mr. Godo said that out of six demands put forward, five have been met.

In their discussions, some political party representatives reiterated the demand to preserve the ratio of the majority-proportional system at 100:40.

At today's meeting, it was decided that meetings with 14 political party representatives continue.

Albania: Rightist League Rejects 'Common Front'

AU0502122096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by A. Vata: "No to a Front Before the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sabri Godo, rotational chairman of the Rightist League, urgently assembled all the party chairmen of the league at his headquarters yesterday, following the approval of the Electoral Law. The meeting lasted more than one hour and concentrated on defining the stand this group will take during today's roundtable on the Electoral Law. According to some leaders of the league, this meeting was also summoned because of some statements that a common front against the Democratic Party [PS] and Berisha is being created in Albania. In connection with the newly approved law, the league's conclusion was that the roundtable efforts of the 13 parties were effective, because many of their criticisms were taken into account when the law was approved. Nevertheless, the leaders of the league agreed among themselves to continue their efforts to again achieve an understanding with the PD over the Electoral Law. They said that they will seek the support of other political forces. The leaders of the league yesterday strongly opposed the idea of creating a common opposition front on the threshold of the election campaign. According to Godo, all the league members came out against propaganda or groups of this kind just before the elections. Godo went on to say that using the roundtable for such purposes went beyond the roundtable's purpose and objectives.

Albania: Berisha Signs Electoral Law, Upsets Roundtable

AU0502103696 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 4 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by Andrea Stefani: "Berisha 'Overturned' Roundtable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The roundtable [illegible]ed to seek a meeting with the president of the republic in order to discuss the Electoral Law once again, but it had no time. A few hours later, Berisha signed the law as approved by parliament, an act that automatically "overturned" the table of the 13 parties and called a halt to the discussion marathon. Everything had been said, and the final session of the famous roundtable, now in its last hours of existence, counted only as a stocktaking. How useful had this roundtable been, as a still uncommon "article of furniture" in our political life? At 1000 [0800 GMT] yesterday, the leaders of the 14 parties (not 13 because they included the Democratic Party [PD] leader Shehu) sat down one more time in one of the halls of the Palace of Congresses to discuss the steps that had to be taken following parliament's approval of the PD-proposed Electoral Bill. The Republican Godo, the initiator and director of the roundtable, opened the session and expressed a sort of satisfaction that four of the six demands presented by the 13 political parties had been borne in mind. Meanwhile, Godo underlined that they could still continue to work for the fulfillment of the other items, such as preserving the balance between the system's majority and proportional lists. However, PD General Secretary Tritan Shehu said that the roundtable had been successful because the overwhelming majority of its criticisms and opinions had been responsibly considered by the PD parliamentary group. Teodor Laco, chairman of the Social Democratic Union, also announced, "It cannot be said that the roundtable was on balance not worthwhile." This was more or less the attitude of other parties such as the National Front and Legality. However, a group of other parties, particularly the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance [AD], and the Democratic Party of the Right [PDD] called the roundtable "insubstantial." The representatives of these political parties expressed concern that the draft submitted by the 13 had been ignored in an anticonstitutional fashion and that their essential demands in connection with the electoral system or the administration of the voting were not taken into account. It was this that apparently led them to say that the roundtable had not been useful. AD's Imami said, "It is hard to believe that free and equal elections will be possible with this law." According to the Socialist Dokle, "Under the system now, which is almost entirely first-past-the-post, the PD takes about five deputies from each of the small parties that are aiming for the 4 percent threshold." For the PDD leader Kalakula, "The newly approved electoral system is a blow mainly against the right-wing parties." After more than two hours of discussion, in which participants "treated" each other to the occasional insult, the roundtable approved a proposal of the Christian Democrat Bushati, asking the president not to promulgate the recently approved Electoral Law, but to meet representatives of the 13 parties. However, the proposal miscarried. The report that Berisha had signed the controversial law was issued, perhaps even before the letter of the Republican Party's Sabri Godo reached the presidential office. The members of the 13 parties reacted to this news in different ways, but the news made everybody realize that yesterday's session had been the last "lunch" at the common table.

Albania: Deputy Tefik Ajazi Leaves Socialist Group

AU0502111596 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 2 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by A.E.: "Ajazi: 'Farewell to the Socialist Party'—Now He Heads for the Honey Pot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of the Democratic Party's vote on the Electoral Law yesterday, Socialist Party [PS] deputy Tefik Ajazi announced his departure from the parliamentary group. His resignation was expected. Before the session, Ajazi told KOHA JONE that he had still not decided and asked for an interview after his statement. He made his statement, and left the Socialists to become an independent deputy. Ajazi is a deputy of Berat District, elected directly by Constituency Number 4 under the Electoral Law that is still in force. Although Ajazi has long had his differences with the PS, he has never before thought of leaving the group. It seems that the reason for his disillusionment arose from the indifference of the Berat organizations toward him during the PS's campaign for nominations. Ajazi left Berat during the four years of his parliamentary mandate, now lives in Tirana, and has not been proposed by any constituency. Within the PS, it is thought that his having been overlooked is the main reason for his not very surprising departure.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Views IFOR Participation, NATO

AU0202183696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a closed meeting today, the Council of Ministers discussed two important foreign policy issues: Bulgaria's eventual participation in the Implementation Force [IFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina and further developing dialogue with NATO.

On the first issue, it was decided to send a letter to the commander in chief of NATO troops in Europe, which will point out that the contacts conducted until now are a good foundation for continuing the dialogue. Bulgaria is already prepared to send a field hospital and place a part of its Medical Academy facilities at IFOR's disposal.

The other aspects of eventual Bulgarian participation must be further elaborated.

On the second issue, it was decided to inform NATO that the Bulgarian Government is prepared to begin intensive dialogue in connection with the study on expanding NATO.

An expert group, formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense will prepare a draft document, which will serve as the foundation of such a dialogue.

Bulgaria: Unprofessional Conduct of Foreign Policy Seen

AU0502123496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 31 Jan 96 p 6

[Commentary by Nikolay Golemanov: "Diplomatic Philosophy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO made a step toward an eventual expansion of its membership. Understanding the complex character of things, the 16 dressed their proposal in a careful and individually flexible formulation, namely, "NATO begins an individual dialogue." This is a formulation that has been thought over, weighed, and checked. This is the nature of real politics.

At the same time, National Assembly Chairman Nikolay Sendov firmly said in Moscow that NATO should not expand to the East.

On the other side of the continent, President Zhelev warned the readers of LE FIGARO that Bulgaria's apparatchiks still preserve the prejudices of the bloc era, and that the cabinet "perhaps" fears that Moscow would not like it if it opens too much to NATO.

Had a different state been involved observers by now would have been engulfed in deep thought trying to grasp the purpose of this coordinated and delicate move. However, since present Bulgaria is involved, they should spare their intellectual effort.

Academician Sendov explained that his visit, in the course of which he was received by the Russian president and foreign minister, was a private visit, and that he has not said precisely what the mass media claim that he has said. For his part, Dr. Zhelev utilized arguments taken from the Bulgarian Socialist Party's White Paper (of one year ago) and repeated his own thoughts already expressed during his NATO dispute with Videnov (of several months ago), as if nothing has changed in Bulgaria and the world since then.

The foreign policy does not need amateur individual steps, ideological slogans, and "gross" phrases. In addition, diplomacy is a profession. Not everyone who can talk is necessarily a philosopher. Not everyone who can multiply is necessarily a mathematician. Then why are we all—nation and statesmen—specialists of international politics?

Bulgaria: Paparizov Views Trade Ministry Priorities

AU0502122196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 31 Jan 96 p 6

[Interview with Atanas Paparizov, minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation, by Albena Ivanova; place and date not given: "Trade Relations Require Precision and Long-Range Outlook"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Ivanova] What are the most important priorities of your ministry?

[Paparizov] Restoring traditional relations with partners from Russia is our main priority. This was the purpose of my meeting with Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev. It appears that toward the end of February there will be a meeting of the joint committee. We will discuss the specific possibilities of expanding bilateral business contacts.

The tendency toward expanding trade exchange is also a basic priority of our trade relations with all other states. We must check whether Bulgaria has the opportunity to resume large-scale export of machine-building equipment. The one-time deals between two companies do not seem to be the most suitable form of export.

We will discuss with the Ministry of Industry and the branch chambers the most suitable forms of coordinating the interests of the producers and exporters who are active at present. We probably will reach the conclusion that it is expedient to appoint coordinators for the export of certain products to the world markets. Those coordinators must represent serious companies, and must be voluntarily accepted by all.

We will seek forms of establishing lasting supply possibilities.

The development of production sharing—both with the East and West—requires precision and a long-range outlook. This is precisely what our trade relations lack. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Commentary on Yeltsin's Invitation to Videnov

AU0502134596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 31 Jan 96 p 14

[Commentary by Angelina Petrova: "Did Zhan Fish for the Invitation?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a businessman with contacts in Russia, Yeltsin's invitation to Videnov is a "special situation." It breaks all the rules of protocol for international contacts, according to which a president may invite his counterpart in another state, but not the prime minister.

The businessman believes that the invitation was probably cadged by Videnov himself in the verbal message from our prime minister that Sendov transmitted to Yeltsin. However, what caused the Russian president to respond so quickly?

Perhaps Yeltsin has made a blunder, and now his advisers will seek a convenient pretext to change the form of Videnov's upcoming visit to Moscow, the businessman believes on the basis of his experience of political games. Or again, perhaps the Russian prime minister decided on this strange move out of a desire to personally set the limits for the Bulgarian Socialist leader's activities.

According to the businessman, Yeltsin cannot fail to be aware that Videnov is paying court to the Russian Communists' leader Gennadiy Zyuganov. The businessman claims that Moscow party circles view Videnov as an orthodox communist who erroneously regards Zyuganov as a kindred spirit. Furthermore, it appears that Videnov is relying on the incorrect forecasts that the Russian Communists will completely reassume power. "Yeltsin will certainly try to explain to our prime minister who the real boss is in Moscow," the businessman concluded.

Czech Republic: Klaus Urges ODS To Avoid 'Squabbles'

AU0202153496 Prague PRAVO in Czech 31 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "ada, nig": "Klaus Warns Against Squabbles Within the ODS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In a personal message to all members of the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], which PRAVO managed to obtain, ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus warns against internal squabbles and "acts that could lead to the weakening of the position of the ODS." The letter is distributed in the ODS at a time when the struggle for listing on party slates is culminating.

Klaus appealed to the members to free themselves of all personal empathies and antipathies when entering the party primaries because local rivalry and lobbyist pressures can, as he writes, turn against the ODS. The chairman predicts an "unusually sharp and aggressive" election campaign, and that not only on the part of the opposition. "Let us not be provoked to impulsive reactions and mercuric actions, let us not accept street-corner politicking," Klaus writes.

The ODS Executive Council stated this weekend that the ward primary elections have been conducted in accordance with ODS regulations. In some instances, however, outsiders won against all expectations (they defeated, among others, Minister Igor Nemec, Executive Deputy Chairman Libor Novak, and Martin Syka, head of the Chamber Health Committee). The final constituency slates will be put together by the ODS regional assemblies in February.

Slovakia: Meciar, Schenk Meet With EU Ambassadors

AU0202153196 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by "jm": "Vladimir Meciar and Juraj Schenk With EU Ambassadors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk participated, at the invitation of Ernanno Squadrilli, ambassador of the Italian Republic, the country currently presiding over the EU, in a working lunch at the Borik Hotel yesterday with the ambassadors of EU countries. They discussed questions related to the development of bilateral relations between the EU and the Slovak Republic and assessed the process of the Slovak Republic's moving closer toward the EU as well as questions of cooperation between the EU member countries' diplomatic missions and representatives of the Slovak Republic.

Slovakia: Former Dissident on Meciar, Future

96CH0024A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 14 Dec 95 p 4

[Interview with former dissident Martin M. Simecka by Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "I Despair of the Intellectual Powerlessness of Slovak Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Hrabko] Apart from the period of the totalitarian system, which was in place for several decades, how do you view the unwillingness of people to conduct a normal debate leading toward an open society?

[Simecka] We lack historical experiences that might facilitate the development of a civic society to a greater extent in this phase. This is so primarily because Slovaks have, in fact, never before had their own state. A person cannot become a citizen of a state until he has such a state. Slovaks do not behave toward the state as though it were something to which, as citizens, they have a natural entitlement because for them the state is still a foreign body. The lack of confidence in state institutions in and of itself shows that people have no relationship toward the state. For this reason, the state is actually in crisis—not only as a society, not only as a political system, but also as a state per se.

But despite all of these circumstances, things look generally well for the time being. The fact that today Slovakia has a large portion of its society willing to live as citizens who are claiming their rights, utilizing mechanisms to which they are entitled as citizens—this is a historical novelty in Slovakia, and I consider it to be the foundation of Slovakia's future. If people succeed in defending themselves on a civic basis, then I have no doubt that society will be able, over the time span of a single generation, to come to terms with the problem of the state that, today, resembles an authoritarian regime.

[Hrabko] Beneath the Tatra Mountains, the dividing of Slovaks into good and bad has very much taken hold. Do you have any problems with the fact that by presenting your views at various conferences, or by your writings, you are categorized among the bad ones?

[Simecka] I agree with V. Mikula when he says that to be dubbed an enemy of Slovakia by those who are in power today is an honor. In this case, I do not mind at all and I have no problems with it. As far as conferences are concerned, I do not attend them frequently. I am more frequently at home and only rarely travel abroad. From time to time, I write something for a foreign country in which I observe that monitoring by Slovak officials is functioning relatively well. They unnecessarily exaggerate their reaction with respect to whatever I write. But that is their problem.

[Hrabko] However, the breakdown into good and bad Slovaks is not without purpose. It is precisely this breakdown that creates the picture of the internal enemy of Slovakia that needs to be pointed out and needs to be combated....

[Simecka] I think that the problem of the internal enemy of Slovakia, which was created by Meciar and his fellow travelers, is based not only in his paranoid attitude, but also in the fact that Meciar wants to perceive himself as the creator of the state—that he has become its father and has done so under conditions that were not favorable to him. With the exception of the Czech Republic, Slovakia is the only state that did not come into being on the basis of a general consensus regarding its origination. This is a very essential moment and Meciar knows this very well. He knows that many did not agree with the establishment of Slovakia and that they are its potential enemies. On the one hand, he knows that he has this disadvantage; on the other hand, he sees his own task in the role of the father-dictator, much as is the case in Croatia or in Serbia. There, however, they had the advantage of having an external enemy, on the basis of which an internal consensus among the citizenry existed and there was loyalty toward the leaders. Meciar has no such external enemy with whom he could go to war. He therefore had to create an enemy so that he could, at the very least, create the illusion for himself that he must fight for this state as a father and must protect it. No enemy other than the Slovaks has actually turned up.

From his viewpoint, the necessity for an internal enemy is completely logical. Our current everyday situation is merely the consequence of erroneous considerations regarding how and by what methods this state should come into being. This is true of all political disputes; it has to do with the inadequate consensus in society regarding minimal values on which it could agree. If society is not capable of coming to agreement on primary problems, such as, say, the standing of a citizen within the state, his tasks, or his rights, where such a consensus does not exist, then democracy is very, very brittle. And such a consensus did not exist from the very beginning of the time the state came into being. It is thus actually difficult to run the state—and that is a fact.

[Hrabko] The dispute characterized by Slovakia versus the Slovaks could also be described as the treatment of various complexes. But is it not precisely the team that can thoroughly prove the capabilities of citizens the one that precisely presents the true picture of Slovak society?

[Simecka] Slovakia has no enemy with whom it might fight. Historically, states came into being on the basis of victories in war. Meciar is simulating this war. Slovakia came into being without the use of force, something for which Europe praised us a great deal, and today Meciar is compelled to simulate a war and to win it. But what is at stake is that he should not win this war. If I can be a bit cynical, this whole matter essentially has one good side—for the time being, the Slovaks have not had the opportunity to confront any enemy who may have arisen from their ranks I say this in the context that society itself, and on its own territory, could have fought some kind of conflict—an authentic Slovak-Slovakia dispute. Meciar is the first politician in the history of Slovakia who has come up with some kind of concept that is exclusively Slovak, taking place on Slovak territory, and one that has resulted in a Slovakia-Slovak dispute. No one is intervening in this dispute, it is not governed by any foreign power, and, I repeat this with a certain dose of cynicism, this must be welcomed, because it is only through such a dispute that society can show itself what kind of society it actually is. Only through such a conflict do people who have learned courage, freedom, and independence grow—people who are willing to fight for these attributes, not only in their own private lives.

In my opinion, it is unnecessary to insult Meciar or laugh at him because within the meaning of the Slovak-Slovakia dispute he is an honorable opponent—he is worthy of such a dispute. He is sufficiently strong to be able to cast society, of its own free will, into calamity and, because he is a Slovak, it is our problem. At the same time, however, he provokes a reaction that could be highly useful in terms of the future of this country. Few people realize how important this dispute is and I am afraid that the problem being experienced by many Slovak politicians lies in the fact that they do not perceive it as a key matter for the future of the country. They retreat, they are afraid, they make compromises through methods not worthy of a political opposition, and they thus actually weaken the essence of this dispute.

[Hrabko] Why is it that in any kind of debate the name Meciar always comes up? Are not, in the end, his steps motivated also by the purpose of implanting a certain kind of Meciarism in society with the objective of having historians not forget him?

[Simecka] I do not like the word Meciarism. Every "ism" is characterized by some kind of special phenomenon and Meciar is no such phenomenon. To the extent one egg resembles another, he resembles Tudjman or Milosevic or any other small dictator. All of them make use of similar elements of populism, they intermingle truth with lies, they use manipulation, and, at the same time, these are people who are capable of making great decisions and even taking risks—which is a characteristic of all dictators who have grown up in postcommunist times. I see nothing specific that Meciar has and the others do not. That is why I find it ridiculous to speak of Meciarism as such. Meciarism, Milosevicism, or Tudjmanism is simply one and the same. However, I am not opposed to talking about Meciar. It is impossible today to leave him out of any considerations in social life because he is a person who, to a great extent, decides about this country, and that must be taken into account. If he were not the prime minister, one would not speak of him a lot; that is logical. Meciar's fate is sealed—I am deeply convinced that he has defeat written in his fate. At some time in the future, he will be remembered as one of the key figures in modern Slovak history. Whether this will be a negative or a positive recollection, that is to be seen. Personally, Meciar reminds me very much of the persona of Pilsudski in Poland who was first a democrat, then he returned as a dictator, and today he is spoken of in Poland as a great Pole. But he was a member of the Polish elite, whereas Meciar is not. Meciar does not come from the elite, does not belong to it, has no sense of responsibility, which the elite always had. Nevertheless, I do not exclude the possibility that he will be remembered much the same as Pilsudski.

[Hrabko] The prime minister's policies are highly variable, even in terms of the fact that he has no problems changing his rhetoric, at the very least. Do you believe that it is still possible that an agreement might come about between Mrs. Democracy and Meciar?

[Simecka] I do not believe so. Meciar is not capable of collaborating in forging democracy. He has already

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From his viewpoint, the necessity for an internal enemy is completely logical. Our current everyday situation is merely the consequence of erroneous considerations rejected this idea. In 1992, he still believed in democracy, because it had carried him to victory in the elections, made him the creator of the state, provided him, in other words, with all opportunities he felt he might utilize. Even the Constitution, in the drafting of which he participated, has elements of a democratic constitution. This means that he believed in it in 1993. In 1993, he already began abandoning this platform, and in 1994 he rejected it definitively because that certain democracy had deprived him of power. He stopped believing in democracy and will never again believe in it. I am certain that Meciar is not capable of collaborating in terms of the principles of democratic mechanisms—and he does not even want to. The fact that he can still make a short-term decision to return to it is another matter, and it would be a mistake for the opposition if it permitted this factor to weaken it. But that is a problem for the Slovak opposition, about which we could speak for a long time.

[Hrabko] Let us leave that aside. Do you not think that in Slovakia, after three years, there is a palpable absence of vision, that there is practically no project that would motivate the people toward a better, more civilized method of living?

[Simecka] You are returning to the question of the origin of the state. Slovakia came into being simply without a fundamental idea. The politicians of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] had not the slightest idea of what would happen with this state. Perhaps they did have a vague notion—that it will be some kind of bridge between the West and the East or some similar wanderings. But these are no ideas. This state came into being as an appeal to the past and not the future. Not with a vision of how it would be, but by referring to the necessity for some kind of thousand-year longing. If a state comes into being on the basis of the ideas of the past, then it simply has no future. This is a problem that can be rectified, but politicians would have to first think about it specially. Sometimes, I downright despair of the intellectual powerlessness of our Slovak politicians.

[Hrabko] What is your own philosophy or notion as to the future?

[Simecka] I have a dual role in my life. I feel something as a writer and, in this case, any kind of factual information is good. Whether it is a dictatorship or a civic society, any kind of state is a welcome opportunity for a writer to live in it and investigate it. As an author, I therefore do not care what kind of state it will be. A law on protecting the republic would not bother me, nor would any other feebleminded law, a strong SIS [Slovak Information Service], and so forth. They will not prevent me from thinking and, as a writer, that is enough for me, because, when push comes to shove, a writer sometimes need not even write. But as a citizen it does matter to me—that is my second role. I know that my own notions, which are highly idealistic, will not come about—a society that is capable of highly regarding its freedom to such an extent that it will leave to the state only the role of an umbrella to be used against bad weather. However, this will not come about, because Central Europe was never this way and will clearly never be this way. But even so, I can visualize Slovakia as a country in which one can live in freedom. Not only for such people as myself, who simply will not allow their freedom to be taken away, but also for people for whom freedom is not a priority goal—but it will be worth their while to fight for it.

This does not mean that society as a whole will be conducting itself overly much in a civic way. In this part of Europe, there is a highly unpleasant phenomenon—a very strong party system in which parties, although they are democratic, represent social life. Room for the individual is then always restricted and he must always fight for it. These party states will not disappear so easily. There will be the tendency to create institutions that will control social life, a tendency toward the exclusion from society of individuals who are indolent. As long as these people will not be incarcerated or killed, this will be tolerable.

Slovakia: Unions Condemn Anti-Kovac Campaign

AU0202153096

[FBIS Report] According to recent Slovak press reports, state administration officials continue to sign petitions in which they express loyalty to the government and criticize the activities of President Kovac and demand his resignation. Some press reports suggest that the petitions are organized by political appointees at the head of central state administration bodies, and, according to one report, signatories are being "deceived" about the petitions' actual contents. On 31 January and 1 February, a number of Slovak newspapers report on a statement issued by the Trade Union of State Administration Employees [SLOVES] that "condemns" the above petitions as "incompatible with the principles of the democratic law-governed state" and call on their organizers to discontinue this activity.

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 24 January on page 3 carries a 200-word report by "iva" on a "statement by the Ministry of Transportation, Post, and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic on the present situation in the Slovak Republic" that was reportedly "signed by 241 employees of this government department." The statement expresses "full support for the policy of the Slovak Government and the implementation of its policy statement" and voices "concern about the attitude and, regrettably, even specific deeds of not only opposition parties and movements but even some constitutional and state officials, including the highest official, whose confrontational and destructive activity is slowing down and thwarting the development of the government's intentions."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 25 January on page 2 carries a 400-word report on a "statement adopted by employees of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic on developments on the political scene." Besides expressing "full support for the present government headed by Vladimir Meciar," the statement says: "We definitely cannot remain indifferent to the defamation of the good name and work of the present government and its prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, at home and abroad. Unfortunately, even the head of state, the president of the Slovak Republic, has opted for this course of action, together with his office. His aggressive tone was evident also in his New Year's address to the citizens of this republic. The majority of the nation gave its votes in the democratic elections to the present political and government coalition and continue to trust it, a fact to which the present opposition cannot become reconciled. It is permanently trying to provoke conflicts on the political scene, poison the atmosphere, and destabilize the state internally."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 26 January on page 2 carries a 300-word report by "jo" stating that Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] , had initiated criminal proceedings against Miroslav Miklas, chairman of the Prievidza District Office, on charges of "abuse of the authority of a public official." Carnogursky tells SME that on 4 December 1995 Miklas convened a meeting of the chiefs of "offices of general and state administration in Prievidza district," at which he "submitted to them for signing an appeal containing criticism of the activity of the president of the Slovak Republic and the proposal that he resign from his post." Carnogursky believes that, "by summoning a meeting of his subordinates and submitting to them for signing a political appeal for Michal Kovac's resignation," Miklas "exceeded his powers" and "acted unlawfully with the intention of causing moral and political damage to the president of the Slovak Republic."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 January on pages 1 and 2 carries a 700-word report by Zita Sujova entitled "Attack on President Kovac Added to Statement of Ministry of Agriculture Employees After Signing." The report states that an unnamed Ministry of Agriculture employee called the NARODNA OBRODA editorial office on 26 January and "deemed it necessary to point out" that the statement by Ministry of Agriculture employees published by SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on 25 January "is not identical with the statement employees were signing." According to the caller, the original text did not contain the "supplement attacking the president and the opposition," which is why "a number of employees who were signing the text in good faith now feel deceived." As the caller told NARODNA OBRODA, "about 47 percent of the ministry's employees signed the original text. Among those who did not sign it were at least two of the six section chiefs."

According to Sujova, Miroslav Zapletal from the Agriculture Ministry's Press Department admitted to the NARODNA OBRODA correspondent that the petition had been tampered with: "Zapletal confirmed to us that 'signatures had been collected only for the first part, about support for the government,' while the passage about the president and the opposition was written by him only a few days ago, on instructions from Jaroslav Rolko, head of the Ministry of Agriculture Office. Rolko also was the initiator of the whole signature-gathering campaign. In the end, again at the behest of Jaroslav Rolko, Zapletal personally delivered the supplemented statement to the editorial office of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 1 February on page 3, under the headline "Civil Servants Are Under No Obligation To Express Support for the Government," publishes the following report: "'The SLOVES Presidium notes with regret that signature-gathering campaigns at ministries and other bodies of state administration are being set in motion again,' states a statement issued by SLOVES. 'The signature-gathering campaigns are conceived as an expression of support for the present government, and they also contain calls for the resignation of the president of the Slovak Republic. State employees are under the obligation to observe the laws of the state and to act in conformity with these laws. They are also under the obligation to respect the instructions of their superiors, including those appointed on the basis of political criteria. However, they are under no obligation to express support for a specific government and its representatives. If this were the case, they would get into an internal conflict at the moment the government or its individual representatives change. The SLOVES Presidium condemns these campaigns and calls on their organizers to discontinue them. These campaigns are incompatible with the principles of the democratic law-governed state and with the apolitical nature of state administration, for which we have been calling for years,' it is written in the statement."

Hungary: Kovacs Says NATO Expansion 'Irreversible'

LD0402155996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hungarian Foreign Minister Kovacs considers it natural that NATO does not want to deepen its differences with Russia; therefore, it is treating the issue of enlargement with some caution. However, after the international security policy conference held in Munich, Laszlo Kovacs talked about the Central European countries chances [of becoming NATO members] with optimism. He is of the view that the enlargement of NATO is an irreversible process since concrete steps to be taken are already in the focus of discussion.

At the conference he said that Hungary wants to join NATO and the European Union not as reaction to any military threat but to help achieve its political goals and as part of its integration efforts. [passage omitted]

Hungary: EU To Study Export Loan Fund Proposal

LD0402151996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union will study a Hungarian proposal to establish an export loan fund to support the export of Central European goods. Hans van der Broek, EU commissioner [for external relations], who has met Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, said this at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The diplomat [Broek] said Hungarian agriculture did not pose a threat to the EU; therefore, he did not think it would hinder admission.

At the World Economic Forum, Goncz also met the Austrian, the Swiss, and the Polish prime ministers.

Hungary: Horn Comments on Reform of State Finances

LD0202162996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Prime Minister Gyula Horn, the reform of state finances can only be carried out if the government is in constant contact with the self-governments. Horn spoke of this after he and several ministers had met self-government leaders. The prime minister said that school development and other tasks can only be carried out in the framework of comprehensive reform with continuous social dialogue.

Hungary: Bokros Threatens To Resign Over Medical Fees

AU0202185796 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 2 Feb 96 p 1

[Correspondent's report: "Bokros Offered His Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NEPSZAVA has learned from government circles that Finance Minister Lajos Bokros offered to resign at the cabinet meeting on 1 February. Bokros intended to resign on 29 February because he did not agree with the change in the system of payments for dental care and with the government concepts regarding medical appliances. At the same time, Bokros supported the compensation payments for the increase in medicine prices. The debate between the Welfare Ministry and the Finance Ministry had already intensified at the economic cabinet meeting of 31 January, because the welfare minister claimed that the planned changes would cost between a minimum of 4-5 billion forints [Ft] and a maximum of Ft20 billion, while the finance minister claimed that the costs would reach Ft80 billion, including the deficit in social security funds. Apparently, Lajos Bokros also named the source of all this, but the economic cabinet did not regard this as acceptable. Only Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze voted in support of the finance minister and 11 cabinet members voted in favor of reexamining the fees for dental care and medical supplies. This is when Lajos Bokros offered to resign, but Prime Minister Gyula Horn reacted to this by saying that they could talk about this if Bokros made the offer in writing as well. NEPSZAVA has learned that the discussion was finished in the prime minister's office.

Hungary: IFOR Troops To Use Taborfalva Firing Range

LD0202215296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The IFOR [Implementation Force] troops want to use the Taborfalva firing range beginning the end of March. Soldiers of the mechanized rifle company temporarily withdrawn from Bosnia will exercise here. Colonel Edward Murdock held talks about the details with the chairman of the Pest County Assembly. Katalin Horvath reports.

[Horvath] (Geza Schmidt), chairman of the Pest County Assembly, said the inhabitants of Taborfalva will be informed about the arrival of the U.S. troops before any shot is fired. He had already had talks with the mayor of the 1000-inhabitant village.

The first rifle company will arrive at the end of March. The soldiers will set up camp near the firing range and stay for three weeks, said Col. Murdock, head of the Military and Civilian Cooperation Information Office, operating at the IFOR headquarters. They will be replaced by other troops and this is expected to continue until the end of November.

Since the troops will be transported to Taborfalva by coach, the inhabitants will not be awakened by the noise of helicopters or military vehicles. Or more precisely, they will be awakened by the latter, because they will arrive in the near future but they will stay there until the end of November. This also means that they are not expected to cause serious damage to the roads, said Col. Murdock.

Hungary: Workers' Party Says MSZP Not 'Left Wing'

LD0302214596 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Workers' Party does not consider the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] to be left wing anymore. It will not initiate high-level relations with the MSZP any more, Chairman Gyula Thurmer said at the national conference of the party's activists. The head of the Workers' Party is of the view that the MSZP is pursuing right-wing policies representing the interests of capitalist interest groups and not that of the voters. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic Briefs Press on Talks With Christopher

LD0302212196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We begin our bulletin with a report on the visit to Sarajevo of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Mehmedalija Sisic has the report:

[Sisic] Shortly after the arrival of the high-ranking U.S. delegation and the formal welcoming ceremony by the hosts, lengthy talks were held in the presidency building between the U.S. and Bosnia-Herzegovina delegations. [passage omitted]

The talks covered all key questions concerning the implementation of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the region as a whole. The visit was covered by a large number of journalists. After the talks, President Izetbegovic and Secretary of State Christopher held a news conference, summing up the impressions of the two delegations and assessing the situation in the light of the future course of the peace process and the agreements already made. The journalists were first addressed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] It was a great honor to talk with U.S. Secretary of State Christopher. The talks were very sincere and friendly. We welcomed Mr. Christopher as a man who enormously contributed to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I thanked him on behalf of our delegation for his efforts in this direction.

Of course, the topic of the talks was the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. We noted with satisfaction that the military aspect of the agreement, which is being implemented by IFOR [Implementation Force], was on the whole proceeding smoothly, without major difficulties. The civilian part of the agreement is proceeding more slowly, despite recent signs of progress.

We discussed Sarajevo, Mostar, the Federation, elections, the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As far as Sarajevo is concerned, we expressed our dissatisfaction with Mr. Bildt's consent concerning the presence of the [Bosnian] Serb police over the next 45 days. We think this is a result of a wrong interpretation of the Dayton agreement, and we think that the presence of the Serb police in the course of these 45 days illegal.

We told Mr. Christopher this, and my impression is that he understood our objection in the right way.

Our other objection concerned the destruction of factories and buildings in the part that is being abandoned by the Serb forces and that ought to go over to the Federation. I briefed Mr. Christopher on yesterday's visit of German Ambassador Johannes Preisinger to Vogosca, which he found very sad and miserable. We think this should be prevented. If this is not possible, then the Serb side should be clearly told that the damage it caused will be deducted from any aid it might receive from the international community.

As far as the elections are concerned, we noticed that the implementation of this part of the agreement — concerning the establishment of political liberties in the part under the Serb control — was not proceeding well. Freedom of the media and freedom of political activity are a vital condition for the implementation of fair elections. The U.S. side agreed with us in this respect.

As far as the prisoners are concerned, most of them have been released by our side. I think that work still continues on the release of the remaining five [Serb] prisoners from Gorazde. We have difficulties in this, as you know. The women, mothers, and daughters of the people from Srebrenica who were killed have been protesting against the release of Serb prisoners before the fate of their husbands, fathers, and sons is established. They are placing this issue above the implementation of the Dayton agreement. For them this issue is more important. And we are encountering difficulties here.

We informed the U.S. side about this. They themselves are well informed about the whole situation. We acknowledged with satisfaction the fact that Mr. Shattuck, assistant U.S. state secretary for human rights, will remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he will travel to Omarska and Ljubija [camps] to establish the issue of mass graves. A special ICRC [International Committee for the Red Cross] working group will be set up to examine... [changes thought] to continue the search for the missing persons [words indistinct].

Mr. Christopher expressed readiness on the part of the United States to persevere until the end in the investigation into war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in Srebrenica. In this context I asked Mr. Christopher to seek better cooperation with the Hague Tribunal from President Milosevic, whom he will meet tomorrow.

Mr. Christopher also expressed readiness to accelerate decisions concerning the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We said that many commissions have been and gone. Many delegations are visiting and leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina, many meetings are taking place, but not a single dollar has come our way, to Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the reconstruction of the state.

I also briefed the state secretary on the implementation of the Federation and the situation in Mostar. Finally, we agreed that all foreign troops must leave Bosnia. We expressed our resolve in this respect and said that the implementation of the Dayton Agreement must follow this course. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Sisic] In response to several questions by journalists, President Izetbegovic explained that we will not carry out unilaterally our demand that compensation for destroyed factories be deducted from the assistance to the Serb entity. As for the security of residents in the areas that are to come under the Federation's control, President Izetbegovic said that only international police could ensure their security. Asked about foreign troops [mujahidin], President Izetbegovic stressed that we will honor the agreement on this issue.

B-H: Bildt Announces Postponed Serb Handover in Sarajevo

AU0202210396 Paris AFP in English
2040 GMT 2 Feb 96

[By Michael Adler]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Feb 2 (AFP) — Bosnia's Serbs will maintain their hold on parts of Sarajevo despite a Dayton peace accord deadline that falls midnight Saturday for the Moslem-Croat federation to take authority for these areas, High Representative Carl Bildt said here Friday.

Bildt, the civilian authority of the Dayton agreement, said he would "use the next six weeks to prepare the transfer of authority."

"I believe all parties agree that we need this time in order to overcome the fears and to create new understanding.

"In the meantime, the existing local authorities and police structures remain, provided that they do not act inconsistently with the constitution and laws of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Federation," Bildt said in a statement.

Serbs in four Sarajevo neighborhoods and suburbs have said they are afraid of administration by their former Bosnian enemies.

Some 10,000-12,000 of 70,000 people living in the Ilidza, Ilijas, Grabavica and Vogosca sectors have already left, with possibly over half of those remaining set also to go.

This handover is particulary important because a failure for Serbs and Moslems to live together in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, could torpedo the peace process. It is also symbolic because the Bosnian war began in these neighborhoods in April 1992.

The D plus 45 deadline that falls Saturday at midnight, 45 days after NATO-led peacekeepers began deploying December 20, mandates faction armies to withdraw from areas they are to transfer and for the incoming party to take over civilian control.

Serb army troops have already withdrawn from these areas as part of a Dayton deadline but Serb authorities will be allowed to maintain their police and the Moslem-Croat federation will not be moving in its administrators and police, Bildt's office said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic Says Continued Serb Presence 'Illegal'

AU0302170796 Paris AFP in English
1658 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 3 (AFP) — Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said here Saturday [3 February] that letting Serb police stay in four Sarajevo neighborhoods past a deadline for allowing transfer of these districts was illegal.

"It is a wrong interpretation of this part of the Dayton (peace) agreement and the presence of Serb police in the following 45 days is illegal," Izetbegovic said after meeting US Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The Dayton agreement that ended in December Bosnia's nearly four-year war orders four Serb-held Sarajevo neighborhoods and suburbs to be handed over to the Moslem-Croat federation. A first deadline falls at midnight Saturday for Serbs forces to be pulled out and for a changeover in civil authority.

The federation can move in its army and population on March 20, 45 days later.

A grey area seems to be emerging over who will guarantee police protection during the interim period, with High Representative Carl Bildt, the civil arm of the Dayton accord, saying Friday that Serb police and civil authority could remain.

Izetbegovic said Saturday that he had "expressed our dissatisfaction with the decision of Mr. Bildt that for the following 45 days there is a presence of Serb police."

Bosnian Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic blasted Bildt's decision in a press statement Friday, and warned that it could unravel the peace process.

He said UN civilian police should be guaranteeing security in the Serb-held districts.

"Due to failure of the civilian police to perform effectively its tasks, and perhaps also because he was not sufficiently aware of his rights, the High Representative permitted today the presence of (Serb leader Radovan) Karadzic's police in Serb-held areas of Sarajevo.

"This can not be tolerated. This constitutes a violation of the Peace Agreement, and we expect Mr. Carl Bildt to ask IFOR (NATO-led Implementation Force) to force these police forces to leave the territory immediately," Muratovic said.

He warned, "All that IFOR has achieved Mr. Bildt will undo if police forces do not leave the territory which belongs to the Federation."

B-H: Muratovic Demands Expulsion of All Serb Policemen

LD0302200996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] So, today is the D-45 day, which stands half way between Dayton and a united Sarajevo under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Carl Bildt's public statements have caused an avalanche of reactions. His free interpretation of the Dayton Agreement was a topic of the talks between Alija Izetbegovic and Warren Christopher. The government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today made a sharp and ultimatum-like statement spelling out its legitimate demands. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Jadranko Katana] This serious violation of the Dayton Agreement was more than a good reason for [Bosnian] Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic to hold a news conference.

[Begin recording] [Muratovic] As far as we are concerned, this is a violation of the agreement, and — I think — a big mistake in Bildt's overall mission here. We will demand from Carl Bildt immediately to request from IFOR [Implementation Force] to remove all armed and uniformed persons from the territory that belongs to the Federation.

[Unidentified correspondent] I suppose Mr. Christopher has been informed about this problem. What was his reaction?

[Muratovic] Immediately after the talks with us, Mr. Christopher went to see Carl Bildt. The U.S. delegation considers this a serious violation of the agreement, and a big step backward in the overall implementation of the agreement. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Katana] Judging by previous experience in situations when UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] bureaucratic machinery created problems, and similar reactions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in these instances, Mr. Bildt will soon have to revoke his decision or step down from his position.

B-H: TANJUG on Continued Serb Police Presence in Sarajevo

LD0402135096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1055 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG) — Serb police will remain in Sarajevo for another 45 days in the Serb suburbs in spite of protests by the Bosnian Muslim Government, high representative for Bosnia Carl Bildt and NATO said late Saturday.

In a joint statement, Bildt, NATO force commander in Bosnia Admiral Lieghton Smith, and ground force commander Gen. Michael Walker said NATO would step up its presence in the five Serb suburbs during that period, the British news agency REUTER said.

There are no indications at this time whether the decision reached by Bildt and the two NATO top officials in Bosnia will satisfy the Bosnian Muslim Government.

Military forces of all three sides in Bosnia should have left territories which they will no longer control under the Dayton peace accords by midnight of Feb. 3.

Implementation Force (IFOR) commander in Bosnia, Admiral Smith on Saturday informed U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that Bosnian Serbs had withdrawn their forces from the five Sarajevo suburbs and met the set deadline.

B-H: Continued Presence of Serb Police Angers Leaders

AU0402143596 Paris AFP in English 1225 GMT 4 Feb 96

[Report by Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 4 (AFP) — The Bosnian Government and Moslem-Croat Federation voiced anger Sunday [4 February] over a decision to allow Serb police to remain temporarily in Serb areas of Sarajevo to be placed under government control.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) earlier Sunday backed a move by Carl Bildt, the UN's top civilian representative, to extend the Serb police presence to a March 19 deadline.

At a midnight meeting with overall IFOR commander US Admiral Leighton Smith and Bildt, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said that allowing Serb police to stay was illegal under the Dayton accord.

Bosnian radio reported that he and Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic had called on Bildt to retract his decision.

The accord, signed in December, ended Bosnia's nearly four-year war and set deadlines for creating Moslem-Croat and Serb states co-existing within a Bosnia republic.

On Sunday, several Bosnian government members and Moslem-Croat Federation president Kresimir Zubak stressed their opposition to Bildt's plan.

Federation Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic said: "No-one had a mandate to accept a delay in the Dayton calendar."

The Serbs were to hand over the Sarajevo areas of Grbavica and Ilidza and the suburbs of Ilijas and Vogosca to the Moslem-Croat Federation, their former enemies.

Bildt decided on Friday to let Serb police stay beyond a Saturday midnight deadline for faction troops to withdraw and civil authority to be transferred, in order to ease tensions and set up the necessary institutions for the full transfer and the return of refugees.

A joint statement by IFOR and Bildt released overnight said: "Present civil authorities, including police forces, can remain in place provided they do not act inconsistently with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and (Moslem-Croat) Federation."

Analysts here said the Bosnian Government had apparently thought it could drive a wedge between Bildt, who is handicapped by a low budget and building his staff from scratch, and IFOR, the first land deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

IFOR backed the Bildt plan, but also moved to assuage the doubts of the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Government with a firm commitment that the federation would take over in Serb-held Sarajevo on March 19.

The statement said that after that date: "Any armed groups of persons other than Federation armed forces or police encountered there will be disarmed and detained by IFOR."

It pledged IFOR troop support for civilian peacekeeping, something NATO commanders have been reluctant to do as they try to keep their mission limited to military duties.

The statement backed Bildt in his plans for a gradual transfer in heavily populated Serb districts in Sarajevo where 10,000 to 12,000 of the 60,000 to 70,000 residents have already fled.

The UN's civilian police (Civpol), currently disorganized, understaffed and underfunded, has been the weak link in assuring security in sensitive areas.

The joint statement said IFOR would be maintaining "an enhanced presence in the areas concerned," but said Civpol would provide a "central and leading role ... to assure orderly replacement of present police structures."

Meanwhile in Zagreb, NATO said Bosnian-Croat forces had withdrawn from two central areas of Bosnia due to come under Serb control in line with the Dayton accord. They began pulling out of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo on Thursday.

B-H: Muratovic Reaffirms Opposition to Serb Police

AU0402211296 Paris AFP in English
2037 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Davos, Switzerland, Feb 4 (AFP) — Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic Sunday [4 February] reaffirmed his opposition to maintaining Serb police in Serb- inhabited districts of Sarajevo for a further 45 days as he arrived in Davos to attend the World Economic Forum.

He said the move was "a serious violation" of the US-brokered peace accords signed in Paris in December and warned it could "jeopardise the (peace) process in Sarajevo."

"No one has the right to change the agreement and we are all there, including the High Representative (Carl Bildt) and IFOR [Implementation Force] and UN police forces, only to answer the question how to implement and not what," Muratovic continued.

Muratovic said he believed that Bildt, the representative for civilian aspects of the accord, "suggested it to IFOR, to leave Serb police only in Sarajevo suburbs, but in no other territories which have the same status."

He added: "Another problem is that (Serb leader Radovan) Karadzic army changed uniform and they are all there now in police uniform and armed."

According to Muratovic: "The solution is to change the decision."

He added that late on Saturday, Bosnian officials had talks with IFOR and Bildt during which he said they "promised and suggested a gradual turnover from de facto Karadzic police to federal police and international police forces." [passage omitted]

B-H: Authorities Angry Over Serb Police Retention

AU0502111496 Paris AFP in English 1045 GMT 5 Feb 96

[By Michael Adler]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 5 (AFP) — International officials enforcing Bosnia's peace agreement consider the issue of Serb police staying in their neighborhoods settled but the Bosnian government remains upset.

"The sabre has been rattled and now we will push on as envisaged," High Representative spokesman Duncan Bullivent told AFP Monday.

He said six weeks remain to resolve how residents will handle falling under Moslem-Croat rule.

International mediators decided Friday to allow Serb police to remain in the suburbs in the meantime, angering Bosnian authorities who argued that the law enforcers should have retreated with the soldiers.

"We cannot allow Serb uniforms to stay in the Federation. These uniforms are the symbol of aggression against our people," said Bosnian foreign ministry spokesman Mirza Hajric.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) earlier Sunday backed a move by Carl Bildt, the UN's top civilian representative, to extend the Serb police presence to March 19.

However, at a midnight meeting with IFOR commander US Admiral Leighton Smith and Bildt, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said allowing them to remain was illegal under the Dayton accord.

Bosnian radio reported that he and Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic had called on Bildt to retract his decision.

The High Representative's resolve to continue with business as usual seemed endangered by Serb officials declaration of a curfew in Grbavica, one of the Serb-held Sarajevo areas.

This is certain to anger Bosnian officials since their government is theoretically sovereign in this sector as of Sunday, and is already andry about Serb police staying on.

Serb police imposed a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. (2000 GMT to 0400 GMT) in Grbavica, one of five Serb-dominated sectors of Sarajevo earmarked for return to Bosnian rule.

Under the Dayton peace accords, Serb districts of Sarajevo are to revert to the Moslem-Croat Federation on March 20, following Saturday's withdrawal of Serb troops.

The Serbs are to hand over the Sarajevo area of Grbavica and the suburbs of Hadzici, Ilijas, Ilidza and Vogosca to the Federation, their former enemy.

Hajric said Bildt's decision would prevent the Bosnian population returning home after almost four years of war.

"We want this situation to cease. It is up to the high representative (Bildt) to do his job and make sure that international police staff come in appropriate numbers to do this job.

"The situation now is that IFOR is moving two steps forward with the military implementation and the civilian implementation is moving one step back. After that you can guess how many moves are needed before the Dayton agreement collapses," Hajric said.

UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko admitted just 218 members of an international police force were currently in Bosnia, including more than 100 in Sarajevo. He said the initial plan had been to bring in 4,500.

Bildt's spokesman Michael Maclay accused the Bosnian government of "blowing hot and cold" in its response to his proposals and engaging in a public debate which hindered the work of Bildt and IFOR.

Earlier Izudin Kapetanovic, president of the Moslem-Croat Federation, said that "no-one had a mandate to accept a delay in the Dayton calendar."

The Dayton accord, signed in December in Paris, set deadlines for creating Moslem-Croat and Serb states coexisting within a Bosnia republic.

B-H: NATO Officials Say Implementation 'Firmly on Track'

AU0302162596 Paris AFP in English 1504 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Munich, Germany, Feb 3 (AFP) — Bosnia's former warring parties are expected to comply fully with the latest Dayton accord deadline of midnight (2300 GMT) Saturday [3 February] to vacate territory, NATO's top military and civilian officials said here.

NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said the alliance-led implementation of the accord was going to plan and although he could not give a final assessment, "the trend is very, very positive."

Implementation of the accords was "firmly on track" and the NATO-led force (IFOR) would from Sunday take over responsibility for the areas evacuated, he added.

The Dayton accords require this to happen 45 days after the countdown date of December 20 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formally took over in Bosnia from the United Nations.

Solana described the reaching of "D+45" as "another significant milestone" in implementing the Dayton peace accords.

The next stage, up to midnight March 19 ("D+90"), will lead to the "new owners" taking over the vacated territories according to the agreed 51/49 percent division between a Moslem Croat Federation on one hand and a Bosnian Serb entity on the other.

Solana also pledged that the international force would cooperate with the international community in the investigation of war crimes, mainly by ensuring evidence of mass graves is conserved and not tampered with.

Speaking to journalists in Munich with Solana was NATO supreme commander General George Joulwan, who said troop movements for the deployment of the international force had so far gone "extremely well."

He said 57,000 troops had been moved in 2,400 airlifts, 35 ships and 3,500 trains, and he expected the deployment to be completed around February 18 and 19.

Joulwan said the troops would continue to respond immediately if threatened by snipers, for example, but he saw the principal threat to IFOR soldiers from an estimated 8,000 minefields.

He noted that the ultimate aim of the NATO-led force, mandated for a period of no more one year, was to restore freedom of movement for civilian agencies throughout the war-torn former Yugoslav republic.

"That's what we're going to do. That's our goal and that's our mission," said Joulwan, the top-ranking military commander in charge of implementing the Dayton accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He and Solana were speaking on the sidelines of an informal conference on security in Europe.

B-H: Bosnian Army Chief on Compliance With Accord

LD0302205696 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina fulfilled all the demands put forward by IFOR [Implementation Force] today, well ahead of the deadline. General Hadzihasanovic, the Bosnian army's chief of General Staff, reported briefly, in true military style, on this.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Dalida Jugo] Has the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army complied with all the obligations due on D-45?

[Hadzihasanovic] This morning I ran a final check with all commanders, in addition to written reports. The Bosnia-Herzegovina army has carried out all its obligations. [end recording]

B-H: Federation PM Says No One Can Extend Deadlines

LD0302215196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic, the prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, told B-H PRESS that no one from the Federation had discussed the Dayton deadlines or had the mandate to extend them.

He sent another protest letter to EU High Representative Carl Bildt today, warning him that Serb extremists were looting the Famos factory [in Serb-held Sarajevo] without being punished. Kapetanovic urged the EU office to make an effort to compensate for the damage caused to the Federation from the credits granted to the Serb entity.

B-H: Soljic on Croats' Compliance With Accord

LD0302223396 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Both the Americans and IFOR (Implementation Force) are satisfied with the situation in the field concerning the withdrawal of the forces. They say that all three sides are showing readiness to comply with the peace agreement provisions, the deadline on which expires at midnight today.

Is this really true? We are asking this our guest this evening, Bosnian Federation Defense Minister Vlado Soljic, who is in the studio in Siroki Brijeg. Good evening, Mr. Soljic.

[Soljic] Good evening.

[Correspondent] So, what is the situation like in the field, according to reports available to you?

[Soljic] My reports correspond to those available to foreign representatives, or rather, IFOR representatives. It seems that all sides are ready to implement the part of the Dayton agreement referring to the return of territory to the side to which the territory should go under the agreement. However, we should wait until tomorrow. But I do not think that any side will run the risk of forcing IFOR to implement this part of the agreement by force.

[Correspondent] It has been confirmed that the Croatian Defense Council today officially removed the flag and left Mrkonjic Grad, Sipovo, and Bocac.

[Soljic] The Croat side has always fulfilled its obligations. That has not always been to its advantage, but I hope that this time it will be. We have complied with our obligations 100 percent.

[Correspondent] Have you received any confirmation that the Serbs have left Odzak?

[Soljic] We do not have full reports on Odzak, but we have reports from other areas. I think that this time they will comply with their obligations.

[Correspondent] On Wednesday [31 January], you became the Bosnian Federation defense minister. According to your insights, what is military cooperation within the Federation like at the moment?

[Soljic] Military cooperation only reflects political cooperation. Judging by the latest sessions of the constituent assembly and the governments of both the Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation has truly changed for the better, the climate is good. All this promises that our cooperation, and the building of the Federation, and through that of the Federation's army, will certainly improve.

[Correspondent] I have to ask you what you think will happen to Sarajevo. Do you think that there will be more problems with the establishment of a united Sarajevo, after extending the deadline and allowing local Serb authorities to keep their police until 19 March?

[Soljic] When the Serbs are involved, it is difficult to say anything with certainty, because they always have some hidden cards up their sleeves. But I think that the international community's policy will try to work on Serbs staying in Sarajevo. I personally favor that outcome, too, because nothing else is possible if we advocate that all people should remain in their homes. I believe that the situation concerning Sarajevo will be dealt with in a situation that will be — so to speak — more normal than so far, and that the issue of a united Sarajevo will be solved to the satisfaction of all three nations living there.

[Correspondent] Mr. Soljic, thank you for the interview.

[Soljic] Thank you.

B-H: Serb PM on Compliance With Accord Obligations

LD0402181796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1750 GMT 4 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Feb. 4 (TANJUG) — The Bosnian Serb state has fulfilled all obligations from the Dayton agreement for the lifting of the sanctions against it, Serb Republic (RS) Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said Sunday [4 February].

Kasagic said on Yugoslav Radio Kragujevac, that the sanctions had not been lifted because IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Leighton Smith had incorrectly interpreted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1022.

He said General Smith had promised to send an additional report to competent authorities.

'We do not intend to violate the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the affairs in which it is sovereign. It is our wish to cooperate with Yugoslavia primarily at the economic level as part of the Dayton agreement,' Kasagic said.

He said he believed the RS would give priority to trade with Yugoslavia, but would also 'establish ties with all other entities on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.'

'We are due in Zagreb next week to establish economic ties and discuss the building of bridges across the Sava River,' RS Prime Minister Kasagic said on Radio Kragujevac.

B-H: Serb Demarcation Commission Head on Negotiations

LD0302232196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2225 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 3 Feb — The commissions for the demarcation of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation today agreed in Ilidza to tackle the issue of border modifications in a global manner.

"In certain sectors we coordinated concrete proposals today but we agreed that they could be discussed only as part of a package and that a definite agreement on the modification of borders would be accepted as an overall agreement," Velibor Ostojic, head of the Serb commission for demarcation, told SRNA.

According to him, individual modifications in certain areas will not be discussed separately, because that would threaten the global interest of one side or the other.

"We agreed to analyze all locations in which even minimal border modifications are needed, particularly in populated areas and important facilities cut by the border between the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation," Ostojic said.

He said that certain proposals by the Muslim-Croat commission in sectors North and West, and partly in Sector East, had been analysed today, as well as proposals by the Serb side regarding border modifications in all areas, including Herzegovina.

B-H: Serbs, Federation Agree on Global Border Changes

LD0402135596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1224 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG) — Demarcation commissions of Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic) and the Croat-Muslim Federation agreed in Sarajevo's suburb of Ilidza on Saturday that the issue of border corrections should be considered globally.

"We coordinated concrete proposals in some sectors, but agreed that they can be considered only within the entire package," Serb Demarcation Commission President Velibor Ostojic told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA.

Ostojic said individual corrections in some places would not be considered separately because this would violate the general interest of either side.

"We agreed to analyse and review all places where even the smallest border corrections should be made, especially in urban areas and those where major facilities are located, where a border has been drawn between Republika Srpska and the Croat-Muslim Federation," Ostojic said.

B-H: Muslims, Croats on Koschnick's Proposals for Mostar

LD0202224796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hans Koschnick, European administrator of Mostar, spoke about his consultations with EU foreign ministers in Brussels at a regular news conference in Mostar today. He did not, however, divulge to the public his decision on future arrangements for the town.

[Unidentified correspondent] As was announced, representatives of the Bosniak and Croat sides, Serb delegates, and European administration officials had a meeting at the European administration headquarters this afternoon. The main topic was administrator Koschnick's proposal on the key issues relating to Mostar: the borders of the future six municipalities and the central district. After a two-hour meeting behind closed doors Mayors, Safet Orucevic and Mijo Brajkovic had the following to say:

[Begin recording] [Orucevic] The map offered by Mr. Koschnick is very similar to our own proposals. I think that both sides could make many objections, and I think that Mr. Koschnick deliberately devised such a solution so that no one is completely satisfied at the moment. In principle, I can say on behalf of our side that we will continue holding talks with Mr. Koschnick in this direction in order to work out certain details. In principle we support his proposal.

[Brajkovic] We received Mr. Koschnick's proposals. We requested a written text of his proposals because there are certain unclear points. We agreed that we should have two more separate meetings on Monday [5 February], and a joint meeting at 1800, so we can go before the advisory body on Tuesday with at least somewhat agreed stances. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Zubak, Ganic on Talks With EU Administrator

LD0402180896 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak, Vice President Ejup Ganic; Michael Steiner, senior UN official in charge of the implementation of the Dayton agreement; and Hans Koschnick, European administrator of Mostar, had a meeting at the EU administration headquarters in Mostar this morning. Koschnick talked about the course of the talks on the political and legal set-up of the town of Mostar. After the meeting Zubak and Ganic answered journalists' questions. Zoran Kresic has a report.

[Kresic] President Zubak and Vice President Ganic voiced their opinions on Koschnick's decision on the political and legal setup of the town on the river Neretva. The president of the federation said that in his opinion the decision affected both sides in Mostar, while Ganic said he agreed with Koschnick's arbitration.

[Begin Ganic recording] I hope that the situation is good. Mr. Koschnick told us he had to make the final decision soon. The only thing I told him was to make a decision his grandchildren will be proud of in the future. [end recording]

[Kresic] President Zubak — as he stressed — presented his views to administrator Koschnick, from the point of view of his background in the law and his political position as the president of the federation.

[Begin Zubak recording] I said that — both as a lawyer and a politician — I believe the decision on the set-up of the town of Mostar must be based on what has been approved, legally and politically, which is: The constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the Brussels memorandum on Mostar, and the Dayton agreement on Mostar.

The Dayton agreement was signed by Mr. Koschnick, both mayors, Mr. [name indistinct] and Mr. [name indistinct], on behalf of the European Union. Now it has not only a political, but also a legal nature. These documents have to be used as the basis for regulating the town of Mostar. How areas will be arranged, where municipal borders will be drawn — I personally would not like to have any particular involvement. There is a principle to follow — the 1991 census; representatives of both nations living in the town of Mostar should reach an agreement on this. [end recording]

[Kresic] The district of Mostar, President Zubak went on to say, is one of the most talked about topics by the public, and one should know the following:

[Begin Zubak recording] None of the three documents I have mentioned speak about a district; this is a completely new category; there is not a single mention of it in the constitution. However, if the sides reach an agreement on it — I personally will accept it and on the basis of that, I will set in motion the appropriate procedure for changes to be made to the Federation's constitution. However, as I said, the district as a category does not exist. [end recording]

[Kresic] Asked whether this would delay finding a solution for Mostar, Zubak said he had only presented his personal opinion, adding that Koschnick would have talks with the two sides and that all relevant political players would take part in it. According to Koschnick, President Zubak concluded, it is very unlikely that the positions of the two sides would be coordinated and, in that case, a decision would be made by the European administrator in line with his authority.

B-H: Koschnick Recommends Multiethnic Districts in Mostar

LD0402223496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1928 GMT 4 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG) — Mayor of the eastern, Muslim section of Mostar Safet Orucevic said Sunday that the European Union's administrator of the city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina has recommended that the city be divided into six multi-ethnic districts.

Orucevic said on Radio Mostar that neither Muslims nor Croats had an absolute majority in any of the city's districts.

Radio Mostar said Orucevic had refuted what the mayor of the western, Croat section of Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic, had said about the meeting held with Koschnick on Friday.

The radio quoted Brajkovic as saying that it had been agreed to divide the city into three Croat and three Muslims districts.

Koschnick has said he will make public on Feb. 7 the decision about the political and territorial organization of the divided city.

After a year of fierce mutual fighting for territory between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, the city of Mostar remained divided and was subsequently placed under the E.U. administration.

Sporadic bloody clashes between Muslims and Croats broke out again in Mostar in January, undermining the agreement on the Muslim- Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed under pressure from Washington in March 1994.

B-H: Pale TV Cites IFOR 'Murder' of Alleged Sniper

LD0202230896 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The mission of IFOR [Implementation Force] has so far been going smoothly and, by all appearances, it has met with exceptionally good cooperation from all three sides. But yesterday a completely unnecessary and tragic incident took place, in which a resident of Serb Sarajevo, or more precisely, a guard at the TAT thermal appliance factory, was killed. Although the IFOR Command described the TAT worker in a public statement as an alleged sniper who had to be shot for security reasons, the truth is completely different. This tragic event will certainly remain a black point in the dossier on the IFOR mission, and should never happen again.

[Unidentified correspondent] All foreign media today reported that special units of the French battalion killed one alleged Serb sniper and captured another in Ilidza. They were accused of opening fire at IFOR several days ago. This carefully planned operation, which was, according to IFOR officials, brilliantly carried out, is in fact a cold-blooded murder of the 43-year-old Mirko

Krestalica, a longtime worker at Energoinvest's factory of thermal appliances. [passage omitted]

B-H: SDP Calls For Separation of State, Religion

AU0502112496 Hanau NOVA BOSNA
in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 4

[ONASA report: "The Army Must Not Be Party-Affiliated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 1 Feb — Esad Zgodic, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has warned about the "growing party, Army, and religious collusion."

According to him, this contravenes democratic principles and, if it continues, would prevent the realization of the ultimate goal of reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Explaining his stand at the SDP news conference in Sarajevo yesterday, Zgodic said that it was up to individual parties to decided to what extent they want to have religion present in the party, but that it was dangerous to try to incorporate the party- religion juncture in the foundations of the state. He said that the SDP was in favor of complete separation of the state and religion.

Regarding the collusion between parties and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zgodic said that we need a professional and not a party army.

"Bosnia needs top professional officers, and not officers who would advocate party interests, or officers who are members of some party leaderships," Zgodic said.

Taking part in the news conference, Mirsad Djapo, member of the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Brcko, said that the employment of demobilized members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not only be a matter of concern for companies, but also for the state entities.

According to Djapo, new employees should be sought through advertisements, and the same conditions should apply to those who found jobs during the war and the demobilized fighters.

B-H: Silajdzic Discusses Resignation, Domestic Situation

AU0402160096 Ljubljana SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian
1 Feb 96 pp 13-16

[Untitled interview with Haris Silajdzic, former prime minister of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Senka Kurtovic; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kurtovic] Have you definitely left the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]? You have been neither the chairman nor a member of the Executive Committee for a long time already.

[Silajdzic] I have not had this function for a long time; this is quite clear. I resigned, and this was the end of the whole thing. At the moment when a group of people, not the people from the SDA Executive Committee, its Main Committee, or its members, but really a group of people started deciding on everything, I parted with that group of people. At that time the war was still going on, but there is no war now. We cannot proceed like that, since I am sure that we deserve a democratic system. What I saw in the latest session of the Parliament was a kind of force and pressure. And Bosnia has had enough of any kind of pressure by anyone.

[Kurtovic] The political conflict between the SDA and you started much earlier, in August 1995; then you also submitted your resignation. There are various stories about that resignation. Which one is true?

[Silajdzic] I cannot go into depth on the problem of why I resigned, but the motive was Srebrenica and Zepa. It is a fact that these topics were not on the agenda of the Assembly, although unbelievable tragedies happened there. I simply could not believe it. Naturally, I was not even consulted about it. I came to Zenica on that day in order to attend the session of the Assembly, directly from Dubrave, and I saw women from Srebrenica, distracted people, children, and tents everywhere. Men were still going around in the woods. This was a tragedy of an unbelievable extent. And nothing! It was not mentioned at all in the Assembly session. This was my direct motive. I could not believe that everything was that much bureaucratized and estranged, that it started to resemble the regimes I know. That is why I resigned. Because of the war I agreed to work up to now, however. [passage omitted]

[Kurtovic] The people could not see what happened in Dayton. Still, you were one of the most responsible for the agreement. You are being accused today that the Army had to be additionally "inserted" into the agreement, after you had completed the negotiations, that pieces had to be put together. You were allegedly not interested in the Army. How would you comment on this?

[Silajdzic] I am very much surprised by this statement, since other people were in charge of the military aspect. President Izetbegovic said in a meeting of the

SDA Parliamentary Club there were people who were designated for the military project and defense issues. Not for a single moment in Dayton was I in charge of these issues. Other people were doing this together with President Izetbegovic all the time.

[Kurtovic] This is certainly not the only statement that will surprise you....

[Silajdzic] Probably. I am aware of that. Disqualifications are a normal thing in politics. [passage omitted]

[Kurtovic] What do you personally consider your political success in the past period?

[Silajdzic] There are three things. First of all, the presentation of the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the international community and the establishment of contacts with the international community. We did not exist as a state, as an international subject. The second thing is the establishment of the Federation after the war between Muslims and Croats was completed, and in the end my participation in Dayton, where the peace was reached. [passage omitted]

[Kurtovic] What are your political plans? There are rumors that you might establish your own party or join another one.

[Silajdzic] Everything is possible. I have to consider this.

[Kurtovic] What?

[Silajdzic] Everything you are talking about.

[Kurtovic] In other words, you will stay on the political scene?

[Silajdzic] Believe me, I would like all this not to be true, that I could say: "The war is over, everything is all right, there will be horrible problems, but there is at least not this problem." Everything which happened shows that certain things are not all right and they have to seen from another point of view. I mean the basic principles of democracy.

[Kurtovic] Are you optimistic about our future?

[Silajdzic] A part of the task has been completed, for the other part we first of all need young and capable people. We need them to implement this project not only in economy but also in the society, in other words in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A lot of work has to be completed. Regardless of where I am or what I do, I know what I have to do. I am an optimist, since our people who have endured such a horrible aggression are certainly able to create a democratic country and live in the freedom they deserve.

B-H: Prlic: Bosnia Under 'Concealed Protectorate'

AU0502120796 Sarajevo NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jan 96 p 12

[Interview with Jadranko Prlic, defense minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Senad Slatina; place and date not given: "Concealed Protectorate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Slatina] After Dayton, Mr. Prlic, you took part in several significant conferences on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Probably the most important was the one in London, at which all components in the implementation of the peace agreement were discussed. What are your impressions of that meeting?

[Prlic] The conference was organized at quite a high level, with over 50 participants at the level of foreign ministers and representatives of all international organizations, starting with the UN secretary general, director of the World Bank, representatives of the MMF, EU, to all the institutions that are involved in the implementation of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I can say on that occasion that full readiness was confirmed of all the relevant factors to implement the peace process to the end, and full support was expressed for the reconstruction, development and preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity.

This Will Be a Protectorate

[Slatina] After that conference you gave a new assessment at the last assembly meeting about the character of the London conference. You said on that occasion that a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina had been inaugurated by the London conference....

[Prlic] The London conference did not bring forth any new decisions, except for the designation of Karl Bildt as high representative. Otherwise, the jurisdiction of the high representative is defined by the provisions of the Dayton accord. It is, however, being differently interpreted. Some think it has to do just with coordination, whereas I consider that it has to do with much more, bearing in mind the various ways in which the whole financial flow going through Bosnia can be managed, and how in such a way all future relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be dictated. It is a protectorate. Otherwise, what would you call a situation when 60,000 foreign troops come into your state? It is not a tourist excursion. It is a protectorate, but not in a negative sense. We have requested it. We have signed not only to ask for foreign troops to assist the military implementation, but also to assist the civilian implementation as well.

[Slatina] You also said that Mr. Bildt would have greater authority than the highest legal administrative organs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Prlic] In certain, very important components — he will. Either he, or other institutions.

[Slatina] Which attributes of state sovereignty is the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina renouncing? Can you illustrate your assessments by examples?

[Prlic] You see, the only military formations that can freely move throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina are those of IFOR. Our military units must notify IFOR about any movement in advance. Which is to say, the situation is completely the reverse of what has been the case so far, when speaking of international military force. The governor of the Central Bank will be a foreigner for a period of six years, and he will be appointed by the MMF.

The program of the refugees' return will be defined by UNHCR. The high representative will be authorized to, for instance, confiscate immovable property and so forth. We should wait and see how all that will function on the ground, but I believe that this is extremely wide authority. All the more as the entire state system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is rather complex. From the central authorities to the Federation, cantons and so forth, the state has still not been consolidated, and it has still not adopted its true functions. Everything is still in a transitional phase.

Institutions are coming that will be present in Sarajevo and on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The OSCE alone will bring along 350 of its highly qualified staff, who will be disposed in 30 places all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and who will control the preparation and conduct of elections. All these are elements that speak for our being under a sort of protectorate. Many things are happening beyond our knowledge. We have to designate in the Assembly a series of bodies and commissions that will follow the implementation. We are already being taken by surprise in the face of certain events.

Governor of Central Bank — a Foreigner

[Slatina] Will Bildt be able to directly intervene in decisionmaking by the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] Directly — no. The international community, however, is still doing so in a more sophisticated way, and not in the way we are used to, that is, whether somebody has a say, or is in charge of decisionmaking. There are objective mechanisms by which the international community can simulate all possible situations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it can almost entirely control them.

[Slatina] Does the agreement anticipate a police force at the federal level?

[Prlic] No, there is no police at the federal level. That is not anticipated by the Dayton accord. How the security service will look will be seen only later.

The State Security Service will be defined on 31 May 1996, in accordance with the agreement that the two sides have reached. It will be defined at the federal level.

[Slatina] What does it mean from the point of view of one country's sovereignty that the governor of the Central Bank is a foreign citizen?

[Prlic] In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think that is an advantage. He will impose demanding criteria, skill, knowledge, and he will manage to build a system that will guarantee a better future to all people. He will be utilizing the currency board system, we shall have a definitely fixed exchange rate and steady prices, we shall have very strict monetary aggregates, a situation without inflation, and everybody will indeed be dependent on the results of his or her work, rather than on manipulations that used to come about due to inflation caused by changes in the exchange rate, which we remember from the times of former Yugoslavia.

[Slatina] After London you were at the conference in Paris. Did you have any more serious contacts there?

[Prlic] We had a series of contacts with many important persons in international politics. We continued the talks on the program of furnishing and training of the army of the Federation, which had been defined earlier, and in that respect everything is developing, more or less, at a regular pace. The act on defense of the Federation will be rapidly passed, and this will create conditions for the establishment of a respectable military force, which is one of the preconditions of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Foreign Minister of the Federation

[Slatina] When speaking of the supreme commander of the army of the Federation, alternative solutions have been left for adoption. In your opinion, how will this last disagreement be settled?

[Prlic] The supreme commander of the armed forces, when speaking of the level of the Federation, is the president and the vice-president, although we have to bear in mind that on the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to their functions, have civilian control over the armed force, and in that respect a proper balance will be found in the process of implementation of the entire peace accord. When speaking of the Defense

Ministry, we have already clarified that minister and chief commander of the army of the Federation will be persons of different nationalities. The Defense Ministry will be in charge of the complete defense system, including the civilian protective force, military industry, joint commands and all staff matters. Consequently, the defense minister will be the most responsible person for that domain, while the chief commander will also have all the authority that the chief commanders have in any other state.

[Slatina] You are no closer now to the idea of unified and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina than you were before?

[Prlic] An integral Bosnia has never been a point of dispute in my political concept. What was disputed was what that integral Bosnia was supposed to be like. We said that Croats were not in favor of a republic in which they would be outvoted, and in which they would not be able to exercise their national rights. We demanded nothing more, nothing less. Through the Federation, Croats are accomplishing that. That is a perfectly clear stance. Bosnia- Herzegovina is not under dispute, and what is important is what Bosnia-Herzegovina is like.

[Slatina] You are being referred to more and more often as the future foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Prlic] According to an agreement that has been endorsed, the chairman of the future Council of Minister will be Bosniak, while foreign minister will be Croat. Consequently, the Presidency of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina has designated me as a candidate for that position. This is all I can tell you about that.

B-H: HDZ Chief Views Federation Implemention

AU0502123196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with Bozo Raic, chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jozo Pavkovic; place and date not given: "Dayton Is an Obligation for All of Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting of the Presidency of HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was chaired by chairman elect Bozo Raic, a series of important decisions was made. Before the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly, being one of the today's key events in the implementation of the Federation, we talked with Mr. Raic.

[Pavkovic] At the latest meeting of the Presidency of HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a decision was made about the gradual transfer of executive functions of power in the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia to administrative bodies of the Croatian-Bosniak Federation. What is all that about?

[Raic] In the Dayton accord the obligation to transfer executive power from the existing authorities in the regions under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the BH Army [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] to the corresponding administrative bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been clearly defined. Dedicated to the implementation of the Dayton accords — as much for the Agreement on Implementation of the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina as for the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina — at the meeting of the Presidency of HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina we have made a political decision on the gradual transfer of functions of executive power from the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia to administrative bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The gradual transfer of power will be carried out in accordance with the establishment and startup of corresponding administrative bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia

[Pavkovic] The Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has made another political decision on the establishment of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. What does that decision mean?

[Raic] By definition the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia represents an institutional form of togetherness, links, and cooperation among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will be primarily a political, economic and cultural community of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will also include other forms of togetherness, mutuality and solidarity, particularly regarding care for all categories of victims of the liberation war. The organization and jurisdictions of Herzeg-Bosnia and its bodies will be in harmony with the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and relevant international conventions on human rights and rights of national communities to self-organization and association.

[Pavkovic] What did you mean by the demand made to the partner side in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina for fulfilling the obligation of transfer of executive power in the regions under the BH Army control to responsible bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Raic] The Dayton agreement is an integrated arrangement in which every side, and thus the partner side, has precisely defined obligations. Making the decision to fulfill our obligations, we considered it our right and duty to call on the partner side to carry out its obligations in a timely and consistent manner. I think that nobody can object to our demand in any point, because it is legitimate and made with the best of intentions.

[Pavkovic] You have designated candidates for the highest functions in the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transitional period. Are you satisfied with the number and quality of future ministerial and deputy offices?

[Raic] The designation of our candidates was preceded by an inter-party accord between the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] regarding the distribution of offices in the governments of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transitional period. I think we can be satisfied with the number and quality of ministerial and deputy offices. All our candidates come directly from positions in the government of Herzeg-Bosnia and its bodies, and it is particularly important that all our future officials in the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are administrators of the uniform policy of the HDZ.

Counties Essential

[Pavkovic] After setting up administrative bodies at the level of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transitional period, given the almost completely constituted authorities in municipalities, what has happened with the establishment of the middle level of power in counties-cantons?

[Raic] The condition for setting up and the functioning of counties and their authorities is completion of the process of transformation and territorial demarcation of counties-cantons in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That process has become an imperative because of changed circumstances. The Dayton accord, with regard to the territorial demarcation between the two entities, considerably deviates from the territorial demarcation envisaged by the Contact Group's plan. Moreover, within the Federation there are newly liberated regions that, in terms of internal territorial demarcation in the Federation, have not yet been defined. Considering that the establishment of county authorities is unacceptable and unproductive before the transformation and territorial demarcation within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina happens, and before the adoption of constitutions of every county is made, we have demanded in inter-party talks with the SDA more expeditious and consistent settling of these questions. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot function constitutionally without the establishment and functioning of county authorities, particularly in view of the fact that through the counties the greatest number of national rights are accomplished. As far as the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, it would be possible to develop the process of setting up county authorities, in accord with what has been said, much more quickly.

[Pavkovic] Why are decisions of the political bodies to which the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and SDA have agreed being implemented so slowly?

[Raic] It would not be correct to say that the leaderships and the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and SDA do not want a quicker and consistent implementation of what they have agreed. However, resistance to the implementation of what has been agreed exists for objective and subjective reasons. We must realize, and this belongs to the sphere of objective reasons, that we were exposed to the negative effects of indoctrination and media war, that we waged war against each other and suffered, and that fresh memories frequently breed inhibitions among people who have not yet suppressed their fears and mistrust. On the other hand, there are individuals and groups who do not consider the peace process fully acceptable, and want to slow down the process by causing delay, if they are not able to prevent it altogether. It is an equal duty of both parties to eliminate causes of delay in the implementation of what has been agreed, particularly by neutralizing centers of resistance that exist for subjective reasons.

Confidence Building

[Pavkovic] What in your opinion is the cooperation between the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SDA like?

[Raic] It is normal that both the parties, defending the rights and interests of their respective peoples, are trying to accomplish as much as possible within the overall agreements. In all that, of course, there are differences in opinions, periods of inactivity taken for reconsideration of attitudes, as well as compromises that are inevitable in any political activity. It is important that we manage to reach accord on more and more issues, and that we are building our relationship on the basis of mutual regard and respect.

[Pavkovic] How do you view the widespread view that two chairmen of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina have already resigned so far, under the pressure of SDA's policy?

[Raic] Politics is the art of the realistic and the possible. Every representative of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those engaged in politics, has accepted and understood his duty aimed at protection of the rights and interests of the Croatian people, equally accepting the beginning of fighting and its cessation, whenever it was assessed as necessary and useful. I want to say that Croatian officials, particularly the chairmen of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have not been designated or relieved of duty by anybody outside or above the HDZ. I do not feel that the more frequent shifts of chairmen of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in view to the practices of other democratic parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are a handicap, but rather an advantage for us over others in the democratization of inter-party life. As for allegations regarding Croatian officials, I will tell you my attitude. In totalitarian systems such as the one we have abandoned to our great good fortune, the burden of proving innocence was borne by the accused, while today, in a democratic society it is not and cannot be like that. Anybody can be accused, but the burden of proof is borne by the accuser. In that light the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and myself personally consider innocent all the accused members of our people until proven otherwise. I have publicly stated the opinion that accusations launched by the Sarajevo media against Croatian officials and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are definitely not helpful in the implementation of the Federation, and the restoration of confidence and cohabitation in the common state. I hope that those who can contribute to the cancellation of legal proceedings have heard this. Of course, crime never lapses in time, there is no doubt about our readiness to cooperate with the international community on these matters, but mutual accusations must cease for the sake of the future of this country and people living in it.

Mostar Is Not Decisive

[Pavkovic] Mostar is again the center of attention. Do you think that Mostar is really the key to the success or failure of the Federation, as is being suggested by certain circles, and what is the attitude of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the settlement of the Mostar issue?

[Raic] I do not think that Mostar is the key to the success or failure of the Federation. Mostar is indeed an important question of the implementation and functioning of the Federation, but it is not the decisive and only one. For the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina current relations are equally important, and how they will be arranged in Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Bihac, and particularly in Bugojno, Vares, Fojnica and Konjic. The partner side would probably point out some other communities as well, looking at things from its own angle. No matter how the issue of Mostar is settled, if we do not appropriately settle relations in other cities and places in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we shall do nothing to accomplish the true Federation. Therefore the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is interested in an integral and equally principled approach to the settlement of questions in Mostar and in the entire Federation, which means that we are all obliged to behave in accordance with the solutions adopted, or in short, the Dayton accord.

We have lived and shall live together with other peoples, which presupposes tolerance and mutual regard, but never at the expense of our own dignity, rights and interests.

[Box, page 7]

[Pavkovic] People are talking about the headquarters of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina being returned to Sarajevo. Will the party move with its entire apparatus to Sarajevo?

[Raic] In the conditions of war it was unproductive, but also impossible, to keep the headquarters of our party in Sarajevo. We were required to secure the functioning of the party, which we did from Mostar. In the changed circumstances as a result of the cessation of war, opening of communications, and particularly the signing of the peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina, conditions have been created for the headquarters of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina to return to Sarajevo. We are needed in Sarajevo to perform our duties and daily contacts with our officials and international factors, but that does not mean we will close our office in Mostar. We shall be working in accordance with our interests and needs both from Sarajevo and Mostar.

[Box, page 7]

[Pavkovic] This year general elections and elections of representatives in the highest bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina are supposed to take place. With what ambitions is the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina preparing for those important elections and how?

[Raic] The HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a party with a full mandate given to it by the Croatian people in the first multi-party elections. Relying on the superior platform of our party and overall achievements in defense and protection of rights of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we are coming out in the next elections with the clear ambition to win. I am sure that the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina know who is able, who wants and knows how to lead and complete the struggle for the accomplishment of strategic goals of the Croatian people as a whole. The party that has established the sovereign, independent and internationally recognized state of Croatia, that has spearheaded the successful struggle for the plain biological survival of the Croats in the region, that has reestablished the political independence and dignity of the Croatian people in Bosnia- Herzegovina, that party cannot achieve nothing but a convincing victory in the next elections. We shall wage the election campaign and run following a special program, which will be determined by the Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and verified by the Central Board.

[Pavkovic] Will the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a choice of more Croatian parties to consider in the next elections?

[Raic] It is realistic to expect a certain pluralization of the political space in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Being members of a democratic party, we do not mind the spreading of a political fan at all. On the contrary, we welcome it, because in a fair game we do not view the appearance of one or 10 parties as a threat to the political position of the HDZ.

[Pavkovic] What is the basic reason for the different views held by the opposition and the HDZ of the situation, relations and models of settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Raic] The main reason for the different views is that the opposition judges about Bosnia-Herzegovina and relations in Bosnia- Herzegovina from a distance, whereas we, the HDZ, judge matters while living and struggling in the region. Assessments of the opposition are more or less academic, whereas ours are based on experience. The HDZ is a ruling party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means great responsibilities, while the opposition is struggling for power using the policy of HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is not directly responsible for the fate of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second, no less important reason for disagreements between the opposition and the HDZ regarding the Croatian issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina and integral Croatian interest is the lack of communication, particularly of direct insight in the local circumstances on the part of opposition leaders, which ought to have been and could have been much better, to the advantage of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our people say, not without reason: If you want to help me, share hardship with me, or at least get to know my own hardship.

[Pavkovic] What is the cooperation of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the central HDZ in Zagreb like?

[Raic] The HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is part of the unified HDZ. Which means that our relations and cooperation are viewed as the relationship between a whole and its part, and vice versa. The harmonization of the general and the common, the individual and the particular, is the basis of our activity, where guidelines of our uniform policy, the integral Croatian interest and the protection of Croatianhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina are invariable. Thanks precisely to the unity of the HDZ's policy such great achievements, in face of which even the most severe critics are disarmed, have been possible to envisage and accomplish. We have known from the beginning, just as we still know, that only with unity in the HDZ, as a planetary organization, will we be able to accomplish our general and particular goals. The ever louder advocates of the so-called autonomous Croatian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina will definitely lose ground to this fact. The Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina has known and will know how to distinguish between a sincere performance and petty politics and trickery.

B-H: Krajisnik: No Changes Expected in Serb Leadership

LD0402182596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 4 Feb (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, said today that he did not expect any changes in the leadership of the Serb Republic.

"President Radovan Karadzic was elected by the people. It is his democratic right. He is absolutely the most popular person in the Serb Republic and the most influential member of the leadership," Krajisnik told the Belgrade-based BETA agency.

He said the international community was making a mistake by trying to isolate Karadzic, and added that "it would be better for the Americans to be rational and talk with those who control the power."

"Our leadership is united and we make decisions mainly together, which is why it makes no difference who represents us at negotiations," Krajisnik explained, and said that the isolation "does not affect Karadzic a great deal."

According to Krajisnik, the Serb Republic does not consider Hasan Muratovic's recently appointed government to be legitimate, because it was not elected in coordination with the Serb entity.

"We do not want to take part in that government and it is not binding for us. We feel Bosnia-Herzegovina will start to function only after the elections are held," Krajisnik said.

According to him, the future joint government can be established only by the Serb Republic and the

Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but only as partners. That government has to be a result of an agreement between partners, Krajisnik said.

According to Krajisnik, the situation in Serb Sarajevo is "confusing;" many people are leaving their homes and others want "to stay at any cost."

"Those who are resolute in their decision to stay do not accept the Muslim authorities and they want a solution to be found which will enable them to participate in the authorities," Krajisnik said and expressed "deep concern" for the further implementation of the Dayton Agreement, because the "international community is not actively trying to solve the problem of Serb Sarajevo."

"I want to be clear: The Serbs will not allow themselves to be expelled from Sarajevo. They are prepared for a compromise and they hope that a just solution will be found," Krajisnik said.

He said Sarajevo should be a separate district in which Serbs would have their authorities in their municipalities.

"We want our national rights. The Serb Republic is a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo Serbs must be linked to their entity. We have a right to our own language, alphabet, holidays, symbols, flag, and local government," Krajisnik said.

B-H: SDA Neglecting Non-Religious Muslims

AU0502115296 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 95 p 4

[Jasmina Sabic article: "Commodities for a Familiar Buyer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the communal SDA [Party of Democratic Action] branches recently issued its first election pamphlet: "It is well known what the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] will do, the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] will vote for itself, and you?" The message is clear — if you do not vote for the SDA, there will be neither Muslims nor Bosnia. There is no doubt that there are many Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina who will vote for the SDA in the coming election — out of fear of a new war, genocide, and suffering, which the SDA warns of, or of losing their Muslim identity. This fear overshadows everything else, the fear of the future will wipe away the imbalance between what they like or perhaps dislike in that party, between the things they support or perhaps oppose in its policy. On the other hand, there are many Muslims who see the future with more optimism, but who do not know yet who to vote for in the election. After what happened at the two-day meeting of the SDA Executive Committee it does not seem, however, that the SDA is counting on the latter!

A Little Bit of Everything

And this is the biggest mistake the SDA is making at the beginning of its election campaign. The pompously proclaimed new SDA course has boiled down to the election of new people into its highest bodies. Everything else has remained as it was. Some people who were criticized for publicly disclosing conflicts have left, and almost anonymous people, but loyal to the party, have entered the leadership. "The purges" announced several months in advance have been completed with the removal of generals whom people already called legendary, and the SDA lets everybody know: "We will win in the elections, and we will have no competition, as we are the party that will enable the Muslim population to survive." Self-confidence, naivete, a good, or a bad guess! There is probably a little bit of everything.

New people could be the generator, but — as is the case in democratic countries — only if they have something new to offer! It seems, however, that the SDA, also with new people, offers too many old things. What has been achieved so far must be praised, but there has been too much repetition of the well-known determination that the Muslims have to remain unique, that their interests have to be preserved, or that the problems should be solved at the level of the nation and the state. The party leadership has not engaged itself enough in the things that have not been done, or that have been been done badly or not at all. People are not deaf, nor blind, and least of all stupid. They want to acknowledge the SDA for what it has done, but they are entitled to ask why the Federation has not started functioning yet, why the fate of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is uncertain, why every meeting with the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] ends up in a new conflict of interests, why we have to place the mere survival of the Muslims in the focus of our interests for three, four, or five more years. What are we threatened by if we cannot accept ourselves that other views of democracy and the orientation toward an opposition party destroy our Muslim unity! If there is the possibility of a new war, we should be told so, so that no one, and especially not the Muslims, use up their energy in a futile struggle for a better political and any other kind of life. Out of fear for life itself, we have learned to consider everything else minor.

Personalities and Programs

If it is not the war, what then is the SDA's interest in primarily supporting the protection of the unity of the Muslim population? At least the part of the Muslim population that has remained in the country has proven that it is unique. The people cannot be said not to be unique simply because they do not unanimously support the SDA, or because they publicly support this or that leader. If the SDA addresses the public with the thesis that people are the prerequisite for the election, that personalities will be voted for in the election, it shakes the proposition that those who support Haris Silajdzic undermine the unity of the SDA. If there are no programs behind the new SDA members by election time, the following thing could happen to the party, which it should not want — that it is voted for out of fear of the future, and not because there is confidence in its abilities and knowledge.

From this aspect we return to the first mistake the SDA has made regarding the election — its election program should offer something also to all those Muslims who are not in the SDA, and whose number is not so small, and who perhaps do not want to become members of any political party at all. Instead of being afraid that Muslims could be atheists, the SDA should finally recognize that a very small number of the country's population have remained atheists. There is not a single Muslim family in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which some or all of its members do not fast for Ramadan, in which Bajram is not celebrated, or Hidjret New Year.

How Many Atheists Are There?

Instead of insulting the Muslims who are not SDA members by saying that they are without color, smell, and taste, that they do not know who and what they are, this party should, before it is too late, make a thorough analysis of how many such Muslims there are. If there are more of them than it has estimated, the SDA will not achieve the success in the next election it is confident of. Many of the things heard in the Executive Committee have a religious rather than a democratic footing. The Muslims have already returned to their religion, they have it in their homes and mosques, so that they will support the SDA if it offers them much more than that. In communist times they had to conceal both their religion and opinion. Today they have the religion, but they crave for the freedom of opinion to the extent that they will not give it up without it being in anyone's interests. If the SDA does not realize this, if it does not steer a new course in its party policy, it cannot count on survival in the long run (nor on the survival of the Muslims).

The current firm links between religion and politics, the lack of liberal opinions about both religion and politics, make the SDA too much a party that requires obedience and does not allow much individuality. If it sticks to this tendency, in future the SDA will not have as members the significant percentage of people it needs to become what it wants to be — it will not have young people, intellectuals from urban centers, which will prevent it in replacing the authority of obedience by the stronger authority of common sense that people have confident in.

Croatia: Christopher, Tudjman Hold Talks

LD0302105096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1036 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb/Belgrade, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived in the northeastern Bosnian town of Tuzla on Saturday morning, continuing his tour of former Yugoslavia which he began late Friday.

On Friday evening, Chrisopher conferred with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb. Christopher said after the talks that all sides should invest maximum efforts for the Bosnia peace accords to be fully implemented.

He said the start of the implementation of the Dayton peace accords gave room for high hopes that peace would be achieved. He said he had taken this message to Zagreb and would also deliver it to Sarajevo and Belgrade.

Christopher warned that Croatia was obliged to secure the return of all expelled persons and respect the rights of all citizens in full. This was clearly an allusion to the 250,000 Serbs who had been forced to flee Krajina and the difficult predicament of several thousand old people who had had to remain in their homes during the Croatian army offensive on this area in August 1995.

Tudjman said in a statement to the press that the Dayton peace accords provided a basis for introducing the new world order in this part of the world.

He said his government would do everything for the basic agreement on eastern Slavonia, Baranja and west Srem to be implemented, the region over which Zagreb and the local Serbs are locked in dispute.

Christopher will visit the U.S. contingent of the international peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Tuzla, and then depart for Sarajevo, from where he will return to Zagreb during the day.

The U.S. Secretary of State will be in Belgrade on Sunday for talks with Yugoslav officials.

Croatia: Tudjman Assesses Talks With Christopher

LD0302185796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we reported, Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman received U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the Presidential Palace last night. The main topics of their talks were the reintegration of the Croatian Danubian region, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, and relations between Croatia and the United. After the talks, which ended at midnight, Tudjman and Christopher made statements to the press and answered questions. Tihomir Vinkovic reports:

[Begin recording] [Vinkovic] Following the talks with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, President Tudjman said:

[Tudjman] The talks which we have had with Secretary of State Christopher and the U.S. delegation were the continuation of the very successful cooperation and friendly partnership between the United States and Croatia, which has been developing particularly well since the Dayton Agreement and the visit of President Clinton.

The Dayton Agreement, under the leadership of the United States and with the constructive participation of Croatia, has contributed to the achievement of peace and the creation of the prerequisites for a new international order in this turbulent part of the world, and therefore has broader significance than our bilateral relations. However, Croatia is of course particularly interested in broad economic, cultural, and other relations with the United States as the major world power. We are very pleased that these relations are developing in this way. [passage omitted]

[Vinkovic] Asked by journalists whether he was now more assured that peaceful reintegration would be carried out or whether force would have to be used for the return of occupied territory, President Tudjman replied:

[Tudjman] We have a situation today which we could not even envisage prior to the Dayton Agreement. Thanks to the leadership and efforts of the United States we have achieved a general agreement on the peaceful solution of the occupied regions, and I believe that we are on the way to realizing that. For its part Croatia will do everything to avoid the use of force and to resolve the situation in the spirit of the agreement in a peaceful manner, and we expect that, precisely thanks to the United States and the present visit of the secretary of state, the other party will also adhere to the agreement and that the agreement will therefore be implemented.

[Vinkovic] Asked whether Croatia would cooperate with the war crimes tribunal, President Tudjman said:

[Tudjman] Just as Croatia was constructive in seeking a peaceful solution, it will also be constructive with regard to The Hague court. Of course, Croatia has its own constitution and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the Croatian government is currently drafting a law to be submitted to parliament in order to be fully compliant with the demands, or rather to cooperate with The Hague court.

[Vinkovic] Asked where he foresaw problems in the application of the Dayton Agreement, President Tudjman replied:

[Tudjman] With regard to the Dayton Agreement, two issues are important for us. One is the peaceful solution, peaceful reintegration of Croatia's occupied regions, and I believe that we are well on the way towards this. The other issue is also connected with the first—the realization of the Croat-Muslim Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding this, what I have already said also applies, that a few weeks ago we still did not have such a favorable situation, but now the representatives of the Croat and Bosniak-Muslim peoples in Bosnia have reached important agreements on the establishment of the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in general we are on the way to resolving the remaining questions which carry the guarantee of peace and the establismhent of a new order in this region. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Croatia: FM Granic Calls Christopher Visit Success

LD0402194496 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Feb 96

[Statement by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic at Zagreb Airport on 4 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Granic] The visit by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Croatia was very successful. It confirmed the current state of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the United States, and Croatia as a strategic partner of the United States. We talked about all issues relating to the promotion of bilateral cooperation, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, the strengthening of the Federation, the development of economic relations, as well as respect for human rights in the whole region. Croatia will certainly make its contribution [to this]. Results that are being achieved surpass what was expected; in fact, few people expected such a huge improvement in our relations, which followed especially after the Dayton talks.

Croatia: Ambassador to U.S. on Christopher's Visit

LD0302163696 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 2 Feb 96

[Interview with Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador to the United States by unidentified correspondent on 2 February; Zuzul in United States, correspondent in Zagreb TV studio—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unidentified correspondent] On the occasion of Warren Christopher's visit to Zagreb, we are talking to Miomir Zuzul, the new Croatian ambassador to the United States.

[Correspondent] Good evening, Mr. Zuzul.

[Zuzul] Good evening.

[Correspondent] We are expecting the arrival of the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Zagreb tonight. Tomorrow he will visit Tuzla and Sarajevo, and the day after tomorrow he is due in Belgrade. What are the main reasons behind the visit and what is the main objective of the secretary of state's visit to the areas of former Yugoslavia?

[Zuzul] The main reasons are well known—they are the further implementation of the Dayton accord, the continuation of an American policy that has been defined through its strategic interests in the area of former Yugoslavia—and having reached certain ideas and solutions—is now trying to implement them. This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that on the bilateral levels they do have a whole range of topics and interests that will also be discussed.

[Correspondent] According to your information, how has Washington assessed the implementation of the Dayton agreement so far? Are there any difficulties in the military aspect of it?

[Zuzul] I do not think there are many difficulties, at least not much is talked about here of the difficulties in the military aspect. As we have been saying from the start, it is evident now that this military aspect is simpler and easier than it was believed here it would be. It is also evident that in respect of the political aspect there is still a whole range of problems and difficulties that will have to be tackled. It is in this context that this visit should be viewed, as well as Mr. Holbrooke's visit a few weeks ago. We should expect a whole series of political developments to be streamlined in this direction.

[Correspondent] What would be the main points the Americans would insist with all sides—in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade—on being improved?

[Zuzul] During the time since the Dayton agreement all of us in the area of former Yugoslavia have entered a new phase. It is now that the relations within every one of these states must be defined, as well as relations with each one of these states individually with the United States. That is why it is difficult to give a uniform answer that could be applied to all three states.

[Correspondent] And each of them separately?

[Zuzul] Well, I think perhaps one could say something briefly about each of them separately. Perhaps I could start with my understanding of Serbia. I believe Serbia is looking for and trying to find an opening and way of entering serious communications with the international community. It is well known...[pauses] There is a lot of discussion here in Washington about whether Secretary of State Christopher should have visited Belgrade or not, but the prevailing opinion is that it is good for him to go there and that it is a normal continuation of what was agreed upon and signed in Dayton. If Serbia, that is Yugoslavia, or to be more precise, Milosevic honors what has been agreed, all this is part of a process that has a foreseeable course.

On the other hand, in Sarajevo, in this political situation where it is still unclear what the real position of the central government in relation to the government of the [Muslim-Croat] federation is, when important, crucial issues are being resolved, I believe that the presence of the United States and the U.S. diplomacy that brokered these solutions is in fact essential if any real improvement is to be made.

I think I am not partial if I say that our position is by far the best and the most relaxed [najkomodniji]. In the period since Dayton we have really shown and proved that Croatia is a real and serious partner upon which both the United States and the world community can rely. Our country is closest to that world and most capable of contributing to peace through its activities. As far as we are concerned, I think this is an additional step in developing bilateral relations between Croatia and the United States.

[Correspondent] Let us go back to Richard Holbrooke, since you mentioned him. Today we read a statement in which he expresses his fear of the collapse of Bosnia-Herzegovina and fear that the two members of the union in Bosnia-Herzegovina might move closer on the one hand to Serbia and on the other to Croatia, which would disintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is this his personal opinion, or does this really exist as a fear in Washington?

[Zuzul] [passage omitted] It seems to me that there is much more fear here in the United States, and among everyone who wants this peace and stabilization to finally come about, there is much more fear for the future of the [Muslim-Croat] federation because the whole peace concept is based on the success of the federation plan, that is the federation between Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If this fails, we are back at the starting point and then there is in effect no political model that could succeed. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Will Christopher's visit to Zagreb—to concentrate on this part—perhaps include some economic aspects, and what can we expect in this area, because it is obvious that some things are happening already that we can put into the context of civilian relations, civilian issues.

[Zuzul] I have to repeat that relations between the United States and Croatia have entered a new stage, it is not just a phrase or our perception. [passage omitted] Christopher's visit should be seen in this context as a continuation of what was beginning to develop before Dayton and entered a new phase in Dayton and which was definitely confirmed by President Clinton's visit. Perhaps, in line with these optimistic views, we should mention that preparations are being made for a major [Croatian] economic delegation, which should come [to the U.S.] at the end of March or in April. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Tudjman, Hungary's Horn Discuss Slavonia

LD0302122096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn is currently staying in Okucani, the base for the Hungarian IFOR [Implementation Force] unit in Croatia. Peter Zentai reports.

[Zentai] During our broadcast, the Hungarian prime minister is meeting members of the Hungarian technical unit in Okucani. In half an hour the Hungarian soldiers will be officially put under NATO command. From this point of view, this is an unprecedented event.

Prior to our departure from Zagreb to Okucani, which is situated at the Bosnian border, Horn held a 40-minute discussion with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. They agreed that working groups will be set up to work out details of the planned infrastructural projects, such as highway construction and railway developments. There was no mention, however, of the privatization of the Adriatic oil pipeline, in which the Hungarian oil company Mol Rt has shown considerable interest.

Another important topic of the Tudjman-Horn meeting was how the Serb-held territories, first and foremost eastern Slavonia—from where, among others, 4-5,000 local Hungarians were forced to flee to Croatia and Hungary—could be returned to Croatia in a peaceful way, meeting international demands. [passage omitted]

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs, Galbraith Discuss Erdut

AU0202173296 Vukovar Radio Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith has been meeting with representatives of the Srem [Serb name for Srijem]-Baranja province] in Vukovar today.

After touring Vukovar and Ilok and talking to people there, U.S. Ambassador in Croatia Peter Galbraith met with Slavko Dokmanovic, the president of the council of the Srem-Baranja province; Borislav Drzaic, president of the executive council of the Srem-Baranja province; and Dusan Teofilovic, president of the executive council of the municipality of Vukovar in Vukovar today. Ambassador Galbraith and president of the council Slavko Dokmanovic made statements about the meeting.

[Begin Galbraith recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I am very pleased with the constructive attitude that they have toward implementation of the Erdut agreement. The task that lies ahead is to translate what has been written on paper into reality and there are many practical issues to be resolved; I think that they are very interested in resolving the practical issues. I think it is very important that everybody understands what is going to be done in the transitional period, so that people's rights are fully protected. Let me say that we also discussed the most difficult issue, which is the right of everybody to return home. This, of course, means that Croats and everybody else who left this territory or were driven from it have the right to return to their homes, but it also means that the Serbs who came here from other parts of Croatia have the right to return to their homes. All the people who are Croatian citizens must have the same rights. We had a very good discussion about this issue.

In a few days General Klein will be returning here, this time in the role of transitional administrator. I will be here to monitor the situation for the United States. [end recording]

[Begin Dokmanovic recording] Today's was one of Mr. Galbraith's frequent visits. We discussed the implementation of the agreement signed in Erdut and established that so far things are going as anticipated by the agreement. We made it clear again that we would abide by all the provisions of the agreement, and that we are not asking for more than the agreement anticipates, but also that we would not accept anything less.

We asked the ambassador to influence the Croatian side to stop the media war against the Serb people, particularly the people who live in the Srem-Baranja province, and we also asked him to point out to the Croatian side that they must also implement the agreement provisions, particularly as far as refugees are concerned, that is, as far as the return of the displaced persons from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia is concerned. This is clearly defined by the agreement, and if this process, which is going to be one of the most difficult to implement, does not go both ways, it will be very difficult to expect the agreement to be implemented.

We also stated that it is not possible to ask only the Serb side to abide by the agreement, which binds both sides. In view of what has been done so far, Croatia has not shown any will to abide by the agreements, not only the Erdut agreement, but also the one signed in Paris, that is, the so-called Dayton accord.

Mr. Galbraith promised to explain our positions to the Croatian Government, and said he and the U.S. Administration would do everything for the agreement to be observed. [end recording]

After the meeting, Ambassador Galbraith held a public forum in the Vukovar Faculty of Economics and Law in the evening, after which he met with Milan Milanovic, the head of the negotiation team of the Srem-Baranja province, in Erdut.

Croatia: UN's Rehn Visits Muslim Dissident Refugees

AU0202185496 Paris AFP in English
1747 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Feb 2 (AFP)—The UN rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Elisabeth Rehn, Friday visited dissident Bosnian Moslem refugees living in extreme conditions in a camp on the border between Croatia and Bosnia.

A spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Rajka Rasan, said Rehn was to assess the humanitarian situation of the refugees, former supporters of the rebel Moslem lawlord Fikret Abdic, before travelling on to Abdic's former stronghold, Velika Kladusa, in the Bihac region of western Bosnia.

Conditions in the refugee camp at Kupljensko, close to the border with Bosnia, are extremely harsh because of the cold.

Thousands of pro-Abdic fighters and their families, who had allied with Bosnian Serb rebels, fled Bihac last September as the course of the conflict in the former enclave turned against them.

Zagreb authorities have refused them residence inside Croatia and refuse to accord them refugee status.

Around half the remaining refugees, estimated by the UNHCR at around 18,000, have decided to return to Bosnia, but the other half are still fearful of possible reprisals against them by the Bosnian authorities and prefer to endure the rigours of camp life.

A mixed police force comprising Croatian, Bosnian and Turkish officers has been set up in Velika Kladusa to reassure returnees. The flow of returns has slowed in recent weeks following the death of one returnee, apparently in a fight with a Bosnian soldier.

Rehn plans on Sunday to visit the former UN "safe area" of Srebrenica, overrun by Serb forces last July. Several thousand Moslem men have been missing since then, presumed killed in the aftermath of the enclave's collapse.

Rebel Serbs are accused of massacring the men in cold blood and burying them in mass graves. The episode led directly to the resignation of Rehn's predecessor as human rights rapporteur in former Bosnia, former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. [passage omitted]

Croatia: IFOR Optimism Seen Unjustified, War Possible

AU0502112196 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 34-35

[Mario Galic article: "NATO Has Only Frozen the Flames of War"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Almost every statement issued by the IFOR [International Force] commander has been full of optimism regarding the future of the international operation and of assessments of how successful it has been, at least regarding the first two months of implementation. Every assessment of success depends, however, on two things at least: results and the assessment criteria. [passage omitted]

That the illusion of success is actually very thin can be seen on the basis of the problems IFOR has been confronted with and has not been able to solve. The first problem that has seriously shaken the international force in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the kidnapping of its personnel and vehicles that tried to enter or leave Sarajevo through Ilidza. IFOR was fully involved in that matter, although it tried to hide it. After all, it was IFOR that declared the road through the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza safe and open to civilian traffic after it had placed its monitoring points around it. Apart from that, some of the unlucky people who ended up in a Serbian prison were at the moment of kidnapping in a convoy under armed IFOR escort. All this was obviously not enough to stop the Serbs. Judging by the circumstances, the whole problem was solved by U.S. diplomacy by exerting pressure on Slobodan Milosevic.

Another problem arose several days later when a Sarajevo streetcar was hit by an antitank shell. The international force showed its determination to punish such attacks in a rather inappropriate way—by opening fire from light guns after three minutes. Since the flight of the shell from the moment it was fired until the moment it hit the street car lasted only several seconds, in three minutes the attacker could already have been several kilometers away from the spot.

Security of Mass Graves

Such terrorist attacks on unprotected civilian objects can always happen, and it is very difficult to prevent them. The best preventive measure is a sharp response, which should make all other terrorist actions senseless. Opening fire three minutes after an attack has been carried out is certainly not such a deterrent, so that in this case IFOR's response can be considered inappropriate. IFOR must be grateful to the Serbs and their political decision not to tighten the situation at the moment that there have been no further similar terrorist attacks.

The third problem that IFOR has yet to solve is related to the security of mass graves. The problem of war crimes is unpleasant for all parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but mass graves place the Serbs in the most difficult position, since they are incontestable proof of committed crimes. The Serbs could therefore easily be tempted to destroy them completely, in order to deprive themselves of responsibility for genocide. Only IFOR units have enough personnel and equipment at the moment to secure mass graves and enable international commissions to work without impediment. This would be very easy to carry out from the technical point of view, but such an operation would place the international force in a very unpleasant position against the Serbs. On the other hand, the pressure exerted by the international community to carry out such an operation is getting stronger from day to day.

There is also the problem of the release of all prisoners of war. Although the deadline for their release was strictly defined by the Dayton agreement (19 January), all three sides are still keeping several hundred prisoners. The reason is, naturally, of a political nature. The Muslims want to link the release of prisoners of war with the problem of missing persons, most of whom ended up in the above mentioned mass graves. According to the agreement, all parties to the conflict should have released the reported prisoners, whereas the problem of the missing persons should be discussed later. The Muslim side is now trying to get an explanation from the Serbs about the disappearance of tens of thousands of Muslims, suggestng that a large part of them might be in Serbian prisons, so that they too should be put on the list of persons to be released. The Muslims in effect want the Serbs to accuse themselves indirectly of having committed the war crime of killing prisoners of war. In this case too, IFOR can only observe ineffectively and engage in endless negotiations without visible results.

The peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is preserved first of all because at the moment this is appropriate for the politicians; all the more so since the international force has frozen the situation it came across upon its arrival. That being so, could the war break out again? Certainly, if IFOR's or someone else's activity placed the vital interests of any of the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina at stake, and there are very many such possibilities.

Military Help Is Coming

The first would be that NATO decided to stay a further year or even longer. Such a decision would not directly place the vital interests of any party at stake, provided nothing else was changed by it. The situation would be significantly different if the present peace led to political processes that are not acceptable to one of the parties. For the Serbs, this could be the strengthening of the central power in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the diminishing of the possibility that they merge with Serbia in the foreseeable future. Such a process could not significantly strengthen in only a year, but if it stretches out continuously over two or more years, this could significantly endanger Serbian intentions. The Muslims would respond unfavorably to IFOR's presence if they noticed that the possibility of creating a unitary state of Bosnia- Herzegovina was disappearing in proportion to the duration of the international force presence. Now the Muslims are even more than pleased since abundant military help is about to come. The Croats do not mind IFOR's presence. On the contrary, every dollar earned on that basis is welcome. The biggest problem Croatia has at the moment is not the Serbs who remained on the other side of the demarcation line, but Alija Izetbegovic's and a majority of SDA members' intentions to use the Federation to strengthen the central government in Sarajevo. IFOR would become undesirable only if it partially supported Sarajevo, if it used its convincing military supremacy to impose unacceptable conditions on the Croats, this only under the condition that the bilateral relations within the Federation plunge to the level of a mutual war again.

Apart from all this, it is always realistically possible that any of the parties might attack IFOR members simply in order to blame someone else, hoping that IFOR would response swiftly and surely. Because of all this, the current optimism of the international force commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina is more than early and it does not rest on a sound basis, since the closer the end of their one-year mandate comes, the greater the danger of various sorts of attacks out of various reasons. Because of all this, it is not at all improbable that this peace operation could end up with the same "success" as the one in Somalia.

Croatia: UNTAES Chief Said To Be Ustasha Descendant

AU0502111896 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by M. Kovacevic: "Ustasha Descendant—'Blue' Commander"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgian General Van de Weghe, chief commander of UN forces for the Srem-Baranja region, "became famous" last year by drawing maps of some of our regions that "he thought" would lead to the outbreak of new secessionist rebellions in the Balkans. Why he had been doing that has only now become clear as it has been discovered that this high officer was of Croatian descent, a son of one of Pavelic's Ustasha [Nazi collaborator in Croatia during World War II].

The lifting of this veil of secrecy has revealed that the Van de Weghe family is well known in "their beautiful country" [Croatia]. The descendants of the family today live in the Vinkovci and Capljina area. During World War II, the general's father was one of the more prominent leaders of the Ustasha formations.

The crushing of fascism in May 1945, as is known, led to a mass exodus of Pavelic's criminals to other countries. Among these was also the father of the future general. He found shelter in Belgium with relatives who worked in the local steelworks.

In order to conceal his past and avoid the possibility of being held responsible for his "activities" during combat operations, Pavelic's soldier married a Belgian and changed his identity. In fact, he added the Van De part of his wife's name in front of his name Vege. That fact that the Belgian commander in eastern Slavonia still has a relative in Borovo, a certain Rosa, confirms that we are talking about the same man.

The discovery of this well kept secret explains Belgium's persistent insistence, supported by Croatia, that General van de Weghe remain in his post as commander of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem] in the Slavonia-Baranja region. It appears that there is no end to attempts to deceive the Serbs....

Croatia: Serb National Council Founded

LD0402210696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2023 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Zagreb-based Serb National Party has announced the setting up of a Serb National Council that would unite all parties and cultural and other institutions of Serbs in Croatia.

The party leader Milan Djukic said in Zagreb on Saturday that the Croatian regime's objective was to 'ethnically cleanse Croatia of the largest and most disagreeable ethnic community—Serbs.'

Djukic was speaking at the meeting, which reviewed the position of Serbs in Croatia following the unprecedented exodus in the latest war.

The Serb National Party wishes to unmask Croatian authorities' dishonest intentions towards the Serbs, Djukic said and added that there could be no lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia unless all Serb refugees were enabled to return to Croatia.

Two parties—the Serb National Party and the Independent Serb Party, led by Milorad Pupovac—rally Serbs in Croatia, who also have their cultural society Prosvjeta, the Community of Serbs in Croatia and the Federation of Serb Organizations.

Croatia: Tuzla Veterans Protest Serb Priest's Arrival

LD0302182896 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received a statement from the United Organization of Fighters—Union of Veterans of Tuzla municipality:

On the occasion of the announced visit to Tuzla of Vasilije Kacevenda, a criminal slave and person who blessed and consecrated crimes against the non-Serb population and the mass graves of Bosniaks and Croats, the United Organization of Fighters—Union of Veterans of Tuzla municipality wishes to remind the following:

We are ready to cooperate with all Serbs whose hands are not bloody, who have not taken part in mass crimes perpetrated by the Serb nazism. We are aware that it is a precondition for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the creation of a democratic and stable society.

But there could be no mention of any dealings with creatures whose moral and ethical characteristics have created out of them monsters who gave spiritual support to the atrocities committed.

The United Organization of Fighters—Union of Veterans of Tuzla municipality, in full, supports yesterday's statement issued by Tuzla municipality press center. We are not authorized to settle accounts with war criminals, but it is our right to warn the organizers of Kacevenda's eventual arrival in Tuzla that this city can neither forgive nor forget the evil committed, which was blessed by this slave of crime and criminals.

During the whole duration of war, we in Tuzla have shown that honest Serbs can always have a place and equality in a humanitarian society for which we are fighting. But we warn that, in spite of the peace agreement, no one can guarantee security to the Serb fascists.

Throughout its history, Tuzla has been Bosnian and anti-fascist and all those who would try to change it must be aware that they will be confronted with resolute resistance of its residents who will not allow their own dignity to be attacked.

FYROM: Government, Greece Cut Cost of Travel Visas

AU0202214296 Paris AFP in English 2122 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Feb 2 (AFP)—Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece ended two days of talks on normalizing their relations Friday [2 February] with an agreement to make travel easier between the two countries.

Under a new protocol, visa fees are to be slashed to one-fifth of their current levels and will cost no more than about seven German marks, a statement from the Macedonian foreign ministry said.

The agreement was signed by Macedonian negotiator Viktor Gaber and Greek counterpart Alexandros Filon, who agreed that it would "stimulate the exchange of people and goods (and) speed up economic cooperation."

Gaber said the two countries' governments have agreed to meet "at least two times a year, and more often if necessary" in order to promote bilateral cooperation in all areas.

Such consulations are called for under an interim bilateral agreement signed in September in New York under United Nations auspices.

That pact was designed to ease tensions caused by a long-running dispute over the use of the name Macedonia by the former Yugoslav republic.

Greece has regarded the name as part of its national heritage. The dispute has yet to be resolved, and in the meantime Athens refuses to recognize Skopje.

FYROM: PDP Supports Cabinet Reshuffle Initiative

AU0302213596 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 3 Feb 96

[Telephone report by Ibadete Hajrullahu from Skopje]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] supports Prime Minister Crvenkovski's initiative to reshuffle its cabinet. This was the topic of discussion at a meeting held last evening by the PDP Central Presidency, the state media reports. This perhaps has been known from rumors spread in public, but whether the support for the reshuffle has been conditioned with purging any Albanian from the ministerial cabinet, or whether the other side has reconciled with this, nothing official has been said at last evening's meeting. However, it should be noted that some deputy minister posts are still vacant in the prime minister's cabinet. No matter how, the reshuffling of the government is a result of cracks between the two main governmental partners of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the Social Democrats and the Liberals, who aimed at strengthening their positions and at having a greater political and economic influence. How the conflict between them will end is still unknown, until the last moment.

No matter how, in an eventual split between the two main Macedonian governmental partners, the Albanian positions will be strengthened, as hardly any law can be passed without their support. Apart from this, we recall that they still stand behind their statements that they will withdraw from the state institutions if the demands of Albanians continue to be ignored in such a way, particularly in using the Albanian language at all education levels.

FYROM: Regulation on Protection of State Secrets

96BA0117A Skopje SLUZBEN VESNIK in Macedonian 12 Oct 95 Vol 51 No 48 pp 1226-1228

["Text" of Regulation on Preserving and Protecting State Secrets No. 121-3641 of 28 September 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text]

REGULATION ON THE MEANS OF PRESERVING AND PROTECTING DOCUMENTS, ANNOUNCEMENTS, DATA, AND OTHER ACTS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSIDERED STATE, MILITARY, OR OFFICIAL SECRET BY LAW OR ANY OTHER STIPULATION OR RESOLUTION OF A PROPER AUTHORITY.

I. GENERAL STIPULATIONS

Article 1. The present regulation stipulates the means of preserving and steps for the protection of documents, notices, data, and other acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (subsequently: the Ministry) classified as state, military, or official secret by law, or in accordance with this or any other stipulation or resolution issued by the respective authority.

Article 2. Within the framework of the rights and obligations based on the law, a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs shall protect state, official, military, or business secrets with which he has become acquainted in the course of or by virtue of performing his obligations and tasks.

Article 3. The determination of the type of secret and the level of secrecy of data classified as secret in accordance with this regulation, as well as the steps taken for the protection of secret data, begin at the start of preparations for caring out the assignment or at the moment of the appearance of the data.

All documents, notices, data, and other acts or actions stemming from or related to the initial document qualified as secret, in terms of nature and extent, shall be subject to the same type and level of secrecy.

Article 4. In issuing assignments on the drafting of acts or engaging in activities constituting a state or service secret classified as strictly confidential, secret (code) names under which such projects will be conducted may be issued.

Article 5. The commitment of protecting secret data begins the moment the data have become known and in accordance with the law shall continue after the work relationship with the Ministry has been terminated.

Release from the commitment for the protection of a secret or the agreement that the secret data may be made public for the proper reasons may be issued by the minister.

Article 6. In the case of noted irregularities related to the safeguarding of secret data, the authorized official must urgently take steps for their elimination.

If secret data become public, the authorized official must determine the basic information relative to the conditions under which the secret was made public and the reasons for its publication and, take steps, depending on the severity of the harm inflicted to the secret, the conditions under which it was made public, and the means of its publication.

In the case of coming across data which is classified as "strictly confidential" or "confidential," the authorized official must notify the organizational unit in charge of internal control.

In the case of lost or found secret data, the authorized official must immediately notify his superior, who must take the proper steps to ensure the responsibility of the violator, based on the gravity of the damage.

Article 7. Should he notice any activity or action aimed at the disclosure of secret data, without delay the official must inform his direct superior who must take the necessary steps within the framework of his rights and obligations.

II. TYPES AND DEGREES OF SECRECY OF DATA OF IMPORTANCE TO THE MINISTRY

Article 8. In addition to the acts that, according to the law, any other regulation or resolution by a proper authority are classified as secret, and state secret, included in the sense of this regulation are steps, actions, notices, documents, data, and sources of data of importance to the Ministry, the disclosure of which could lead to more severe damaging consequences related to the security and defense of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The following are classified as state secrets:

Security information, studies, evaluations, and actions taken by the Ministry, considered of particular importance in terms of the security and defense of the Republic;

Documents containing planned protection in the course of evacuation of gold, foreign currency, other currency, securities, or important acts, as well as protecting and evacuating the individuals named by the Ministry;

The organization and the plans, documents, and means of cryptographic protection, as well as the stipulated standards, rules, and actions needed in the implementation of such cryptographic protection;

Measures for safeguarding protected individuals and objects;

Data on the organization and systematization of the Ministry related to operations in a situation of security, and extraordinary or military status;

Strategic studies and evaluations on the basis of which the intentions, plans, and specific resolutions for the use of police in the defense of the Republic are based;

Additions to the plans for the defense of the Republic, drafted by the Ministry;

Documents pertaining to measures for drafting and issuing secret signals related to mobilization instructions;

Data on reserve and military deployment;

Documents and plans for preparing and organizing the territory of the Republic to meet security and defense requirements; and

Documents, data, and other acts or actions drafted or taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, classified by the minister as "state secret."

The word "SECURITY," under which is "State Secret" must be stamped on any document constituting a state secret, in the upper right corner.

Article 9. Steps, actions, notices, documents, data, and sources of data of importance to the Ministry, approved in accordance with Article 63 of the Law on Internal Affairs, the disclosure of which may result in damaging consequences to the Ministry, constitute state secrets.

Any data constituting an official secret, based on its significance, is classified in one of the following three levels of secrecy: "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL," "CONFIDENTIAL," or "INTERNAL."

Article 10. Data of particular importance to the Ministry, the disclosure of which may lead to more severe damaging consequences in the performance of the work and the tasks of the Ministry are considered strictly confidential.

Ministry data classified as strictly confidential apply to the following:

Internal organization and systematization of jobs;

The files of the Ministry's personnel;

The operations of the Operative Center on Duty, and the existing operative duty officials;

Information on taking operative actions and current operative actions (data on substantiated suspicion on suspected individuals, on information sources, on measures and actions taken and on the use of special ways and means of work);

Special technical facilities and equipment as well as their operational use;

Plans for the functioning of the organizational units of the Ministry in war conditions;

Addendum on the mobilization of the Ministry and the organizational units formulating independent mobilization systems;

Operations related to cryptographic protection, not qualified as state secret, and expert data used for instruction and other official needs in the same area, as well the organization of a communication system;

Appendixes on relations and cryptological protection of local organizational units;

Criteria on armaments and material and technical equipment (individual and of formations) for work under wartime conditions;

Work with operative maps with data;

Security and self-protection measures;

Data on material needs, food, health, financial, and other supplies for work in wartime by the Ministry and its organizational units;

Addenda on the evacuation, destruction, and disabling of equipment and material and technical means by the Ministry and its organizational units;

The formation, number, structure, armament, and equipment of police units;

Reserves for Ministry use;

Collected statistics and data in the area of internal work;

Statistical data, and resolutions of the minister or his authorized official for the use of special operative-technical ways and means;

Documentation (file, registration, or archive) and all forms of information of the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate, the Criminal Police, the Police, and the analysis included in a suitable list;

Projects and tasks of the organizational unit for defense preparations;

Projects and tasks of the organizational internal control unit; and

Documents, data, and other acts or actions within the scope of the Ministry concerning which, at the time of their occurrence or implementation, the minister or the authorized official will assess as constituting an official secret of a strictly confidential nature.

The following words are stamped on documents considered strictly confidential, on the upper right corner: "OFFICIAL SECRET" and under it "STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL."

Article 11. Data of importance to the Ministry, the exposure of which could lead to damaging consequences to the work and tasks of the Ministry, are considered confidential.

Data considered confidential apply to the following:

Individual stipulations, rules, instructions, and other acts as determined by the minister or an authorized official;

More important data on material and financial operations;

Analyses and information of special significance;

Some personnel and cadre operations, and

Documents, data, and other acts or actions that at the moment of their drafting or implementation are qualified as "Confidential" official service.

The documents which contain confidential data are stamped on the right upper corner with the words "OFFICIAL DATA" and under them "CONFIDENTIAL."

Article 12. The classification "internal" applies to data of importance to the Ministry, earmarked for official use by the ministry personnel and which, in terms of their importance, do not prove to be data as per Articles 10 and 11 of this regulation.

Documents which contain internal data are marked on the upper right corner with the words "OFFICIAL SECRET" and under that "INTERNAL."

Article 13. A proposal on changing or eliminating the secrecy qualification and the degree of secrecy may be submitted by any authorized official who, in the course of his work, reaches the belief that the conditions have occurred for amending or voiding the stipulated type and degree of secrecy.

The minister or an authorized official who has classified the level of secrecy may amend the type and degree of secrecy for which he will notify all those using such documents or data of the amended type of secrecy or level of secrecy.

III. WAYS OF GUARDING AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF SECRET DATA

Article 14. Secret data must be mandatorily stored in a steel safe or an iron closet.

If so required, the safe or the closet may be opened with a cipher or protected with alarm systems.

Article 15. General and special protective measures are taken for the protection of secret data.

Article 16. The following are general measures for the protection of secret data:

1. Establishing a type of secret and level of secrecy at the time of origination of the data or at the time the data have been accepted by another agency or enterprise;

2. Determining the means of protection of the secret data from the moment of its existence or acceptance until the lifting of the secrecy;

3. Prohibiting taking secret documents outside the premises set for their processing, use, and safeguarding, and determining the conditions under which said documents may be removed, should this become necessary;

4. Unauthorized individuals are forbidden to enter the areas earmarked for the processing, use, and safeguarding the secret documents;

5. Public display and communication of secret data without the approval of the minister or an authorized official is forbidden;

6. Determination of the ways and means for the transportation of technical or material, means, equipment, and documents;

7. Use of measures for the cryptological protection of data classified as state, military, or official secret, qualified as "strictly confidential" or "confidential" in the course of their transportation by any technical means of communication, as well as the stipulated measures and steps to ensure the protection of all elements of cryptological protection (workplaces, personnel, nature and method of work, and so on);

8. Classification and adoption of steps for the physical and technical safeguarding and other protective measures;

9. Providing the necessary proof of the existence of secret documents;

10. The publication of secret data without the approval of the minister or an authorized official is prohibited;

11. Control of the implementation of the stipulated protective measures;

12. Determining the specific officials who will work on specific assignments and other officials who may be acquainted with secret data, and the extent, conditions, and means of such acquaintance.

Article 17. The following are special measures for safeguarding secret data:

1. Providing special evidence concerning the data classified as state secret or official secret and concerning the individuals familiar with such data or individuals to whom such data has been provided for their use;

2. Protection of secret documents in steel safes and areas equipped with the necessary technical facilities for the safeguarding of data considered state secret in special physically equipped areas;

3. Transferring secret documents by courier and transferring documents constituting a state secret with mandatory armed accompanying personnel or use of proper technical protection facilities;

4. Assumption of written commitments by the personnel engaged in the drafting of secret documents, as well as other officials whose official activities require the use of documents classified as state secrets, concerning the preservation of their secrecy;

5. Assigning secret names (codes) under which the work will be carried out and the overall documentation from the beginning to its implementation will be referred to;

6. Written proof of transfer of duties between personnel who are handling or preserving secret documents, as well as the transfer of such documents to authorized individuals with a written confirmation of their receival;

7. Numbering the items subject to processing of a secret document, the individuals to whom they will be issued, and the official entitled to approve their duplication or summarization;

8. Destruction of work samples, notes, copies, computations, designs, and other auxiliary materials used in the course of the work, and which are subsequently burned or disposed of by any other means ensuring the full protection of the secrecy of the content of the destroyed material, in the presence of a commission;

9. Special steps taken to ensure the safety of the cryptological protection (counterintelligence, cryptological, physical, and technical steps and steps for the protection from compromising electromagnetic irradiation).

Documents constituting a state secret or official secret, qualified as "Strictly Confidential" may not leave the premises and used away from official premises, whereas other documents may be taken out for official purposes exclusively on the basis of approval by the minister or an authorized official.

The use of technical facilities for duplication and summarization or other purposes may be used only with the approval of the minister or an authorized official. The photographed material must be numbered and assigned a type or level of secrecy, provided with confirmation, and proper steps must be taken for its protection, use, or destruction.

Article 18. Foreigners are not allowed to look at secret data or have access to the means, objects, and implements considered secret data without the special approval of the minister or an authorized official.

The Ministry personnel may not make public titles or any other information contained in secret data using public information media.

IV. CONCLUDING STIPULATIONS

Article 19. Violations of stipulations included in this regulation by a Ministry official, as a result of which damaging consequences have occurred or could have occurred, affecting the work of the Ministry shall be considered a violation of labor discipline and the official shall be held responsible in accordance with the stipulations of the Law on Work Relations, Law on Internal Affairs, and other regulations in that area.

Article 20. The present regulation becomes effective on the eighth day following its publication in SLUZBEN VESNIK NA REPUBLIKA MAKEDONIJA.

Dr. Ljubomir Frckovski, Minister of Internal Affairs

No. 121-3641, 28 September 1995, Skopje

Poland: Rosati Comments on Coming Visit by Holbrooke

LD0202132596 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1211 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 2 Feb—The visit to Poland by Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, has been prompted not by U.S. concern about the situation in our country, but by the will to know the plans of the new prime minister in the sphere of Polish foreign policy, Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati said today. Holbrooke is to come to Warsaw in the middle of next week.

At the same time, this is going to be the first contact between a high-level representative of the U.S. Administration and the Polish president, which would have taken place irrespective of the developments in Poland, Rosati added. He admitted that a tone of some concern has been appearing for some days in commentaries in the Western press, but that he did not think this had had an "impact on the politicians' statements." In his view, Polish partners in the United States and the EU stay calm and are convinced that events in Poland will have no influence on its foreign policy.

Rosati let it be known that he had already talked to the prime minister-designate, but he refused to discuss the details of the conversation. He only said that as far as he was concerned "he would see himself in Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's cabinet."

Poland: Daily Views Forthcoming Holbrooke Visit

WS0502125596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3-4 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "CEG": "Holbrooke Will Not Have Dinner With Oleksy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The United States is clearly disturbed by the situation that has developed in Poland as a result of the so-called Oleksy case. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke will come to Warsaw on 6 February to look into the situation on site.*

"The reason for Hoolbroke's visit to Poland is not the Americans' concern over the situation in our country, but a desire to find out more about the plans the new prime minister has in the foreign policy area," Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati gave assurances yesterday [2 February]. ZYCIE WARSZAWY found out, however, that the Oleksy case would be one of the main topics that Holbrooke will discuss in Poland. The U.S. guest will also talk about issues related to our possible entry into NATO and about civilian control over the Armed Forces.

Holbrooke is coming on Tuesday night. He will spend the next day holding talks with key Polish politicians: President Kwasniewski, Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, Minister Rosati, and heads of the major parliamentary clubs. In the evening he is to have dinner with the leaders of the biggest parties. ZYCIE WARSZAWY found out at the U.S. Embassy that Jozef Oleksy, newly elected chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, had not been invited.

As we found out from an employee of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the White House is very interested in the developments that have taken place since the so-called Oleksy case was revealed. U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Rey recently held a series of meetings with the most important people in Poland. Last week, in turn, National Security Office head Jerzy Milewski visited the United States to explain our situation there.

Poland: Poles, Russians Discuss NATO Expansion

LD0302203196 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The discussion on the second day of the Polish-Russian roundtable deliberations in Warsaw, which is devoted to the expansion of NATO, ended with the mutual recognition of differing positions. However, a slightly different tone could be heard in the voices of the Russian partners from the hitherto firm opposition to our aspirations.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Jerzy Modlinger] The two-day debate of politicians and experts in the government hotel opposite the Russian Embassy has shown that the Russian politicians no longer regard Poland's strivings to join NATO as an act hostile to Russia.

[Yevgeniy Kozhokhin, adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, identified by caption; in Russian fading to Polish translation] The fact that our points of view were not and evidently could not be concurrent is no drama. There are differing interests, but that is not a tragedy but a subject for talks.

[Modlinger] The Polish representatives recalled that entry to NATO remains the main aim of our policy, and the Russians pay too much attention to that.

[Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission, identified by caption] It is not a good thing that the Russian political elites have made this into a more controversal issue than it should be.

[Modlinger] Poland in NATO is a stable country, interested in good relations between NATO and Russia.

Professor Sergey Karaganov thinks that Poland should not join NATO, but whether Poland is in NATO or not, Poland should be a friend of Russia and Russia should have good relations with Poland. This is all the more important, Prof. Karaganov says, because Russia wants, if not to block then at least to lengthen, the process of Poland's entry into NATO.

[Prof. Sergey Karaganov, adviser to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, identified by caption; in Russian fading to Polish translation] The point is for Poland not to perceive this policy as hostile toward itself. Russia has not opposed Poland's acceptance into NATO. First, Russia should emerge from internal crisis, overcome its psychological, political, and economic weaknesses. Second, a European security system that would include Russia, not isolate it, should be created. Finally, NATO should enter into a close partnership with Russia, creating a new security system. Then there would be no problem of expanding NATO because this would be a process integrated into a system in which Russia is one of the chief elements.

[Modlinger] The Polish representatives get the impression that Russian policy does not yet have an idea for this new system. [end recording]

Poland: Karaganov: Russia Will Fight NATO Expansion

LD0302194796 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1835 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 3 Feb—Russia will fight to prevent the expansion of NATO and will certainly succeed in doing so in the immediate future because it has the majority of Western political elites on its side, Sergey Karaganov, Boris Yeltsin's adviser, said in his lecture on Russian foreign policy delivered at the Warsaw Center for Eastern Studies on 3 February.

Karaganov, who led the Russian delegation to a conference of the Polish-Russian roundtable, which ended in Warsaw on 3 February, said that, in his opinion, the expansion of NATO was unacceptable to Russia. It would be received as a betrayal on the part of the West of the Russian liberal and democratic elites. Inevitably, it would also create a sphere of sharp conflicts in Europe because of the Baltic republics, which would also like to become members of the alliance in the fear of Russia and Ukraine. "Russia does not want to fight for the strategic adherence of Ukraine," Karaganov said.

"I respect Poland's choice, but joining NATO is not the most effective way to get into Europe," he added. According to him, joining the European Union and friendship with Russia are in Poland's interests. Karaganov said that Russia would agree to the expansion of the pact only if the construction of a new European security system were set in motion—with Russia holding a key position in such a system—if appropriate conditions were created for an agreement between NATO and Russia, if Russia started to overcome the current crisis, and if the current feeling of instability were no longer present.

Russia would like to retain a 1,500-km zone between itself and the West after the demise of the former setup. At the moment, Russia is in the process of defining its policy for the next dozen or so years. Our interests are pointing toward the West and Poland. However, in Central Europe, with which Russia wants to develop economic relations, we have no strategic interests, except preventing the expansion of NATO, Karaganov said.

Poland: President: Poland in NATO No Danger to Russia

LD0402212296 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On his return from Davos, President Aleksander Kwasniewski said that Poland should convince Russia that our membership in NATO is not a danger to it.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] I think that to this extent we can achieve agreement, certainly not during the presidential election campaign in Russia; that is to say, the next few months will be a bit unfruitful for discussion on this subject. However, Poland's strategic aims—and I would like this to be demonstrated—have not been falsified in the Polish media. It is clear—and I stress this as the Polish president—that our strategic aim is to be in NATO: not a NATO that is against Russia, but a NATO that is part of a new security order in Europe. [end recording]

Poland: Need To Modernize by Western Standards Stressed

96EP0018A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
28 Dec 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Gen. Bde. Kazimierz Nalaskowski, director of the Legal Department, Ministry of National Defense, by Jan Forowicz; place and date not given: "White Book Is Needed in Defense Sphere"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We discussed the legal context of national defense, characteristic of Poland, and certainly also of other countries of Central Eastern Europe, with General of Brigade Kazimierz Nalaskowski, director of the Legal Department at the Ministry of National Defense.*

During the present era of polity changes occurring in the countries of our region of Europe, it can be best seen that in all these countries military and civilian lawyers are all riding in the same boat. That is because legislative tasks relating to defense are, in Poland just as well as in, say, Slovakia or Hungary, part of the entire process of the adaptation of our laws to European standards, Gen. Nalaskowski emphasized.

[Forowicz] But here on the Vistula our situation differs somewhat from that of our neighbors; Polish lawmakers are still only working on a draft of the constitution.

[Nalaskowski] This delay may bear some good fruit for us. The constitution encompasses solutions to complex problems of guiding national defense and financing the military. Constitutional provisions outline the duties of citizens, the obligations of businesses and local governments, the status of military personnel (without excluding their participation in public life), and aspects of national states of emergency. Because these solutions appear acceptable and are known by now, that makes it easier to incorporate them properly in the draft of the new constitution. Recently, the catalog of experiences suitable for utilization by politicians and framers of the constitutional draft has included a definite innovation in Polish state law—regulations governing the participation of Polish military units in foreign military activities and the sojourn and deployment in Poland of foreign units cooperating with us in implementing international decisions.

[Forowicz] The constraints on military law which we share with other countries of the former camp of real socialism are related to the economic situation. Economic factors necessitate modifying certain military regulations. The military are reorganizing their structures in the image of NATO. At the same time, the defense funding system is experiencing major problems. In the opinion of certain officers, this is a painful paradox of our times.

[Nalaskowski] I would not call it a paradox. I view it as a normal consequence of the change in the economic system. The former country of real socialism must, during the transformation of its political and economic system, get rid of its pretensions to being the all-powerful state. That also accounts for the emergence of such innovative solutions as the law on military housing, which permits the sale of housing by the career military. Another consequence of the reform of the state's economic system, in my view, that is important to the military is the creation of legal foundations for the military—that are organizationally not linked to the command structures—Housing Agency. Such an agency is a typical institution among the Western European armies. In Western Europe the military try to keep apart the largest possible number of matters that are not of a purely military nature.

We are beginning to apply similar solutions in other domains. Another proof is the drafting of a law establishing the Agency for Military Property, which will serve to relieve the military of a superfluous infrastructure.

Changes are taking place in many domains, not just the economic ones. For example, we are adapting our disciplinary manuals to Western European military standards. We are creating modern legal foundations for the activities of the Gendarmerie and the Military Information Services. Our neighbors, who are applying for membership in NATO and the Western European Union, are certain to start doing the same thing.

[Forowicz] What if some long-existing regulations in Poland or a neighboring country that is also applying to NATO or is associated with the EU prove to be better? Will Poland or that other country also abandon them anyway in our common drive for unification?

[Nalaskowski] We select from the Western legal system models that have been tried and tested in democratic countries and astutely handle all matters relating to defense. Any blind emulation is out of the question. The former Soviet Union tried to impose on us its standards under the Warsaw Pact, and we hardly are going to be brought to heel again. This is all the more certain considering that Poland has always—also as regards its military legal system—been a part of Central Europe, and we have patterned most of our juridical solutions on those of Italy and France.

Even during the interwar independence of Poland, in the years 1919-39, when a legal system was being created for the Polish Military, it was modeled chiefly on Austrian and German standards. In saying this I don't mean to badmouth the regulations that had existed while a large part of Poland was under Czarist Russian rule. What I mean is to emphasize that the differences between the Polish legal system and the systems of most Western European countries are smaller than we think, because they derive from the same tradition. I think this also applies to the legal systems of Poland's other neighbors, countries which also are applying for membership in NATO and are EU associate members. One thing is certain: At present we must achieve full convergence with regulations defining our membership in NATO and generally in united Europe.

[Forowicz] You refer to a just but rather broad goal which takes time to accomplish. In 1995 we have already been holding joint military exercises with units from NATO armies. It turned out that regulations governing the use of Bundeswehr equipment on Polish firing ranges or rubber coverings of the treads of Polish tanks—since in traveling to international exercises we are using German roads—are urgently needed.

[Nalaskowski] Just as international exercises establish closer rapport among staff officers, tank crews, engineers, and communications personnel of various armies, they do so among their military legal services. Prior to the exercises we draft rules of conduct covering a broad gamut of specific problems from those of the highest rank, such as the jurisdiction over military personnel in foreign exercise areas, to purely technical questions such as passport procedures, conditional customs clearance of equipment, etc. The regulations binding in the individual partner countries are becoming harmonized. It is just in this manner that full unification is being accelerated.

A major impetus for the standardization of these regulations will be the signing of the PFP [Partnership for Peace] SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] Multilateral Agreement, which defines the guidelines for the sojourn of joint troops on foreign territory. The procedure for ratifying that agreement in Poland has already been initiated, and this process is just as advanced in Hungary and the Czech Republic.

[Forowicz] Should military law really be the subject of special attention of the parliaments of the countries applying for admission to NATO and associated with the EU?

[Nalaskowski] In highly civilized countries, military legislation is an integral part of the overall legal system. It ensues that in this country it should be subject to the same rules for standardization as in the countries of Western Europe. This seems to be known to politicians throughout this region, from Estonia to Bulgaria. Especially those who are trying to have their military incorporated in NATO structures are very much aware of this. Thus, it is hardly pertinent to recommend some special separate attention to military law. It would suffice for the legislatures to work solidly. But as for drafting a list of military issues or of their priorities, that is another matter, and it would be worthwhile. Such a national White Book on defense has been proposed in, e.g., the Czech Republic. We here at the Ministry of National Defense have likewise drafted for our parliament a document listing for politicians the fundamental problems of national defense.

Generally speaking, here in Poland we are trying to examine the related problems and keep public opinion informed about advances in unifying military laws. We also gladly share our experience with our neighbors. Consider, for example, finally, that recently the Ministry of National Defense held an international seminar on the degree of advancement of this process. We are ready for further contacts, including with the military lawyers of the other armies ready to join NATO.

Poland: Reaction to Evans-Novak Column on KGB, Oleksy

WS0202142096 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 2 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Waldemar Piasecki in New York: "THE WASHINGTON POST on the Oleksy Affair; The KGB Recruited Agents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Newly appointed Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov supervised an operation targeted at restoring communist rule in Poland back in the early 1990's, when he was still chief of the KGB.*

Such, at least, are claims made by the U.S. daily THE WASHINGTON POST in a column entitled "KGB Plans in Poland." The paper maintains that Primakov was responsible for recruiting Jozef Oleksy to cooperate.

The authors, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, write that in 1991 the Russian intelligence service, headed by Primakov, tried to help the communists capture national assets and return to power not only in Poland, but also in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia.

THE WASHINGTON POST column did not stir much reaction in the United States. Evans and Novak are known for spectacular politcal stories rarely based on fact. Also, this time the authors did not specify the sources of the revelations, quoting only nondescript officers of the U.S. Administration. The authors made several substantive errors when describing the current situation in Poland and the recent history of our country.

The aim of the authors of THE WASHINGTON POST column was most probably to criticize President Bill Clinton's acquiescent Russian policy.

Poland: Kwasniewski Comments on Oleksy Affair

LD0402201496 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski has returned from Davos, where he took part in the annual world economic forum. At Warsaw's Okecie airport, Kwasniewski assessed the visit as very successful. The politicians and financiers gathered there see Poland as a serious partner. The president also criticized the Polish media for attaching too great, in his opinion, importance to the Oleksy affair. Kwasniewski observed that the world approached this issue a with much greater detachment.

Poland: Walesa Called Source of Oleksy Allegations

LD0302195196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Andrzej Drawicz, the outgoing prime minister's adviser for Russian affairs, has told the Polish Radio that the accusation that Jozef Oleksy collaborated with a foreign intelligence service was a provocation organized by Lech Walesa.

[Begin Drawicz recording] I am convinced that the matter originated in the circles inspired by him. I can recognize his handwriting, his way of conducting state politics, which is based on a chain of continuous intrigues, on the understanding that politics means involvement in a system of palace intrigues, on creating the atmosphere of continuous instability within society and the state. [end recording]

Poland: Minister Denies Walesa Bought Own Files

WS0202132596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 2 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by "WZ": "Walesa Did Not Purchase His Own Files"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Lech Walesa did not buy out his own files. They remain in the archives of the Office of State Protection [UOP]," Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny told deputies of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] yesterday. They had pointed out that the former president purchased his UOP files and can therefore account for every hour in the 1980's. The SLD deputies were not satisfied with the minister's explanation. "Could UOP publish a price list and give discounts for old-age pensioners?" asked one of them ironically.

Poland: Labor Minister Agrees To Head Cabinet Office

LD0302094996 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0917 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 3 Feb—Leszek Miller, to date the minister of labor and social policy, has accepted Prime Minister-designate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's proposal to take up the post of head of the Council of Ministers [Cabinet] Office.

Poland: Export of Construction Services to Russia

96EP0019A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish 24 Dec 95 No 52, p 31

[Article by Iwona Ryniewicz: "Silent Barter: Energopol Profits From Imports of Russian Gas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Energopol-Trade, the largest of the companies belonging to the Energopol-Warsaw, S.A., holding group, derives more than 90 percent of its income from exports of construction services to the CIS.

Its deals are mostly of the barter kind. According to unofficial sources, last year it imported 700,000-800,000 cubic meters of natural gas. Until 1991 Energopol was a state enterprise. It was privatized by the employee-leasing method. The assets of this liquidated state enterprise were purchased (on the installment plan) by Energopol-Warsaw, S.A., founded by former and present employees. A total of 227 stockholders acquired 14,500 shares worth 1 million old zlotys each, with preferred voting rights.

In 1993 a general meeting of stockholders voted to transform the company into a holding company. Energopol-Warsaw, S.A., became the parent company of a structure consisting of six limited partnerships/subsidiaries. Four of them, Energopol-Plus, Energopol-Merkury, Energopol-Construction, and Energopol-Agencja Celna, were capitalized 100 percent by their parent company. In the two others, Energopol-Zabki and Energopol-Trade, the parent company holds a majority stake (87 and 80 percent, respectively). The remaining assets of the parent company are leased by it to its subsidiaries—exports of services to Germany and investment activities on behalf of the holding group. In 1993 the stake owned by Energopol-Warsaw in other companies totaled 44 billion old zlotys, 16.7 billion in its own subsidiaries.

Approaches to Natural Gas

The company engages in business on CIS territory. Its interest in natural gas is demonstrated by its contribution of capital to Inwestgaz, a company building underground gas tanks and eventually handling gas transmission, that is, the construction and operation of a transit pipeline). Energopol-Warsaw, S.A., owns a stake of 51 percent in Inwestgaz. The remaining 49 percent is held by Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe i Gazowe [Polish Petroleum and Gas Extraction]. It is said that the underground tanks have already begun to be built. The other investment in natural gas is in Gaz 2000, a company in which Energopol-Trade, in its turn, acquired a 20-percent stake in 1993, in return for 4 billion old zlotys.

Energopol-Trade is the biggest and most dynamic of the companies in this holding group. Its predominance ensues from its status as a joint venture with foreign capital, which exempts it from the corporate income tax, which already last year it did not pay. Moreover, it is precisely this company, among those in the holding group, that handles foreign trade, with special consideration to exports of construction and installation services to the former USSR.

From Gliwice to Warsaw

Energopol-Trade originates from ATIMARKT, a company founded in November 1991 by two individuals, one authorized by, and on behalf of, ATI International Trade Import-Export GmbH, a German company which held 49 percent of capital appraised at more than 1.1 billion old zlotys. The remaining shares were held by the aforementioned individuals. The capital contributed by the German partner was food processing machinery. The company's site was in Gliwice.

In February 1993 its site was moved to Warsaw, and as of March the appellation ATIMARKT was gone and was replaced by Energopol-Trade, because Energopol-Warsaw acquired an 80-percent stake in the company and changed its appellation. Owing to this transaction, the German-held stake shrank to 20 percent of the capital. In June 1993 the operating capital of Energopol-Trade was augmented to more than 2.9 billion zlotys, with the shareholders acquiring the extra shares. In September the German company sold its stake to Congas Gesellschaft fuer Consulting Bau und Gas, AG, a Swiss company.

Energopol-Trade officially began operating in June 1993. Its principal purpose was to handle construction operations in the CIS and in this country. By the end of 1993 the company had acquired shares worth 7.7 billion zlotys in other companies. In addition to its stake in Gaz 2000, the company purchased from Energopol-Warsaw shares in joint projects on CIS territory: in Ukraine, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kobryn.

Last year Energopol-Trade spent 150 billion old zlotys on investments, chiefly on creating a construction and transportation infrastructure for the needs of its eastern contractors Its biggest investment was in Belarus. The value of the shares held by the company in other companies climbed to 28.8 billion old zlotys. Although as recently as 1994 as much as 94 percent of the company's income was derived from providing construction services, that meant a decrease of 4 percent compared with the preceding year.

It can be expected that this year the share of income from nonconstruction operations will continue to increase. In 1994 Energopol-Trade opened a travel agency and this year, a printing plant. Its profits from financial operations also are rising. In sum, the financial situation of Energopol-Trade is very good, just like that of Energopol-Warsaw and the entire holding group. This makes all the more surprising the consistency with which its management shies from publicity. Or perhaps that is just why?

Poland: Procedure for Fiscal Integration Described

96EP0020A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish 17 Dec 95 No 51, pp 1, 9

[Article by Lucjan Orlowski: "A Change in Orientation Is Needed: During the Preparations for Integration With the European Union, Monetary Policy Must Be Focused First on Suppressing Inflation and Then on Stabilizing the Currency Exchange Rate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The program for integration with the European Union (EU) should be focused on institutional adaptations and on the macroeconomic stabilization of Poland. Monetary policy plays a special role in creating the conditions for the stabilization of prices, interest rates, and the currency exchange rate. During the first stage of the transformation of the Polish economy, the principal purpose of monetary policy was to bolster the credibility of the National Bank of Poland and the Ministry of Finance.

The changes needed to meet the integration requirements will therefore represent the second stage of said transformation. This stage will differ markedly from the first stage.

In the initial stage of the transformation, monetary and fiscal policy had to cope with the problem of dismantling the economic structures inherited from the central planning system. To this day this objective has not been fully accomplished.

In the first two years of the transformation, Polish monetary policy reacted proactively to jumps in inflation and fluctuations of the GDP. However, a discretionary monetary policy is not suitable for creating a climate of macroeconomic stability and strengthening the credibility of economic policy, for it is accompanied by an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the directions to be pursued by the central bank. This magnifies economic risk and leads to high interest rates, as well as to price increases by producers who fear the inflationary consequences of an eventual loosening of the money supply.

In the initial stage of the transformation the credibility of the new government was high. There were also high social hopes for improvements in the economic situation, owing to the activation of market mechanisms.

These factors should have been exploited by settling on a consistent and long-term course of a widely publicized fiscal and monetary policy. In brief, monetary policy should have been based upon reasonably fixed principles adopted a priori. The more so considering that the soaring inflation due to price liberalization and the concurrent elimination of the monetary overhang is usually of a short-lasting and self-correcting nature. This also applies to the hyperinflationary shock in the second half of 1989 and in early 1990.

Economists generally believe that combatting hyperinflation is a relatively easy task. An immediate slashing of budgetary spending, restoration of the fiscal equilibrium, and a steady and moderately restrictive course of the money supply are sufficient measures for effectively combatting hyperinflation. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to combat chronic inflation driven by the indexing of wages and benefits, as well as by inertial price increases. Such inflation can be counteracted only by implementing a long-term program for fiscal equilibrium and hewing to a steady, restrictive monetary policy. Only in an extreme case can economic authorities adopt a rigid exchange rate for a stable foreign currency, because then credibility is transferred to foreign monetary authorities.

Inflation First

Eliminating the inflationary expectations that chronically affect the behavior of businesses usually requires many years of a consistent stabilization policy. This is exemplified by Argentina's program for stabilizing its economy, which was adopted in April 1991 when annual inflation reached 3,100 percent. It was only in 1995, after four years of persistent implementation of that program, that annual inflation dropped to 2.2 percent. The previous huge disparity between the high loan interest rates for pesos and the low rates for dollars also had narrowed.

Poland cannot join the EU given its chronic inflation and structural budget deficit. That is because EU countries would then have to shoulder the burden of the so-called inflationary tax generated by Poland and perform transfers to offset its budget deficit.

Hence, price stabilization during the preparations for integration with the EU should be a primary objective of macroeconomic policy. To accomplish this, the monetary policy of the NBP [National Bank of Poland] should be moderately restrictive, and as such understood by the public and approved by virtue of a broad political consensus.

Another problem, and not that of Poland alone, is how to alleviate the inflationary consequences of the growth in foreign-exchange reserves during the transition period. In this case two solutions are possible for the central bank. Either it restricts the growth in these reserves by markedly slashing domestic credit, or it allows an automatic appreciation of the zloty and floats the currency exchange rate to a greater extent. It seems the monetary authorities should not abuse the former solution. That is because limiting the increase in credit can be very harmful. For example, it could impede major restructuring moves and privatization, for which servicing by credit is simply indispensable. In such a situation, floating the currency exchange rate seems to be a much more preferable solution, despite the threat harbored in the attendant deterioration of current-account balance.

Assuring adequate domestic credit for servicing restructuring is a major objective of the present stage of the transformation. The NBP should also assure an adequate increase in bank reserves, with the object of augmenting the capitalization of financial institutions and protecting banks against eventual attacks on zloty assets by speculators. At the same time, the banks should be prompted to maintain a high level of mandatory reserves.

As can be readily seen, the growth of domestic credit and in the capitalization of banks will be objectives that are unusually difficult to accomplish in the presence of preparations for integration with the EU. This is because these preparations will at the same time require, as mentioned above, an unusually restrictive monetary policy.

The Importance of Exchange Rate Stabilization

This conflict can be alleviated only if monetary policy is fundamentally reoriented. That policy must be oriented toward stabilizing the currency exchange rate. A stable exchange rate will become the principal criterion. Then monetary policy will be of a diametrically opposite nature compared with that of the first stage of the transformation. In practice, this means that the NBP will have to maintain somewhat—and initially fairly steep—higher interest rates in Poland compared with those obtained in Germany.

In this way, the Polish economy will be subjected to pressures similar to those existing in, say, the French economy. The growth of inflation worldwide, or even in Germany alone, will force the NBP to raise interest rates to levels higher than those in Germany.

On the other hand, as can be readily seen, a decrease in interest rates in Germany would make it possible to increase the money supply in Poland.

Poland's economic authorities should carefully consider being ready to reorient monetary policy so as to make the stability of the currency exchange rate its principal criterion.

This kind of monetary policy will restrict the possibility of maneuvers with domestic credit, and hence may complicate restructuring and privatization. Certainly, such objectives of monetary policy could also be accomplished by restricting domestic credit. However, that would have to be financed chiefly with foreign capital. But are EU countries ready to make this kind of capital investment in Poland?

This is bound to lead to an important conclusion: Privatization processes and restructuring investments in Poland must be implemented as soon as possible. If possible, before adapting a specific integration program. For, in the future, their servicing by domestic credit will be more difficult, and by foreign credit, uncertain.

The Role of Fiscal Policy

The stabilization of the currency exchange rate and high nominal interest rates could lead to a recession in the presence of deeply rooted, chronic inflation. This would be promoted by the appreciation of the zloty in real terms and the growth of the trade deficit. That is why the paramount objective of both monetary and fiscal policy must be to fight inflation. Inflation of a chronic nature cannot be effectively combatted solely by means of monetary policy. Its effective reduction requires businesses to accept a long-term, reasonably restrictive orientation of stabilization policy. And this requires, of course, that monetary policy also operate with the criterion of an increase in the money supply.

As for combatting chronic inflation, however, that should be done chiefly by means of fiscal policy. Changes in fiscal policy require a longer time frame than changes in monetary policy, which can be accomplished at any moment. Therefore, a program for fiscal consolidation adopted by the economic authorities has to become the best and most durable determinant of the government's anti-inflationary intentions.

As part of the preparations for integration with the EU, the Polish Government must attach special importance to augmenting the budgetary receipts of the state. The implementation of the privatization program and rational reforms of the tax system are thus indispensable. Tax rates in Poland are definitely too high. Reducing the corporate and wage taxes would likely augment budgetary receipts (according to the Laffer-curve concept). That would also improve the tax discipline of businesses and individuals. It would at the same time discourage foreign companies from so-called transfer pricing and alleviate the tendencies to conceal taxable income or to delay tax payments.

The Italian Example

As part of the preparations for integration with the EU, monetary policy should thus be changed. The paramount objective should be to suppress inflation. This should result in creating convenient conditions for adopting the criterion of a stable currency exchange rate, essential after joining the EU. Several basic factors have to be considered when developing the model of a proper monetary policy. First of all, the time frame and the corresponding maximum inflation index have to be determined. The year preceding entry into the EU seems to be a reasonable choice of time frame. The corresponding inflation index can be fixed arbitrarily. From the standpoint of compatibility with general price trends in the EU, however, the annual inflation rate should, of a certainty, not exceed 5 percent. It is obvious that the Maastricht Treaty's criterion of monetary convergence (an inflation rate not exceeding 1.5 percent more than the average of the three lowest rates in member countries) is completely unrealistic and even undesirable for most of the economies in the transformation period. That is because these economies must finance structural changes and privatization processes by means of an appropriate level of domestic credit.

It can be readily calculated that if Poland is to reach a 5-percent inflation level in the year 2004, the average annual rate of decrease in inflation during the 1996-2004 period should be 1.075 percent, and on a monthly scale, 0.156 percent. This is an ambitious objective considering that between January 1994 and September 1995 the average monthly decline in inflation was barely 0.012 percent. Thus, reducing inflation in Poland is a crucial task. The NBP cannot shoulder this burden alone.

An important aspect of the NBP's anti-inflationary policy, however, should be constructing an econometric model for estimating actual and predicted inflation. Such a model should take into account the effect of changes in the money supply and interest rates on price and wage levels and the currency exchange rate. Once Poland joins the EU, it would be desirable for the NBP to adopt a model similar to that followed by the Italian central bank, which focuses on a stable currency exchange rate as an exogenous factor.

Another aspect of anti-inflationary policy should, of course, be determining the permissible scope of changes in M1 and M2 money supply, the monetary base, and the range of fluctuations in interest rates and the currency exchange rate.

Anti-inflationary policy may result in solidly bolstering the credibility of the Polish economic authorities and the stability of the economic system. It is only subsequent to this that monetary policy will have to be focused on stabilizing the currency exchange rate, without which monetary integration with the European Monetary System will be impossible. The directions of monetary policy as part of the program of preparation for membership in the EU afford, in this connection, a very great opportunity for stabilizing the nation's economy. Hence, the second stage of the transformation should be based upon the consistent implementation of precisely such a program.

Romania: New Ambassador to U.S. Discusses Plans

96P20246A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jan 96 p 9

[Interview with Mircea Geoana, newly appointed Romanian ambassador to the United States, by Cristiana Terenche and Catalin C. Harnagea; place and date not given: "The Creation of High-Ranking Diplomatic Posts in Washington Will Help Us in Possible Meetings With American Officials in the Same Category"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ROMANIA LIBERA] Mr. Ambassador, public opinion continues to ask how you got to be appointed Romanian ambassador to Washington, in light of the short time that you have been involved in diplomatic activity and the difficulty of the mission which is before you.

[Geoana] I must confess that this nomination surprised even me. But I believe that the fact that, last year, Mihai Botez, the former ambassador, proposed that I come with him as a counsellor carried some weight. Thus, he was the first one to mention my name in the context of the embassy in the U.S. and I am grateful to him for thinking about taking me on the team. Probably, this recommendation still remained on the books, somewhere, and this was influential in the decision to include me on the list of candidates. In regard to the difficulty of the mission, it is evident that Romanian-American relations in 1996 are more advanced on the political, security, and economic levels and in the perception of Romania than they were in 1993-94. Knowing the power of the media, we will take into consideration the way in which our policy will be reflected in the most powerful press in the world.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Another issue which you will face is that of the diaspora, which is somewhat hostile to the policy of Bucharest...

[Geoana] I do not think that it is hostile. Rather, it is divided. A large number of Romanians living in the U.S. have a constructive attitude in regard to Romania, but also some reservations about the transition. We will try to change the image of Romania, at the level of the U.S. Congress.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] There is a need for a lobby in Congress. How will you approach this delicate component of your mission with only five years of diplomatic experience?

[Geoana] I believe that the very fact that it is five years is an asset, since it is a guarantee of "freshness" in finding more pragmatic solutions. Of course, the advantage is relative, but necessary in the treatment and perception of positive elements. Contributing to this is the experience that I have had in contacts with the press, which makes me a credible advocate for Romania. In addition, this relative youth is a phenomenon which has included the entire mission in the U.S., which is in the process of being "refreshed". Thus, young people will accompany me, some of the best in the ministry; the Mazuru family and the Matache family, who have both had responsible positions in the directorate for the EU and in multilateral diplomacy. Through them and others, who are already at the post, we are aiming to dynamize the forces of the embassy. On the basis of the same criteria, we have also solicited coworkers from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Who makes the decision on these appointments? Were they imposed on you?

[Geoana] It is completely our choice and, in general, we sought, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MAE], within definite constitutional and legal limits, that ambassadors be allowed this preemptive right in the selection of coworkers. We have not had and we have not noted even the slightest form of influencing or of recommending.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] In a period of budgetary crisis, the MAE has been able to supplement the embassy staff in Washington with an additional three positions. Which ones are they?

[Geoana] Although we are passing through a difficult time in regard to finances, these three positions have been approved, since it is a matter of some very important functions: two minister counsellors and one counsellor. In this way, we are trying to cope with the multitudes of problems with which we are confronted in the United States, calling upon people with experience, young people, from [the ministries of] Finance and Trade. We are trying, by the creation of high-ranking diplomatic posts, to come to welcome possible meetings with American officials in the same category.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] You are stressing the youth element. Do you believe that this is sufficient in the diplomatic sphere?

[Geoana] The phenomenon of rejuvenation characterizes many embassies in Washington. For example, the Czech and Polish embassies have been completely redone with people whose age is about 40. The phenomenon reflects the historic moment through which Central Europe is passing, which involves a certain regeneration of the diplomatic presence. There are also disadvantages. One might be the actual experience of heading a diplomatic office. But this can be compensated for by work on a team.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] How have the Americans reacted to your appointment?

[Geoana] It is not very diplomatic to dwell on such reactions. I would say that they have been positive. But, in general, I believe that the best barometer is the impression which our future allies will have after a period of activity in Washington.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] You said, at one time, that the "image" of Romania in the United States will occupy an important place in your activity. Concretely, what are you thinking about?

[Geoana] The "image" problem is important for all Romanian diplomats, no matter where they are. We will act simultaneously on a number of levels: in relations with the press, in Congress, in cultural relations and, in particular, with the diaspora. We will try to involve institutions in the country in this action, in order to exceed the financial limits, especially since we have proposed to organize two activities a week in our embassy to draw attention to ourselves as much as possible.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] With what funds?

[Geoana] This is what I was talking about when I said that we want to involve the people in the country in assisting us. First of all, the MAE obtained supplementary budget funds which will be allocated for this purpose. Second, we are thinking about a project by which we would set up a foundation, but we want to get so-called sponsors both from the country and from the United States. Of course, this will all be in the open because we have nothing to hide.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] We are touching a sensitive spot here. How do you think that you can prevent situations such as those in South Africa, in the "Puma" affair, in which embassy officials were involved?

[Geoana] There is no universal panacea against this social evil. But you should know that Americans are not familiar with "bribes." With them, everything is done by means of the contract and the commission which the middleman receives. Everything is written in black and white, so I believe that such paralyzing phenomena are hard to imagine in Washington.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Parasites or not, they frighten all the foreign investors who come to Romania. As ambassador, how will you respond to those disappointed in their efforts to enter Romania on business?

[Geoana] I have raised this issues, which is known on the policy level. At the most recent interministerial meeting, which dealt with the integration of Romania in the EU structures, the phenomenon of corruption, inertia, and bureaucracy, which had often been noted by foreign businessmen, was discussed. Thus, an interdependent Romanian-U.S. committee was created, under the direction of the MAE, which would create a type of relationship: an American investor and a single interlocutor—this committee. This would avoid the complicated steps necessary for the implementation of an investment project or any project of broad dimensions. I hope that, in this way, we will overcome those difficulties which still keep investors from coming to the country.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Let us move on now to a rather personal area, Mr. Ambassador. What was your wife's reaction to your appointment to this position?

[Geoana] It was a big surprise to both of us. We did not expect it, but since we are a close couple, we have been thinking about how we will share the problems raised by our new situation. Of course, as a good wife and mother, Mihaela was thinking, first of all, about our two children—two and a half years old and five months old. Since we get along very well, I must admit that she helps me very much with organizational matters.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Will Mrs. Geoana be involved in the embassy's business?

[Geoana] Of course, in the social and protocol areas. She is an architect by education and has European-type refinement and good taste, which will help us to attract as many guests as possible to the embassy, especially since, as I have already told you, we have set for ourselves the goal of opening the doors...

[ROMANIA LIBERA] Mr. Geoana, is it true that someone in your family belonged to the former Securitate, as the Romanian media have been saying?

[Geoana] I ascribe such approaches to a certain way of understanding the internal struggle. It is way of looking for a weak point when someone attracts the attention of public opinion.

Indeed, we received the little barbs, which appeared in the press, with smiles on our faces. The whole family was amused. To put things in order, I would like say that my wife's father and almost all her family are engineers in the wood industry. My father-in-law retired from the position of director of a furniture factory. Until 1991, my father was a general in the Ministry of National Defense and Civil Defense commander, and, basically, a construction engineer. The fact that some publications wrote various things about me means that I seemed interesting to them. And in this respect, I consider their attention as a compliment.

Romania: Iliescu 'Stance' on Ethnic Hungarian Prisoners

LD0202173596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyorgy Frunda, senator of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] has held talks with President Ion Iliescu in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] on the issue of the [ethnic] Hungarians who have been imprisoned innocently. Tibor Bogdan reports:

[Bodgan] The talks focused on Pal Cseresznyes, who was given 10 years for kicking a Romanian who was lying on the ground during the bloody events in Marosvasarhely in March 1990 [scuffles between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians], and seven Seklers from Zetelaka [Zetea], who were sentenced in absentia for damaging the local police building and burning the flag of the Communist Party in December 1989 [when Ceaucescu's regime was toppled].

To date, President Iliescu has always refused to sign the clemency plea with reference to his restricted legal scope. Now, however, he has changed his stance by promising that, following consultations with lawyers, he will try to make a positive decision in the matter of the [ethnic] Hungarian prisoners.

Romania: PDSR Head Criticizes PUNR Leadership

AU0302174696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today a delegation of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], consisting of Executive President Adrian Nastase, as well as Vice Presidents Dumitru Ganga, Doru Ioan Taracila, and Secretary General Miron Mitrea, continued its visit in Gorj County. [passage omitted]

During a press conference held here, asked about current relations between the PDSR and the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], Mr. Adrian Nastase said, quote, the PUNR thought that we would tolerate the policy of the fait accomplit and that we will not pick up the gauntlet. We will have to continue to talk things over, provided they take in account that parties having the size of the PDSR have to serve the national interest. No government can function if it is run from two centers, one in Bucharest and one in Cluj [PUNR headquarters]. We are fed up with having to keep giving answers to Mr. Funar [reference to Funar's numerous open letters]. To me, it seems that the PUNR has no leadership and every one of them acts according to his own whim. We do not wish to govern at all costs and, if necessary, we could also resort to early elections, unquote, concluded PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase.

Romania: PUNR Decides To Remain in Government

AU0302181896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The proceedings of the National Council of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] concluded today in Alba Iulia, in accordance with the preestablished agenda. During the eight hours of discussions, the meeting examined and endorsed the PUNR strategy for the forthcoming local elections, with the participants emphasizing the need that all necessary steps be taken to disseminate the PUNR's doctrine and the economic and social program, so as to draw the electorate toward this party. On this occasion, they also decided to conduct an offensive campaign, in the spirit the highest moral principles and decency in discourse.

The National Council decided that the PUNR should remain in the government.

Nevertheless, references to the current political moment also disclosed certain malfunctions of the political protocol between the PUNR and the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], which have led to artificial tensions in the relations between the two parties and which have also affected the executive branch.

The communique released at the end of the Alba Iulia meeting points out that the essential purpose of the political and governing act is the observance of legality, even beyond electoral interests. Likewise, the communique emphasizes that the dissensions arising in the relations between the two parties currently governing the country should be considered normal, given the fact that the two parties, PDSR and PUNR, are addressing themselves to the same electoral segment.

Also today, the National Council authorized the Standing Bureau of this political grouping to designate the future minister of telecommunications.

Slovenia: No-Confidence Vote in Thaler Demanded

AU0202100596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 1 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of 11 deputies in the State Chamber today filed a request for the interpellation in the work and responsibility of Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. They stress that they are requesting the interpellation because of, as they state among other things, the personal incapability of the foreign minister, which has resulted in a deadlock in Slovenia's negotiations with neighboring countries and the EU. A notice about this has been issued by the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Optimistic About Government

AU0202191696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 2 Feb 96

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Sandi Frelih, place not given, on 2 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Drnovsek] The coalition, naturally, has shrunk in terms of deputies. It can secure a majority in parliament with the support of individual independent deputies or other deputies who will vote independently. I believe that the coalition can function and soon there will be abundant opportunities to test this. One such opportunity will also be the interpellations that some are instigating now, at the very beginning, for example, the interpellation against Foreign Minister Thaler or the call for the replacement of State Chamber Speaker Skoljc, to destabilize the government and create a political crisis. I believe that the coalition will be able to fend off these attacks, too, although it might be difficult sometimes. We may have to grind our teeth a little.

What matters now is the continued functioning of the state, that we maintain the necessary stability to be able to pursue matters further.

I am a little surprised that the opposition has immediately launched so many attacks with the blatant intention of destabilizing the political situation. Take the sphere of foreign policy, for example; by doing this they are actually stabbing our country in the back, as it is negotiating with Italy and the EU. At the same time as these awkward moments and points, the opposition is attacking us at home to create political havoc. However, I am convinced that we will survive and that we will solve the problems and ensure the further functioning of the state.

[Frelih] Asked whether any additional personnel changes could be expected in the government, Prime Minister Drnovsek replied that the latest events had demonstrated that changes can sometimes happen unexpectedly. However, he believes that the present reconstruction will suffice.

Slovenia: SDSS Expected SKD To Quit Coalition

AU0202104796 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 31 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Dejan Pusenjak: "SDSS Leader: Wrong Party Left Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 30 January—Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS], said at the news conference today that the wrong party had left the coalition. Namely, the SDSS expected and had hoped that the Christian Democrats [SKD], not the United List, would have left the coalition.

Due to the positions that the United List acquired in the past, the party can, in Jansa's opinion, formally be in the opposition, however, in reality—in banks, insurance companies, the police, the crime department, and other important centers of decision making—it has maintained its power. The SDSS is of the opinion that the departure of the United List from the coalition was planned and that the one who had formed the grand coalition also influenced this decision. In the future, the LDS will try to cash in on the success story, while the United List will play up the failure story. If SKD is rejoicing the acceptance of its proposal for a two-fold coalition it is forgetting, Jansa believes, that it all took place during the electoral campaign when the departure of the United List has different consequences than it would have had earlier. According to Jansa, the purpose of the departure is double: to keep SKD in the coalition and neutralize the growth of the SDSS. He thinks that the SKD will have to state whether it insists on its proposal for early elections—the reasons for them have not changed, rather, the proposal gained additional weight—or not.

As Jansa said, no serious analyst abroad could conclude that the situation on the Slovene political scene has not been destabilized with the departure of the United List from the government coalition. For that reason, the consequence of the departure is Slovenia's deteriorated international position in the relations with neighbors and its rapprochement with the European Union. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: SKD Favors Thaler No-Confidence Vote

AU0202191896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 2 Feb 96

[Report on a new conference by Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, by Robert Skerjanc in Ljubljana on 2 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] As Jansa said in his introduction, the party's assessment is that over the past few days our country has become very much destabilized internally and internationally. The ruling coalition is losing deputies daily. With 43 deputies in parliament it is already a minority government. With the departure of the Slovene Christian Democrats it would only have a third of the deputies.

We are constantly being presented with different names for the ministers just as though the coalition were picking them out of a telephone directory. If things continue in this vein, Jansa says, soon all that will be left will be the prime minister and the incapable ministers. It is precisely because of this that the party does not understand why the ruling coalition will not agree to early elections, as they believe that this is the only neutral way out of the deadlock for Slovenia.

On the other hand, prompted by the desire to stop the damage, primarily in the foreign affairs area, the party has decided in favor of the no-confidence vote in Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. According to Jansa, a more mature person should be picked for this post who at least will not do any damage in foreign affairs. They also point out that with the interpellation they will also force a general debate on our foreign policy, which is something that the State Chamber speaker has been resisting putting on the agenda for over 46 days. The party fears the repetition of the Tajnikar scenario; namely, that Drnovsek, because he does not want any debate on his responsibility for foreign policy, will propose Thaler's replacement himself.

Slovenia: Christian Democrats Undecided on Vote

AU0202191996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 2 Feb 96

[Report by Gojko Bervar on a news conference by the Slovene Christian Democrats in Ljubljana on 2 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday's agreement within the government coalition yielded the nomination of ministerial candidates for the remaining three ministries that were left vacant with the departure of the ministers of the United List of Social Democrats from the coalition.

The confirmed suspicion that the prime minister is not satisfied with the justice minister suggests that the above changes are probably not the last among the ministerial portfolios. As we were told, in yesterday's negotiations Drnovsek also offered a post high up in the Justice Ministry to the [Slovene] Christian Democrats. For the time being, these are the only personnel changes known, but changes at other levels in the four ministries, Economics, Science, Labor, and Culture, will reportedly be discussed next week. [passage omitted]

Party President Lojze Peterle avoided answering how the Christian Democrats will act in the interpellation against the foreign minister and the demand for the resignation of the State Chamber speaker, claiming that these questions have not been discussed yet. However, news that a joint coalition foreign policy working group has started to operate suggests that a successful agreement within this group could yet save Thaler's head.

Slovenia: United List Touts Social Democratic Policy

AU0202104996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 1 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the United List's news conference at midday Miran Potrc, head of the party's deputies club, among other things, concurred with the assessment of President of the Social Democrats Janez Jansa that the United List's departure from the government had destabilized the political situation in the country.

Party secretary general Dusan Kumer emphasized that the main reason that the party had left the government was the fact that the government had abandoned a dialogue with the classes most affected by its measures. Here is a report by Sandi Frelih:

[Begin recording] In the opposition the United List will support good government proposals, Miran Potrc said. However, now that it is no longer in the government it will be able to champion social democratic policy more clearly, in which it has been limited so far by the inevitable agreements within the coalition. He said that the party's deputies will do all they can to draw attention to the program principles of the government parties on issues where there are great differences between them.

The United List has no doubt about the lack of unity of the two parties, as a result of which the Christian Democrats [SKD] will have to become very liberal or the Liberal Democracy very right-wing.

Potrc believes that cooperation among the opposition parties is inevitable, as they will have to prove that their criticism of the government was not sheer demagogy.

Dusan Kumer, however, says that the times of what he called Peterle's button accordion [as heard] have returned in cadre policy and that a country that is unable to collect taxes cannot constantly shift the burden on the employees and pensioners. The two men also announced numerous legal projects but refused to divulge any details. [end recording]

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The first topic was the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Milosevic said and added that both he and Christopher had been optimistic about it.

The second topic were bilateral relations, which are being gradually promoted, Milosevic said and added that they had been optimistic about this issue as well.

Christopher thanked Milosevic on the reception and said he was pleased to have the opportunity to come to Belgrade.

He said that his basic task in the tour of the former Yugoslavia was to secure a further implementation of the Dayton Accords.

Christopher said he was very pleased with the president's new assurances of the determination to implement the Dayton Agreement.

Christopher said that he was leaving with the belief that the implementation of the agreement would continue and that he hoped that the gradual promotion of bilateral relations would continue.

FRY: Milosevic, U.S. Secretary of State Address Media

AU0402152496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Feb 96

[Report by Daniela Spasic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. They discussed the course of implementation of the peace process agreed in Dayton and the possibilities to speed it up. Richard Holbrooke, head of the U.S. negotiating team for the former Yugoslavia and assistant secretary of state, and State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns arrived in Belgrade together with Warren Christopher.

After their two-hour talks in the building of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia, President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made statements. Daniela Spasic reports:

[Spasic] The journalists were first addressed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic:

[Begin Milosevic recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I am very pleased to have this opportunity to greet Warren Christopher. We attach great importance to the fact that this is the first visit by a U.S. secretary of state after five years. This is a symbolic sign of changes in relations between the two countries. We held very sincere and open talks. We exchanged views on all important issues in the region, and our bilateral relations.

We spoke generally about two important issues: One of them is the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The other topic was our bilateral relations, which we have concluded are progressing step-by-step. Both of us were optimistic with regard to this issue.

I am pleased that we have met and I would like to welcome Christopher and his aides once again. [end recording]

[Spasic] The journalists were then addressed by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. [passage omitted]

The talks between Slobodan Milosevic and Warren Christopher were also attended by FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, and Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European issues.

FRY: Radio Statement on Christopher-Milosevic Talks

AU0402161496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 4 Feb 96

["Statement" on the talks held between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Belgrade on 4 February—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who, accompanied by his aides, arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia this morning. Secretary of State Christopher was welcomed at the airport by Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

During the cordial and open talks, which were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, President Milosevic expressed pleasure that a U.S. secretary of state is again visiting our country after several years. The arrival of Secretary Christopher, President Milosevic stressed, undoubtedly manifests the progress achieved in the Yugoslav-U.S. bilateral cooperation and the successful course of the peace process in Bosnia that has achieved positive results in its implementation after the signing of the agreement in Dayton.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia attaches great importance to this visit and believes that it will contribute to the intensification of comprehensive cooperation between the two countries on an equal footing and to the reaffirmation of their traditionally friendly relations.

Political dialogue and the constructive approaches by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States were the decisive factors in achieving peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is why continuation of this dialogue and coordination of approaches to the most

The first topic was the full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Milosevic said and added that both he and Christopher had been optimistic about it.

The second topic were bilateral relations, which are being gradually promoted, Milosevic said and added that they had been optimistic about this issue as well.

Christopher thanked Milosevic on the reception and said he was pleased to have the opportunity to come to Belgrade.

He said that his basic task in the tour of the former Yugoslavia was to secure a further implementation of the Dayton Accords.

Christopher said he was very pleased with the president's new assurances of the determination to implement the Dayton Agreement.

Christopher said that he was leaving with the belief that the implementation of the agreement would continue and that he hoped that the gradual promotion of bilateral relations would continue.

FRY: Milosevic, U.S. Secretary of State Address Media

AU0402152496 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Feb 96

[Report by Daniela Spasic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. They discussed the course of implementation of the peace process agreed in Dayton and the possibilities to speed it up. Richard Holbrooke, head of the U.S. negotiating team for the former Yugoslavia and assistant secretary of state, and State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns arrived in Belgrade together with Warren Christopher.

After their two-hour talks in the building of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia, President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made statements. Daniela Spasic reports:

[Spasic] The journalists were first addressed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic:

[Begin Milosevic recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I am very pleased to have this opportunity to greet Warren Christopher. We attach great importance to the fact that this is the first visit by a U.S. secretary of state after five years. This is a symbolic sign of changes in relations between the two countries. We held very sincere and open talks. We exchanged views on all important issues in the region, and our bilateral relations.

We spoke generally about two important issues: One of them is the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The other topic was our bilateral relations, which we have concluded are progressing step-by-step. Both of us were optimistic with regard to this issue.

I am pleased that we have met and I would like to welcome Christopher and his aides once again. [end recording]

[Spasic] The journalists were then addressed by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. [passage omitted]

The talks between Slobodan Milosevic and Warren Christopher were also attended by FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, and Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European issues.

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The powers of the future International Tribunal's office have not been made precise yet. The work regarding its opening, as we were told in the Ministry of Justice, is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The permission for opening the International Tribunal's office, despite the fact that the government does not consider it competent for establishing responsibility for war crimes, has been termed in the Ministry of Justice as a "pragmatic gesture that fits the modalities of cooperation with the tribunal." [passage omitted]

The FRY Ministry of Justice claims that when experts from the Tribunal start coming after the opening of the office, they will have to behave in line with the Federal Constitution and local laws. One can conclude from this view that was presented by Uros Klikovac, federal minister of justice and deputy federal prime minister, at a news conference last week that Yugoslavia will continue to adhere to the local legal regulations on the extradition of its citizens despite the fact that the court's statute and rules of procedure (according to which that court operates) threaten the introduction of sanctions against the country that refuses to cooperate. [passage omitted]

FRY: Markovic Interviewed on JUL Platform

AU0202162696 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 96 pp 26-29

[Interview with JUL Directorate President Mirjana Markovic by Branka Plamenac in Belgrade; date not given: "If Djukanovic Says It Will Not Pass, It Will Not Pass"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Plamenac] It is indisputable that you are one of the most powerful persons in Serbia today. Is your political power based on the fact that you are the wife of the president of the Republic, Mr. Milosevic, or that you are the leader of the Yugoslav United Left [JUL], which is very much present in the political life?

[Markovic] Honestly speaking, it is very difficult for me to answer this question. I do not think that my power is as great as is generally considered. If I have political influence, and I do not doubt that there is some, it is probably a combination of many factors, of those you mentioned and some others, such as, for example, that I am also an intellectual to a certain extent who is very much present in public and political life. This influence might arise primarily from the ideas I support, or, perhaps, especially from the manner in which I present them.

[Plamenac] This opinion has been formed on the basis of the fact that many of your party members, although it is not a parliamentary party, are ministers in both the Serbian and Federal Governments. You have one prime minister, a certain number of ambassadors, district chairmen, managers of large companies, and members of the boards of directors of important state institutions.

[Markovic] Your question gives me the opportunity to deny before a broad audience some incorrect facts and remove some misunderstandings that appear in the press regarding the JUL position. First of all, JUL is not in the parliament because it was established after the parliamentary election on 23 July 1994.

[Plamenac] You participated in the election as the United Left.

[Markovic] Yes, but this is not the same thing. This was the original form, the beginning of our organization, and it really has nothing to do with JUL. You can believe this. I am not saying this in order to eliminate any criticism that could possibly be directed against the Yugoslav left, but because JUL is something completely different from the initial association of three parties. JUL is a large movement in which there are 23 parties oriented to the left and a large number of individuals who joined our movement on their own. I, for example, joined JUL collectively. The number of those who joined it individually is now bigger than the number of those who joined it collectively. Since that time, there have been no elections. We shall participate in the next elections that take place.

The fact that many JUL members have important positions in political, economic, and financial institutions or are eminent personalities in cultural institutions does not prove that JUL has succeeded in placing them there. Most of them held their positions when they joined the leftist movement. We have not appointed a single minister or manager.

[Plamenac] Because of the impressive number of JUL members in prominent positions people are not sure whether JUL is an opposition party or the ruling party in Serbia. If it is an opposition party, who does JUL oppose?

[Markovic] We are in opposition to everybody. Our political opponents are political parties—regardless of whether they are on the left or the right—and all those who oppose the equity of nations and an equal status of all people, all who support war, political hierarchy, the exploitation of people, poverty, and an isolated and lonely Yugoslavia.

[Plamenac] You say that you oppose supporters of the war. Did the ruling SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], led by your husband, not support and start the war? Did you oppose him at that time too?

[Markovic] I have already given you an answer to that question.

[Plamenac] How do you interpret the huge, almost aggressive presence of both your party and you, yourself, in all official state media, especially on the Radio-Television of Serbia, a presence that does not correspond to the election results? Is this a misuse of the press and television from the position of power you have, or do reporters and editors simply flatter you?

[Markovic] Regarding our representation in the press, we are mostly present in the so-called opposition press. We do not have any competition there. And they certainly do not flatter me and do not want to do me a favor. What is more, they do not want to help me at all. On the contrary. The whole of the opposition press is primarily engaged in studying JUL and the personalities among its members. We are considerably less represented in the non-opposition press. I have rarely seen us in NOVOSTI, never in EKSPRES POLITIKA, whereas POLITIKA is very balanced in reporting on what is going on in JUL. Regarding the television, this is not our doing. We have never asked anybody to invite us. Personally, if you believe me, I do not want to appear on television at all. This is something my friends and people in my environment and my family know very well. I would give anything in the world not to appear on television. I do not like to speak, I do not like to be present there, and I do not like to be photographed. This interview is also a burden to me. [passage omitted]

[Plamenac] Your articles in DUGA announce, as a rule, personnel changes in the Serbian leadership. How is it that you, the leader of a rival party, can influence personnel changes in the leadership of the ruling SPS?

[Markovic] If I tell you that this is not true, you will not believe me. I shall not mention any more names in my articles. I have decided to describe phenomena. My role in the appointment of some SPS politicians to certain political positions is completely negligible. I do not think that you believe me, but I find it inappropriate to explain to you that I did not have any influence on their position. I have never done this.

[Plamenac] You and your husband are engaged in two different political parties. This is an unusual situation. I have always wanted to ask you the following question: If we consider the possibility that your party wins in the next election, and your husband's party loses, does this mean that the final aim of your political engagement is to depose your husband?

[Markovic] We want the idea we support to win. The struggle for these ideas will in my opinion last for a long time. I do not pay much attention to election results, neither this nor next year, and I am telling you this quite frankly and seriously. Our ideas belong to the future. It is claimed that the 21st century will be the century of the political left, science, and women. It is only natural, however, that—especially young people—in the JUL think that it is necessary to participate in elections, and we shall do that. Regarding the second part of the question, I do not think that we shall win, I do not have that impression, and nor do I think that socialists will lose much in Serbia and in Montenegro compared to the previous election. This is what I think at the moment. There will be no change of political positions in the next one and a half years. Since my high-school and university times I have been politically active and have had my political resolve. I have remained faithful to my ideas and the positions I have supported all of my life. Furthermore, I can claim to be a Yugoslav and a leftist politician. I was this before too, I am this now, and this is my life, this is my choice and I shall remain on this side until the end of my life.

[Plamenac] You have recently been supporting peace. We in Montenegro heard nothing about this at the time when Dubrovnik was attacked, when Vukovar and Sarajevo were destroyed?

[Markovic] I was the first one in Yugoslavia to respond to that. I even published a text about it.

[Plamenac] Your political power was great, why did you not undertake political actions, issue statements on television, publish commentaries, or give interviews?

[Markovic] I have to tell you that I was in the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ] leadership at that time. This is the only party that did everything to support peace. This is injustice toward communists. A really big injustice. I have now proposed that all statements, letters, threats, or requests made by the SK-PJ since 1990 be collected. I wrote a text about Dubrovnik and published it in INTERVJU, which was transmitted by all foreign papers. In the autumn of 1990 the SK-PJ published a proclamation, which we pasted on poles, threw out of planes, in which we warned of the danger of war and the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

[Plamenac] You were in the leadership of the "party of generals" (SK-PJ). Why could you not influence your party friends, generals of the Yugoslav People's Army?

[Markovic] Why would I not have done this? I would have given my life to save Yugoslavia and to avoid this war.

[Plamenac] Does this mean that you were powerless toward generals, who waged the war, and toward your husband, Mr. Milosevic?

[Markovic] Absolutely. And he did not have decisive influence in 1990, either. I wrote and spoke very much against war, but nothing was published in the press. The media were blocked. [passage omitted]

[Plamenac] How will the federal state function in your opinion if there are two different economic systems in Serbia and Montenegro? Montenegro is just about to complete the privatization of the economy, whereas the privatization process has been stopped in Serbia?

[Markovic] I doubt that it will come to a complete privatization in Montenegro. Full privatization does not exist anywhere in the world. This is a superseded model of economic and civilizational organization of a society. It is from the first half of the 19th century. This is why I doubt that Montenegro will allow such a civilizational backwardness and lack of functionality. Regarding Serbia, I do not think that it opposes privatization. This is simply incorrect. Neither Serbia nor JUL are against privatization. We support all forms of property. How could we oppose privatization, if JUL has the most businessmen among its members? How could we oppose the privatization of the economy if our most prominent members, both in the party leadership and in our regional branches, are businessmen? This is not true. I do not think that full privatization will be carried out in Montenegro, since this form belongs to history. I have to tell you that nor do I think that the atmosphere in Serbia is against this process, including the ruling party, the official state, and the JUL. A measure for privatization will be found here too. I hope that Serbia and Montenegro will in that respect find a common denominator, for the sake of Yugoslavia.

[Plamenac] Will Slobodan Milosevic run for the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the next election? Is a change to the federal Constitution being prepared for that purpose with the aim of enhancing the presidential function, as is claimed among the public? There are announcements already that Montenegro will not support the changes to the Constitution?

[Markovic] Honestly speaking, we have not discussed changes to the Constitution yet, at least not in a way that would have pointed to the possibility that these changes would be radical. Regarding him, we have not discussed this matter yet.

[Plamenac] How do you assess the chances of JUL in Montenegro, especially in the light of Djukanovic's statement that JUL "will not pass."

[Markovic] If the Montenegrin prime minister decides that it will not pass, it will not pass then. What can we do?!

[Plamenac] How can he decide about it? The decision is hopefully taken by voters in elections?

[Markovic] He has the power. JUL, and the left in general, have little chance in some other republics of the former Yugoslavia, since they have no access to the public. If the official politics of the Montenegrin leadership is to shut the door for JUL, it will be like that.

[Plamenac] What do you think about Milo Djukanovic, who recognized himself in one of your articles? He is the only Montenegrin leader who sharply opposed the strengthening of JUL in Montenegro, which has made him very popular there.

[Markovic] This opposition is his choice and his right.

[Plamenac] What do you think about Momir Bulatovic, the Montenegrin president, who is said not to take a single political decision regarding Montenegro without Slobodan Milosevic's consent.

[Markovic] I cannot assess this. I would not say it is like that. It might be true, but I do not know that.

[Plamenac] Do you recognize the Montenegrin nation?

[Markovic] Yes, I do. I think that Montenegrins and Serbs are very similar, but I think there are differences that entitle the Montenegrins to identify themselves as a separate nation. Just as Croats, Macedonian, Slovenes can. All former Yugoslav nations are very similar.

[Plamenac] Do you think that Montenegro can have an equal status in the federation despite its [smaller] size and economic power? How would your party react if Montenegrins adopted the decision to secede from the federal state?

[Markovic] First of all, I think that it should have equal status, since equity does not arise from the size of an object. If the people of Montenegro decided to leave Yugoslavia, JUL's attitude would be resignation.

[Plamenac] Do you support Avramovic, the National Bank president, and his program? Why did you completely oppose the adoption of "Program 2," or, rather, the part of it related to privatization?

[Markovic] First of all, we did not oppose his program. Secondly, we support our own program. We have been working on our own program, we have in fact already completed it, but we have not prepared it for publishing, for presentation. I think that this will be the best economic and social program in Yugoslavia. I will tell you in short what it contains. We support all forms of property, especially the new forms brought by the new era. These are mixed property, socially-owned property, in other words all the achievements of the modern age. We do not oppose private property, we do not oppose the opening of the market, but we think that it should be regulated in the way in which this is regulated in all developed economies in the world. The free market, in the sense in which it is understood by our people, especially uneducated people, does not exist anywhere.

[Plamenac] What was your reaction to the torture of the Sandzak Muslims by the police, in Bijelo Polje? The JUL also wants Muslims as its members.

[Markovic] I do not really know the facts about these events. I have heard about it both from the Serbs and the Muslims many times. People have told me about it. I assume this is true, but it is also possible that it is not true. I do not have an attitude about it on the basis of facts. If it is true, all those people who hurt the Muslims, in the slightest way, physically or morally, should be made responsible. It is the duty of us all to require that the people who humiliated, offended, or tortured these people be made responsible.

[Plamenac] There were also political party leaders among them.

[Markovic] If this is true, anyone who contributed to it, directly or indirectly, should be made responsible. An analysis of the situation has to be made in order to arrive at the truth. I do not differentiate between the nationalities in Sandzak, and in general I do not divide the Serbs from the Muslims, I do not give advantage to anybody. The whole of my generation was raised this way.

[Plamenac] Arrests and beating of political leaders have become aspects of the political struggle against people who have a different opinion. The same thing happened to Vuk and Danica Draskovic, and you did not respond in the proper way.

[Markovic] We did not know about it, but as soon as Vuk contacted me, when he sent me a letter, these methods were abolished.

[Plamenac] Does this mean that you had influence on your husband.

[Markovic] I did in that case.

[Plamenac] What do you think about the opposition in Serbia and Montenegro?

[Markovic] I think that opposition parties do not have a political profile. Generally speaking, both left and right parties are still in search of an identity. They are recognized by their leaders, not by their ideas, which is the reason for their short life. This might be a stage that cannot be avoided at the beginning of the creation of a parliamentary society. I can see the future of both Serbia and Montenegro in a left and a right bloc. I do not believe in the center. It is very boring in my opinion. I cannot imagine either Serbs or Montenegrins, especially Montenegrins, in the center. They are very radical and not inclined to the political center. I do not want to say that I am giving advantage to the left bloc compared to the right, but that I expect the left front to be more powerful than the right in Montenegro. I had considered Montenegrins to be big supporters of parties on the left. I was surprised by the fact that they did not identify themselves as supporters of the leftist movement. I have the impression that they are sleepy, as if they have been confused by history. They really surprised me; more than the Serbs. I expected from Montenegrins a more powerful and finer political activity, I did not expect it to be better organized, but in any case more intensive.

[Plamenac] Let us return to the forthcoming election. Will JUL participate in it on its own, or in a coalition?

[Markovic] Presently I think that we shall participate alone.

[Plamenac] Which group of voters are you counting on in the election, since the ruling SPS is also of leftist orientation?

[Markovic] I do not think that we shall put at stake the support of the SPS voters for their party. I have not thought about these aspects up to now. You are making me think about it. I count on young, educated people, the poor, minorities....

[Plamenac] Is there a conflict between the JUL and the SPS? It is claimed that you are not beloved by the SPS because of your influence on personnel changes.

[Markovic] This is possible, but it is possible that those who do not like me are louder than those who like me. Who knows? I am not preoccupied by this.

[Plamenac] Have you had problems with your husband, since some SPS members have become JUL members?

[Markovic] No, never really. I could not do anything if I were not convinced of my husband's support for my work. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Serbia: Russian LDP Delegates Meet With Serb Radicals

AU0402214196 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jan 96 p 9

[Report by V.D.: "Everyone Favors 'Great Russia'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] of Russia, led by Leontiy

Archipov, secretary general of the party and deputy in the Russian Duma, and Galina Aleksandrova, wife of the party's leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, is paying a 5-day visit to the Serbian Radical Party.

The LDP has arrived in Yugoslavia to intensify cooperation with the Serbian Radicals. In contrast to some earlier visits by the representatives of the second largest party in the Russian parliament, neither Vladimir Zhirinovskiy nor members of the visiting delegation had this time been contacted by any of the Yugoslav officials even though their visit to our country was mentioned in the state media. [passage omitted]

According to the LDP Secretary General Leontiy Archipov, at the forthcoming presidential elections in June, Zhirinovskiy will be one of the most serious candidates along with Boris Yeltsin (or someone from his team) and the representative of the communists.

In case he wins, his political aides claim, cooperation with Yugoslavia will improve and real chances for renewing a Great Russia will be created. Asked about Russia's relations with the West in case Zhirinovskiy wins, the wife of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (who has been declared person non grata in many countries) said: "I think that all countries will do their utmost to find a way to establish contacts and mutual understanding with Russia."

Serbia: Seselj Says Milosevic Wants To Run Again

AU0502082596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Yugoslavia Is To Get New Constitution and President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party, stated yesterday that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] are working intensively on a new FRY Constitution.

Seselj said that Milosevic is personally interested in that, because, as he said, according to the existing Constitution, at the end of Milosevic's mandate in 1997, he would not have the right to run for the presidency of Serbia again. According to Seselj, Milosevic also wants to secure the legal basis for his candidacy for the post of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Seselj also claims that in addition to this, Milosevic is making "terrible concessions to the political leaders of some ethnic minorities living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially to the Albanians and the major powers with regard to the internal administrative changes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly in Serbia."

"According to this plan, which is currently being worked on and has already been put on paper, Milosevic plans to divide the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into four, possibly five federal units: Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo-Metohija and possibly Sandzak.

Serbia: Critical Humanitarian Situation Reported

LD0402133996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1201 GMT 4 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 4 (TANJUG)—The Red Cross, the Serbian office for refugees, and other state institutions warn that humanitarian supplies have long been exhausted and that about 700,000 refugees and exilees in Serbia and host families are in the most difficult predicament since two years ago.

According to figures of the Yugoslav Red Cross, Serbia has 450,719 refugees from the period 1991-1995 and 286,959 exilees from the republic of Serb Krajina who arrived in August 1995.

Red Cross warehouses were practically emptied six months ago, while international humanitarian organizations for now only evaluate and assess the situation in the field in order to appear before donors in mid-February and ask for new funds for their work in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Within international humanitarian aid and bilateral cooperation, about 18,000 tons of food, including 54 percent flour, arrived from August 1995 until January 1996.

When this amount of aid is placed in proportion with the number of refugees, it stems that one person monthly gets 17.5 kilos of humanitarian aid consisting of one liter of table oil, one kilo of sugar, two cans of corned beef, three cans of sardines, and 10-15 kg of flour.

Packages with articles for personal hygiene arrive only occasionally, and warm clothing and winter footwear very seldom.

The main reason for this disproportion in needs and possibilities lies in the number of refugees and exiled persons registered by international humanitarian organizations.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the humanitarian office of the European Union, or the world food program have on their lists 160,000 refugees and 175,000 expelled persons, while the Yugoslav Red Cross has 185,294 active users of aid among refugees and 289,438 among expelled persons.

Moreover, about 50,000 persons from Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Republic—from Grahovo, Glamoc, Mrkonjic Grad, Drvar) should be added to this list, the

Red Cross said, as they have no refugee status but use aid provided by the Red Cross.

With the return of peace to Bosnia, it has been announced that refugees will be returning home soon, raising the hopes of refugees and exilees.

Unfortunately, both the Yugoslav authorities and representatives of international humanitarian organizations estimate that refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be leaving for their homes much more slowly than it would seem, since much more is needed for their safe return than what is being offered at this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia.

Serbia: Committee Against Hague Indictments Meets

LD0302185396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1212 GMT 3 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Feb (SRNA)—The Committee for the Protection of Rights against the Hague War Crimes Tribunal began its first session in the Trade Union Hall in Belgrade this morning.

The session is being attended by committee members Veselin Retic, Smilja Avramov, Momo Kapor, Veljko Guberina, Rajko Petrov Nogo, Milic od Macve, Mirko Jovic, Vojislav Lubarda, Gojko Djogo, Tanasije Mladenovic, and Andrija Biorcevic, who will take part in its proceedings.

It is expected that Milan Vujin, president of the Bar Council of Serbia, academic Milorad Ekmecic, and writer Slobodan Rakitic will also speak at the meeting.

Also present are writer Yuriy Loshchich [name as received], the vice chairman of the Russian Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Serbs, and representatives of several patriotic societies, movements, and parties.

The Committee for Protection of Rights against the Hague War Crimes Tribunal was founded around Christmas 1995 by 40 intellectuals whose aim is to raise their voice against the abuse of the law, which should bring about the resignations of the prosecutor and judges, and make the UN resolution on the establishment of the tribunal redundant.

Serbia: Volunteer Guard Refutes Recent Reports

AU0402185596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by V. Mt.: "'Tigers' Are Not Going to Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The headquarters of the Serbian Volunteer Guard in Belgrade has denied reports that have appeared in some domestic newspapers that the "Tigers" will be moving to Kosovo and that they will set up a new center in Urosevac.

The stories about the Serbian Volunteer Guard moving to Urosevac are sheer invention as the Guard is stationed only where there is a war and where the Serb people need help. And this is not Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija], said Borislav Pelevic, acting president of the Party of Serbian Unity and major in the Serbian Volunteer Guard.

He said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has its army and police and that therefore there was no need for the Serbian Volunteer Guard to operate anywhere on the Yugoslav territory.

"Members of the Guard, in accordance with the signed peace agreement, will be demobilized from the Republic of Serb Krajina, but will be the last to leave Srem and Baranja. If by any chance the war starts in that region again, the 'Tigers' will again take part in the defense of the Serb people," Pelevic said.

Serbia: Opposition Parties To Present United Front

LD0202232796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2237 GMT 2 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jagodina, 2 Feb (TANJUG)—Zoran Djindjic, the leader of the Democratic Party, said at a round table of the party's members and supporters in Jagodina this evening that four parliamentary opposition parties will put forward one list at the elections at local level and for the federal assembly. If we win, we will agree that no opposition leader should take any position, Djindjic said.

He stressed that the opposition parties were "under huge pressure and scrutiny of the ruling party," but he added: "We are like a spring; the more they press us, the stronger we are."

The Democrats' leader announced that the opposition "will soon hold an open air parliamentary session in front of the Serbian Assembly building," and that will be the first parliamentary session in open air in Europe.

Djindjic also announced a big meeting in March, which Serbian opposition parties will organize together in Belgrade.

He said that during the election campaign the leaders of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, the Serbian Renewal Movement, and the Serbian Radical Party will hold joint meetings in 14 regions in Serbia.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Ethnic Albanians Disappointed by EU Stand

LD0302134696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1319 GMT 3 Feb 96

[Report by Djordje Jeftic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Feb. 3 (TANJUG)—Leaders of the secessionist movement in Kosovo have interpreted as a form of betrayal this week's decision by the European Union [EU] not to connect the issue of the normalization of its relations with Yugoslavia with the problem of this southern Serbian province populated with ethnic Albanians.

With this stand, the E.U. ministers in Brussels on Wednesday practically confirmed that Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) was an inseparable part of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia's internal affair, shattering the secessionists' expectations that this issue could be given an international dimension.

'The latest vote in Brussels jeopardizes not only the independence and the republic but even the autonomy of Kosovo,' commented Skeljzen Malici, a prominent Kosovo publicist who has in the recent years become the permanent interpreter of Albanian separatist wishes.

In the latest number of the ethnic Albanian review ZERI, Malici said resignedly that 'recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in fact implies recognition of its existing borders and, therefore, also of Kosovo as a part of Serbia.'

The E.U. ministers in Brussels postponed their decision on a normalization of relations with Yugoslavia pending the mutual recognitions of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians has been under way in Kosmet for decades. Separatists urge the proclamation of a so-called Republic of Kosovo, secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia, and annexation to Albania.

Ethnic Albanians are a national minority which, under the Yugoslav Constitution and international norms, has not right to self-determination or secession. Foreign officials made this fact clear to ethnic Albanians on several occasions.

The Albanian minority in Kosovo does not recognize the authority and laws of Serbia or Yugoslavia, refuses to work or attend schools, pay taxes, and also boycotted the multi-party elections in 1990 and 1992.

Ethnic Albanians enjoy all civil rights in Yugoslavia. They have Albanian-language schools and universities, papers and reviews, and radio and television programs.

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